【作者】 梁铄；

【导师】 唐小我； 刘星；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 并购重组是资本市场上永恒的主题。资本市场的主要功能是进行资源配置,而其中的两个主要环节是IPO上市和并购重组。一个公司只有一次IPO上市,而上市后的并购重组却可能经常发生。公司IPO上市后,迟早都会面临着通过并购重组对股权结构和存量资产进行再次资源优化配置的需要。目前我国处于转轨经济时期,并购重组市场的发展尤其重要,需要加强对并购重组活动的研究。企业的并购重组决策是在动态不确定的环境下进行的,这使得并购重组的收益并不确定。进行并购重组会产生不可逆的成本,例如谈判、律师、财务、整合等费用,这些费用一旦付出则不能挽回。因此进行并购重组的决策方需要寻找最优的决策时机,以使并购重组产生的收益最大。并购重组的上述特性使其具有了实物期权投资的特点,因而基于实物期权方法的并购重组研究逐渐引起研究者们重视。本文针对现有的研究空白以及实践中实际存在的一些问题,利用实物期权方法研究了基于委托代理框架以及基于讨价还价的企业资产剥离决策,对目标企业具有规模选择权和规模扩张实物期权情况下的企业并购决策,垂直合并的实物期权决策,以及信息不对称的委托代理框架下代理人的各类私人收益对企业并购时机的影响。并在最后讨论了实物期权方法的实践性与局限性问题。在介绍了并购重组以及并购与资产剥离的概念、分类及其动因理论,回顾了实物期权基本理论的发展并进而评述了基于实物期权的企业并购重组理论研究之后,本文做了如下创新性的工作。本文在第三章研究了两种情况下的资产剥离决策。资产剥离是并购的前端问题,并购的目标企业往往是另外一个企业资产剥离的标的,同时资产剥离本身作为并购重组的形式在实践中大量存在,然而基于实物期权方法的研究还不够深入。在3.1节,分析了委托代理框架下的企业资产剥离实物期权决策,研究了委托人和代理人之间的信息不对称对执行资产剥离期权的影响。发现与对称信息情况下相比,不对称信息使得执行资产剥离期权的资产临界价值降低,并且给委托人带来包括支付信息租金和效率损失等两方面损失。第3.2节在Nash讨价还价的框架下研究了资产剥离决策。在非完全市场和企业风险规避的情况下,发现买卖双方贴现率的差异会使其对最优交易时机的判断不同,因而双方除需要对交易价格进行讨价还价外,还需要对交易时机进行讨价还价,这会进一步对双方价值产生影响。企业并购决策是目前基于实物期权方法的并购重组研究的重点,但仍然存在一些研究空白。第四章研究了三种情况下的企业并购决策。第4.1节分析了拥有对被收购企业规模进行选择的权利对收购期权的影响。分析表明,在收购过程中如果拥有对被收购企业规模进行选择的能力,将使收购期权的价值大为增加,并会推迟并购时机。第4.2节讨论了在并购企业拥有并购之后对目标企业进行扩张的实物期权情况下的并购决策。研究发现,对目标企业拥有扩张期权使得对其并购期权的价值增大,并在一定条件下降低了执行并购期权的临界值。当在目标企业的基础上进行扩张投资的单位规模成本低于并购的单位规模投资成本时,扩张期权将在并购期权执行后被立即执行。否则,并购企业将等待一个最优的门阈价格执行扩张期权。第4.3节利用实物期权方法研究了垂直合并决策。由于在动态不确定的环境下垂直合并的收益不确定,而合并支付的成本不可逆,因此垂直合并具有实物期权特性。论文在连续上下游垄断市场结构的双重加价模型基础上,引入需求的动态外生不确定性,得到了垂直合并的时机与条件以及合并双方所占股份比例决定公式。代理问题是决定和影响企业并购的重要因素,第五章在不同的信息不对称假设下研究了经理私人收益对于并购时机的影响。第5.1节考虑的经理私人收益包括经理经营企业所获得的工资、福利等收益,由经营企业而获得的社会地位、声望、权力等外部收益以及经理人利用关于经营成本的信息优势获得的信息价值等三部分。分析发现,工资、福利等对并购时机没有影响,外部收益会促使并购时机提前,信息价值收益会使并购时机延后,而加总的影响依赖参数取值。5.2节进一步假设经理外部私人收益同样为私人信息的情况,在二维信息不对称的委托代理框架下分析了并购时机问题,研究发现并购临界值会由于委托人降低经营成本与外部私人收益信息不对称带来的信息租金的原因而上升,但又会由于外部私人收益的存在而下降,最终结果取决于两者的相对大小。此外,二维信息不对称下均衡情况更为复杂。作为定量分析的工具,实物期权方法面临着一些局限性,但是作为一种思想方法,它有助于企业制定与评估不确定环境下的战略,这对于企业或许更为重要。并购与剥离作为企业的重要战略行为,也需要在实物期权思想的指导下进行。第6.1节讨论了实物期权方法实践中的一个主要局限性:在标的资产不可交易,且其价值和风险不可复制情况下,利用MAD假设进行实物期权定价时被研究者忽视的问题——实物期权价值所具有的风险。从理论上分析了期权价值风险的含义并讨论了其实践意义并给出了计算公式。6.2节讨论了实物期权思想与企业战略管理,将实物期权思想融入企业战略管理,使在不确定环境下的战略管理有合适的思维工具指导。更多还原

【Abstract】 Merger and Acquisitions are the eternal themes of the capital market. The fundamental function of capital market is the allocation of resources, while IPO and M&A are the basic ways to do so. Most firm has only one chance of IPO, but may have more chances to engaged in M&A activity. China is in an era of economic reform, in which the market for M&A is especially important. M&As activities happened in a dynamic stochastic environment, as made the revenue of M&A was uncertain. M&A will incur irreversible cost, such as negotiation fees and financial consultant fees, so the participating sides had to decide the optimal timing to execute the M&A decisions, which can be better modeled and analyzed by real option approach. After reviewing of the related literature in theory of real option and M&A, this paper made contributions in several aspects.In section 3.1, I studied the affection of information asymmetry between principal and agent on asset divestiture decisions through ROA approach. Deducted the optimal contact and the optimal divestiture rule. It is showed that compared with symmetry information, asymmetry information lowered the execution corridor value of the asset, and induce loss to the principal in two different aspects, i.e. efficiency loss and information rent. Section 3.2 studied the divestiture decisions in a Nash bargaining framework. Analysis showed that when the buying side and selling side has different discount rate, the participating parties have to bargain not only on the price, but also on the timing of the transaction.Section 4.1 analyzed the option to acquire another firm when the buying side had the option to choose among the targeting firms with different sizes. It is proved that this option increased the value of acquire option and postponed the timing of acquiring. Section 4.2 Developed a pricing model of the option to acquire a target firm to which the buying side has an option to expand. Analyzed the parameters that affect value of the option. The main conclusions include: (1) owing the expansion option will increase the total value of the acquiring option, and lower the striking price in certain circumstances. (2) The option to expand will be executed when the cost to expand is lower than the cost to acquire, otherwise the acquiring firm will wait. In section 4.3, I studied vertical integration by real option approach. The return of vertical merge is uncertain when firms operated in an uncertain environment, the vertical merge decision is irreversible, thus a vertical merge has a real option feature. Analyzed vertical merge decision by real option approach, deducted the optimal merge trigger. The paper also analyzed the parameters that affect the merge decision.Section 5.1 analyzed the affect of manager private benefit on timing of M&A under an asymmetric information principal-agent framework. The private benefit considered include manager’s wage, outside benefit and information rent about operating cost. Analysis showed that the wage do not affect timing of M&A, the outside benefit have an negative effect on M&A trigger value and the information value have positive effect on trigger value. Optimal compensation contract is derived, followed by the parameters analysis. Section 5.2 further assumed that the outside benefit is asymmetric information on the basis of section 5.1, studied M&A option investment in a two-dimensional information asymmetry framework. It is showed that the principal will increase M&A trigger value so as to decrease the information cost caused by the asymmetric information of operating cost and manager’s outside benefit, but the M&A trigger value itself will be lowered by the outside benefit, the total effect of manager’s private benefits on the M&A trigger value depend on the value of parameters.Section 6.1 discussed one of the limitations of RO approach. When the underlying asset is not tradable, and its risk can not be replicated by existing assets, the standard way is to use the Marketed Asset Disclaimer to pricing the real option, but doing so has neglected one problem, i.e. the risk associated with real option value. The paper analyzed the real option value risk theoretically and pointed out its implications in practice.Section 6.2 incorporated real option thinking into corporate strategy making. The goal of corporate strategy management is to guide the firm to do the right things. But in turbulent environments, nobody can tell what is right for all the time. Thus the responsibility of strategy management is to create and maintain flexibility, to prepare for the unexpected changes and to seize the opportunity. This paper combined the real option thinking into corporate strategy management, which then could be evaluated more properly.更多还原