【作者】 陈红；

【导师】 尚杰；

【作者基本信息】 东北林业大学 ， 林业经济管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 农业是国民经济的一个特殊部门，一方面它是国民经济的基础，是其他产业发展的前提，社会效益显著，另一方面，它又是经济效益低下的弱质产业。所以世界上多数国家的各级政府对农业不同时期的发展都实施不同的支持政策。中国的农业产业发展到了受环境和资源制约相对严重的时期，探讨节约型农业的发展模式是中国中央政府和各级地方政府的首要任务。循环型农业是循环经济的理念应用于农业生产，在农业生产中减少资源、物质的投入量和减少废弃物的产出排放量，实现节约型农业和可持续性发展农业的现实可行的模式。循环型农业发展的必要性学术界已经达成了共识，但是如何实现农业生产方式的转变?政府在推动循环型农业的发展进程中扮演什么角色?尤其是地方政府的经济行为如何影响循环型农业的发展进程，对这些问题的研究显有所见，所以对于上述一系列问题的研究具有十分重要的理论与现实意义。在市场经济条件下循环型农业能否实现的关键是经济主体的利益博弈，其中地方政府行为的转变是促进农业循环经济发展的关键，地方政府在我国一方面是国家行政序列中的一个环节，另一方面是地方经济的投资人和保护人。这种双重身份使得地方政府在经济发展中居于特殊的地位，它既是中央政府的执行者，又是相对独立区域经济行为主体。本论文将地方政府行为纳入循环型农业发展进程的经济学分析视野，采用历史和逻辑相结合的方法来考察循环型农业发展进程中的地方政府行为。运用循环经济理论、公共选择理论、新制度经济学理论、发展经济学理论、市场失灵与外部性理论、政府经济学理论，按照“政府行为与市场行为互补”的研究思路，采用实证研究与规范研究相结合的方法，对新时期我国循环型农业的内涵与要求、地方政府在循环型农业发展进程中的利益、绩效、行为方式、行为准则进行深入系统的研究；并通过对国内外地方政府在推动循环经济发展进程中行为的比较研究，提出了加快我国实现循环型农业发展的地方政府行为优化的措施。论文从循环型农业的理论特征入手，通过对不同国家循环型农业发展模式的比较分析，发现无论发达国家还是发展中国家或是我国发展循环型农业成功的经验均表明，循环型农业很难自发形成体系和规模，必须在各级政府的行为引导下，扶持成长，不断完善。论文重点分析了循环型农业的经济学特征。分析地方政府的层级结构，阐明它直接影响着政府的施政过程，规定和制约着政府的角色和功能。得出地方政府的多目标行为函数，并着重分析地方政府的经济行为与循环型农业发展的关联系数。通过全面系统论述影响循环型农业发展的制度因素、辅助体系和经济因素。认为我国发展循环型农业需要从制度主体的层面进行制度创新，寻找一种新的利益关系的均衡——利益关系相容，寻找各利益主体的相容性，而地方政府在这个制度创新中担任着重要的角色。论文通过构建基于产品市场和要素市场发展循环型农业的地方政府行为模型，用经济学的研究范式研究地方政府如何影响农户和农产品加工企业的经济行为，如何影响农产品的生产者的经营环境，进而提升本地区的循环型农业的竞争力。以促进本地区循环型农业的发展进程。运用博弈论的分析方法分析了中央政府与地方政府之间、同级地方政府之间、地方政府与循环型农业的微观主体之间在循环型农业发展进程中的利益关系，阐明了地方政府的行为对循环型农业的发展过程中各经济主体的影响。指出地方政府是本地区循环型农业发展激励措施的设计者、监督者、执行者。地方政府通过确立或改变规则，承担起创立循环型农业激励机制的重任。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a particular sector of the national economy, agriculture constitutes its basis and functions as the premise for the growth of other industries. Although it can produce prominent social benefits, agriculture is also an incompetent industry with low economic results. As a result, the governments of all levels in the world adopt different policies to support the growth of agriculture based on its different stages of development. Now China’s agriculture is subjected to the environment and resources seriously, therefore, to discuss economical agriculture development mode is the key task of central government and the local governments of all levels. The cycle agriculture is a mode of production that puts the theory of cycle economy into practice. It is featured by the decrease in resource and material inputs as well as reduction in residue generation and discharges in the process of agricultural production to achieve an economical and sustainable agricultural development. The academic community has reached consensus on the necessity of cycle agriculture. As a consequence, it is of great importance, both in practice and in theory, to study how to transform the mode of agricultural production, what roles governments can play in promoting the cycle agriculture and in particular, in which ways the local governments’ economic conducts influence the development of cycle agriculture. The studies about these problems are scarce, therefore it is theoretically and realistically meaningful to study these problems.In market economy, whether cycle agriculture can come true depends on the benefit games of economy bodies, the transformation of local governments’ conducts is the key. On the one hand, local governments act as one link in China’s administrative chains. On the other hand, they also play as the investors and guards of the local economy. Their double status places the local governments in a special position in the economic development, which makes them both executers of Central Government’s policies and players of relatively independent regional economies. This paper put local governments’ conducts into the economic analysis of cycle agriculture development process, and review local governments’ conducts in this process by adopting historic and logic methods. By using the cycle economy theory, public choice theory, the neo-institutional economics, modern economic growth theory, market failure and externality theory, the thesis bases itself on the idea of complementation between government conducts and market behaviors. It also integrates the approach of empirical and normative research and conducts a profound and systematic probe into the connotation and requirements of China’s cycle agriculture in the new period, and into the benefits, achievements, approaches and norms of local governments’ conducts in their efforts to promote the cycle agriculture. Moreover, the thesis carries out a comparative study on the conducts of Chinese and overseas local governments in promoting the cycle agriculture. Based on this study, it proposes a yardstick helping to optimize the local governments’ conducts in speeding up the cycle economy in China.To start from the theoretical features of cycle agriculture, by conducting a comparative analysis on the typical model of cycle agricultural growth in developed and developing countries including China, the thesis reaches a conclusion that cycle agriculture cannot develop itself on its own. Instead, its growth depends on the guidance and support of governments of all levels. Based on this, the thesis highlights the analysis on the economics features of cycle agriculture and focuses on the hierarchy structure of local governments, which has a direct impact on the administration of governments and defines and restricts their roles and functions. A local governments’ multi-target behavior function is introduced. Moreover, a correlation coefficient is analyzed to highlight the relationship between the economic behaviors of local governments and the cycle agriculture. The thesis discusses in an overall and systematic way the factors blocking the cycle agricultural development, including the economic institutions and elements as well as the supporting systems. The conclusion is that China needs the institutional innovation, in which the local governments play a very important part, and a new balance of interests to develop its cycle agriculture, namely, the compatibility of interests and subjects of interests.By building the model of cycle agriculture based on products market, and factor market the thesis studies, with economics methods, how the local governments can affect the economic behaviors of farming households and enterprises engaged in processing agricultural products and how they influence the farm producers’ business environment to upgrade the competitiveness of the region’s cycle agriculture. By employing the analytical approach of the Game Theory in analyzing the relationship of interests among the local governments of the same level, local governments and Central Government, local governments and micro subjects of cycle agriculture development, the thesis states clearly the impacts of local governments’ conducts on all the economic subjects in developing the cycle agriculture, and points out that the local governments are the designers, supervisors and executers of incentives in the region’s cycle agriculture. The local governments assume the responsibility of establishing the incentive mechanism by enacting or altering the rules.更多还原