市场化进程中的地方政府行为自主性研究

【作者】 何显明；

【导师】 竺乾威；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 行政学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 在市场化的改革进程中地方政府的角色行为模式为什么呈现出如此大的差异，并给地方工业化、市场化的路径选择带来深刻的影响?而地方政府职能转变作为行政体制改革的主题，为什么长期滞后于市场化改革的进程?本文认为，问题的核心在于，在制度环境的深刻变迁过程中，地方政府无论是职能履行还是政策执行都存在着一种“选择性”机制，地方政府能够根据自身的效用偏好，有选择性地履行职能和执行中央政策，其行为选择存在着一个相当大的弹性空间。从地方政府演变为一个相对独立的利益主体的那一天开始，政府职能的转变，就不再是一个简单的角色认知或公共财力问题，而更主要的是一个政府效用目标的选择，一个政府行为的激励机制和约束机制问题。论文以地方政府行为自主性扩张为基本视角，立足于浙江区域市场化进程中地方政府与微观主体互动关系的个案分析，就市场化改革进程中地方政府的行为模式及其演变轨迹，特别是地方政府在区域市场化进程中的行为选择的内在逻辑进行分析总结。改革开放以来社会制度环境的深刻演变，使地方政府在整个中国行政管理体制中的角色发生了重大转变。地方政府从计划经济时代单纯的中央指令的执行者，演变成了有着自身特殊利益结构和效用目标的地方公共事务管理主体。而经济体制和行政体制的一系列放权改革，重构了政府间的关系以及地方政府行为的动力机制，地方政府的自主意识迅速觉醒，并逐步形成了最大限度地扩张权限，不断尝试突破中央政策底线，以实现其特定的效用目标的内在冲动。由于中央政府与地方政府之间没有能够建立起刚性化的权限、职责分工体系，中央政府缺乏监督控制地方政府行为的有效机制。同时，为了充分调动地方政府发展地方经济、推动体制改革的积极性，中央政府持续性地推行了权力下放的行政体制改革，对地方政府官员的考核也越来越偏重于地方经济发展绩效所显示的政绩。上下级政府之间的关系，由此越来越具有了政治总承包的意味，即只要下级政府能够在经济发展上创造出良好的政绩，并完成上级下达的各种任务指标，上级政府通常很少干预下级政府的具体行为选择。地方政府以完成上级政府规定的刚性任务为前提，获取了在辖区内“说了算”的自主行为空间。制度环境变迁过程中约束条件与动力机制的演变，既为地方政府扩张行为自主性构建了强大的内在诱因，也为这种扩张提供了极富弹性的可能性空间。所谓地方政府行为自主性(The Discretion of Local Government’Action)，指的是拥有相对独立的利益结构的地方政府，摆脱上级政府和地方各种具有行政影响力的社会力量的控制，按照自己的意志实现其行政目标的可能性，以及由此表现出来的区别于上级政府和地方公众意愿的行为逻辑。地方政府行为自主性不同于中央下放的自主权的一个重要特征，就在于它是一个充满弹性的可能性空间。通过规避法律、政策的限制，地方政府可以成倍地放大中央政府下放的自主权，甚至获取中央政府根本就没有下放的权限。在这样的背景下，无论是执行上级政府制定的政策，还是追求地方政府自身的行政目标，地方政府都拥有了前所未有的自主选择余地。地方政府不仅能够根据自身的偏好选择性地执行中央的政策，履行自己的职能，还可以根据自己的效用目标来配置其拥有的越来越丰富的公共资源，甚至还可以在一定程度上凭借自己同上级政府的博弈经验或者地方的经济实力，超越自身权限，突破政策界线，自主地把握政府行为的边界。地方政府行为自主的扩张，意味着地方政府权力、职责及行为边界的模糊化，意味着地方政府角色行为潜在的多元化的可能性，它使得地方政府的行为模式呈现出了越来越强烈的个性化色彩，进而导致地方经济和社会发展的“个性化”。地方政府行为自主性的扩张，合乎逻辑地产生了地方政府行为绩效的不确定性，以及区域市场体系发育的路径选择及其绩效的不确定性。从“温州模式”到“浙江现象”，浙江的实践表明，地方政府的行为自主性是区域市场体系发育的关键变量。一方面，地方政府的行为自主性构成了地方民众推动的诱致性制度变迁与中央政府推动的强制性制度变迁的中间环节，是推进中国经济体制改革，激发体制改革创新活力的关键性因素。另一方面，利益驱动下的地方政府行为自主性往往表现为地方政府利用行政手段，强制性地介入微观经济过程，人为阻碍要素流动和区域市场体系的发育，甚至可能出现地方政府行为的自主性为地方行政长官追求政绩最大化的冲动所左右，为地方资本力量所摆布的局面。换言之，地方政府既可能通过扩张其行为自主性，创造性地利用政策机遇，积极推进区域市场体系的发育；也可能通过扩张行为自主性，最大限度汲取地方资源实现政绩最大化，成为区域市场体系发育的阻碍力量。地方政府行为自主性的日益膨胀，表明地方政府行为既在一定程度失去了中央政府的有效监督和制约，也没有能够在地方政治与行政体制的框架内形成有效的制约机制，地方政府行为已经在很大程度上处于失范境地。因此，建立健全法律化、规范化的政府间职责、权限分工体系，最大限度地压缩政府间博弈的制度空间；积极推进政治分权改革，探索在各级公共权威层面建立体制内和体制外的横向权力制衡机制，从而最终建立地方政府行为自主性的有效控制机制，已经成为中国政治体制和行政体制改革的重大现实课题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Why did such great difference in the role action mode of the localgovernment exist and brought so profound effect on the choice of thelocal industrialized and market-oriented course during themarket-oriented reform? And why did the transformation of the localgovernment function which is considered as the subject of administrativesystem reform long-term lag behind the market-oriented reform? Thispaper thinks that the core of the problem is that a kind of "selective"system exists in both the performance of function and the implementationof policy of the local government during the great transformation of thesystem circumstances. The local government can perform the functionand implement the central policy selectively according to own utility andpreference and there is an equivalent large flexible space for this actionchoice. Since the local government was evolved into a relativelyindependent beneficial subject, the transformation of the governmentalfunction is no longer a simple role recognition or public finance problem,but mainly a problem of the choice of the government utility objects, andthe stimulate and restrain system of governmental action. With a view ofthe expansion of the discretion of local government’s action, and basedon the individual case analysis on the interactive relationship between thelocal government and micro-main body in Zhejiang regionalmarket-oriented course, this paper analyzes and sums up the action modeand evolved track of the local government in the course of themarket-oriented reform, especially the internal logic of the action choiceduring the regional market-oriented course.Since the reform and opening, the social system circumstances hasevolved profoundly, which leads to the great change of the role of thelocal government in the whole Chinese administrative managementsystem. The local government has evolved into the main body of the localpublic affairs management with the own special beneficial structure andutility objects from the simple executor of the central command in the eraof the planned economy. And a series of power division reform on theeconomic system and administrative system reinstitute the relationship between the governments and the motive system of the localgovernmental action, rapidly awake the autonomic consciousness of thelocal government and gradually form the maximum expansion authority,continually try to breakthrough the bottom line of the central policy torealize its specialized utility objects.Because the compulsive division system of authority andresponsibility between the central government and local governmenthaven’t been set up, the central government lacks the effective system tosupervise and control the local government action. Meanwhile, in order tomotivate the enthusiasm of the local government to develop the localeconomy and promote system reform, the central government persistentlycarried out the administrative system reform of the power division andthe assess to the officials of the local government is also laid particularstress on the achievements shown by the local economic developmentperformance gradually. As a result, the relationship between the upperand lower government has the meaning of political general contractgradually, that is, as long as the lower government can create the greatachievement on the economic development and complete various taskindex arranged by the upper government, the upper government usuallydon’t interfere with the specific action choice of the lower government.With the completion of the compulsive tasks regulated by the superiorgovernment as the premise, the local government can have a say fordecision-making in their jurisdiction.The evolvement of the restricting condition and motive system in thevariance of systematic environment has constructed strong internal causesfor the expansion of discretion of action of local government and has alsoprovided the flexible potential spaces. The Discretion of LocalGovernment’s Action means possibility of the realize the administrativeobjects according to its own purpose of the local government, whopossesses relative independent beneficial structure, gets rid of the controlof the superior government and local social powers possessing variousadministrative influences, and thereof the action logic reflected, which isdifferent from the superior government and public desires. One of theimportant features of the Discretion of Local Government’s Action that different from the decision-making power authorized by the central is thatit is a flexible potential Space. Through the elusion of the restriction oflaws and policies, the local government can greatly enlarge thedecision-making power authorized by the central and even gain theauthorities not granted by the central government. Under suchbackground, whether to carry out the policy made by the superiorgovernment or pursue for the administrative objectives of the localgovernment itself, the local government possesses unheard-of freedom tochoose. The local government can not only choose the policies to carryout and fulfill its responsibilities according to its favors, but also canequip its possessed public resources that become more and moreabundant according to its utility objectives, and even more, to a certainextent, it can exceed its authority and breakthrough the policy boundariesand master the boundary of governmental action through its gameexperiences with superior government or local economic capacity.The expansion of Discretion of Local Government’s Action meansthe boundary of power, responsibility and action of local governmentbecome vague and indicates the possibility of the potential diversificationof role action of local government. It makes the local governmental actionmode shows more and much stronger individualization, and causes theindividualization of local economy and social development. With theexpansion of the Discretion of Local Government’s Action, theuncertainty of the action performance of local government and of thechoice of courses of the development of regional market system and itsperformance has logically taken place. The practice of Zhejing Province,from "Wenzhou Mode" to "Zhejiang Phenomenon", shows that theDiscretion of Local Government’s Action is the key variable of thedevelopment of regional market system. On one hand, the Discretion ofLocal Government’s Action composes the intermedium link between theinduced institutional change promoted by local publics and the Imposedinstitutional change promoted by central government, and is the keyfactor to promote the reform of economic system in China and stimulatethe vigor of innovation and reform of system. On the other hand, theDiscretion of Local Government’s Action drove by benefits always appears as that the local government makes use of administrative meansto compulsively interfere in the microeconomic process and artificiallycounteract the circulation of elements and the development of regionalmarket system, and what’s more, the Discretion of Local Government’sAction may be directed by the impulsion of the local administrativeofficers pursuing for the maximization of achievements and be controlledby the local capital power. In other words, the local government can notonly creatively make use of policy opportunities to actively promote thedevelopment of the regional market system through the expansion of itsdiscretion of action, but also may farthest make use of the local resourcesto realize the maximization of achievements through the expansion ofdiscretion of action and become the counteracting power for thedevelopment of regional market system.The increasingly expansion of the discretion of action of the localgovernment shows that the action of local government not only lose theeffective monitoring and restriction of the central government to a certainextent, but also do not form effective restriction system within theframework of local politics and administrative system. The action oflocal government has been, to a large extent, in a situation away fromregulation. Therefore, it has been the important realistic problem of theChina’s reform in political and administrative system to establishcomplete law-oriented and standardized division system of governmentalresponsibilities and authorities, to farthest reduce systematic spaces ofgambling relation between the governments; and to actively promote thepolitical power division reform and explore to establish the lateral powercheck-and-balance system both inside and outside Party System in eachpublic authority level, so as to finally establish effective control system ofthe Discretion of Local Government’s Action.更多还原