基于零售商垄断势力的纵向关系与竞争政策研究

【作者】 张赞；

【导师】 郁义鸿；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 产业经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 20世纪70年代以来，全球零售业发生了巨大变革，大型零售店的普遍兴起以及零售业市场集中度的显著提高，都表明零售商的垄断势力正在日趋增强。当零售商拥有垄断势力后，他们凭借其在产业链中的优势地位，向生产商实施各种纵向控制手段，如收取通道货、要求生产商签订独家交易契约、开发自有品牌产品进入生产领域等。这些策略行为的实施导致供销之间矛盾四起，同时也引起了政府的广泛关注，但至今尚未有行之有效的相关政策出台。面对供销矛盾的现实，产业组织理论所关注的是零售商垄断势力下的纵向关系问题。这些问题具体包括：零售商凭借其垄断势力对生产商实施的纵向控制策略有哪些?这些纵向控制策略是出于怎样的私人激励?从社会激励的角度，零售商垄断势力的增强以及所实施的各种纵向控制策略，对于生产商、零售商和消费者的福利会产生什么影响?在此基础上，以社会福利最大化为己任的政府部门，又该对零售业和相应的纵向控制行为制定怎样的竞争政策?虽然纵向关系作为现代产业组织理论中的一个前沿领域，已积累了较为丰硕的成果，针对零售商实施的纵向控制也是西方国家反垄断司法实践所关注的焦点之一，但是现有的理论研究仍与社会现实存在较大的差距。大多数关于纵向问题的研究仍沿用经典的微观经济学中的假设，即假发生产商具有垄断势力而零售商是完全竞争的。少有的关于零售商垄断势力的研究也较为单一和片面，尚没有对此问题的全面而系统的研究。为此，本文针对零售商垄断势力增强的现实，在一个系统的分析框架下，从产业链的角度剖析零售商与生产商之间的纵向关系，并提出相应的竞争政策，具有较强的理论和现实意义。本文首先通过实证分析论证了零售商具有垄断势力的现实。由于零售业具有显著的区域性，且零售业各种业态之间具有分工互补性，因此对于零售业市场集中度的衡量，要将区域市场和零售业态这两个因素考虑进来。本文利用1998-2004年上海市主要超市公司的基本数据，对上海市的超市企业市场集中度进行了实证考察，结果发现我国零售业呈现出区域寡头垄断的态势。在此前提下，本文建立了一个较为完整的基于产业链的“SCP-R(纵向市场结构—纵向控制策略行为—产业链市场绩效—规制政策)”经济分析框架，并从零售商具有垄断势力的角度对分析框架的各个要素进行阐述，从而为全文的研究奠定基础。接着，本文按照常见的零售商向生产商实施的纵向控制策略展开分析，研究了通道费、独家交易和自有品牌等策略。对于这些策略行为的分析，我们构建了与现有研究不同的博弈模型，通过比较不同纵向市场结构下博弈的均衡结果，找到了影响市场绩效的关键因素，并对私人绩效和社会福利进行分析和评价，最后提出相应的竞争政策。具体来讲，通道费一章分析了三种纵向市场结构，结论表明在双边垄断情况下，通道费的收取将导致社会福利增加；当上游竞争下游垄断时，通道费对社会福利无影响；而当零售商有买方而无卖方垄断势力时，社会福利的大小还要取决于需求函数的性质。独家交易的分析则通过与共同代理对比，证明了当生产商的产品存在筹异时，零售商实施独家交易能够导致纵向市场圈定，且随着两种产品替代性的增加，独家交易将导致社会福利损失的减少。自有品牌的分析则基于目前我国零售商自有品牌质量较低的现实，将产品质量作为一个变量，考察了一对一和二对一两种纵向市场结构，从而得出自有品牌的社会福利不仅受到纵向市场结构的影响，也与自有品牌和厂商品牌的产品质量水平密切相关。由于零售商实施纵向控制策略的研究建立在生产商垄断势力较弱的基础上，那么当生产商也具有较强的垄断势力时，零售商垄断势力的提高相对于生产商来说就是抗衡力量。自从加尔布雷斯提出了抗衡力量的概念后，关于零售商抗衡力量的讨论一直没有停息，但始终没有一个较清晰的结论，本文通过对双边垄断、零售商具有边缘竞争者和对称竞争者三种情况的分析，得出零售商抗衡力量的社会福利取决于纵向市场结构(包括零售商替代性大小)的结论。在理论分析的基础上，本文最后从产业的层面讨论了我国零售业的竞争政策。由于国外现有的理论研究相对较少，以及研究结果的不确定性，再加上我国零售业具有一些特殊问题，这些因素导致西方理论界对于我国零售业竞争政策的制定缺乏指导。目前我国反垄断法尚未正式出台，国内在这一领域的理论研究更为少见，因此本文结合国内一些特殊情况，对这一问题进行了较为系统的研究，能够在一定程度上弥补理论与现实的差距，为我国零售业竞争政策的制定提供合理化的建议和指导。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the 1970s, the world has undergone tremendous changes in retailindustries. The general upsurge of large retailers and the significant increase of theretail market concentration show that the monopoly power of retailers beingreinforced. When retailers own monopoly power, they will use their dominant statusin the industrial chain implementing various vertical control means against producers,such as charging slotting fees, requiring exclusive dealing contracts, tapping privatebrand goods and so on. The implementation of these strategies has resulted incontinuous contradictions between supplier and retailers. At the same time, that hasattracted wide attention from the government. But so far no effective policies havebeen worked out yet.Facing these contradictions, the theory of industrial organization is concernedabout the topic of the vertical relationship with monopolistic retail. Specifically, whatvertical control strategies are used by retailers depending on their monopoly poweragainst producers? How do private incentives stimulate these vertical controlstrategies? From the perspective of social incentive, how do the enhancement of retailmonopoly power and various vertical control strategies make effects on the welfarefor the manufacturer, retailers and consumers? On this ground, what the competitionpolicies should be established by the governments, who take the maximum socialwelfare as their responsibilities, against the retail industry and the correspondingvertical restrains?Although, as a frontier area in the modern theory of industrial organization, thevertical relationship has yielded a rich harvest, and the anti-trust judicial practice inthe West has aimed at the vertical control implemented by the retailers as the focus,there still exists a big gap between the reality and the theoretical research. Mostresearches on the vertical issues are still followed the classic assumptions in themicro-economics, which assumed that manufacturers monopoly and retailerscompetitive. Few researches about monopoly retailers are usually simple and biased.So far there is no comprehensive and systematic study on this topic.To this end, this paper has strong theoretical and practical significance, whichaimed at the increasing monopoly power of retailers, and in a systematic framework,from the perspective of the industrial chain dissected the vertical relationship betweenmanufacturers and retailers, and finally brought forward the corresponding competition policies.We first empirically demonstrated the realities that the retailer indeed hasmonopoly power. Due to the significant regionality and the complementarity betweenvarious retailing formats, we must take the regional market and retailing format thesetwo factors into account for measuring the degree of concentration of the retail market.Using the 1998-2004 data of major supermarkets in Shanghai, we empirically testedthe market concentration of the supermarket in Shanghai. The results showed that theretail industry in China was presenting a kind of regional oligopoly trend. Under thispremise, we on the base of industrial chain established a relatively completeframework of the "SCP-R (vertical market structure, vertical control conduct, marketperformance of the industrial chain, and regulation policy). Then from the perspectiveof monopoly retailers, we elaborated the various elements of the analytical framework,thus laying the foundation for this Full thesis.In accordance with the common vertical restraint strategies, this paper analyzedthe slotting fee, the exclusive dealing and the private brand in turn. We constructeddifferent games from existing models. Through comparing all equilibrium resultsunder different vertical market structures and environments, we found out the keyfactor affecting the market performance; then analyzed and evaluated their privateperformances and social welfare. Finally, the corresponding competition policies wereproposed. In detail, the chapter about slotting fee analyzed three kinds of verticalmarket structures and showed that under the bilateral monopoly context the charge ofslotting fee would enhance the social welfare; with competitive upstream andmonopoly downstream, the slotting fee were neutral for social welfare; withmonopsony power in the buyer side and without monopoly power in the seller side,the magnitude of social welfare would also depend on the attribute of the demandfunction. About exclusive dealing, we compared it with the common agency provingthat with differential products the exclusive dealing would result in vertical marketforeclosure. And with the increase of the level of substitution between two products,the loss of social welfare from ED would be reduced. The analysis of private brandwas based on the reality of lower qualities of retailers’ private brands in present China.We took the product quality as a viable reviewing two kinds of market structures of"one-to-one" and "two-to-one", then got following conclusions that the social welfarefrom private brand was not only affected by the vertical market structures, but alsowas closely related to the quality of products of private brand and manufacture brand. As the research about the retailers’ vertical control strategies was based onweaker producers, when the manufacturers had strong monopoly power, theenhancement of retailers’ monopoly power would become the countervailing poweragainst producers. Since the concept of "countervailing power" was invented byGalbraith, the discussion about it has not been stopped with a clear coherence.Through analyzing three situations including bilateral monopoly, retailers with fringecompetitors and symmetric competitors, this thesis drew an important conclusion thatthe social welfare from retailers’ countervailing power would depend on the verticalmarket structures (including the level of substitution between alternative retailers).On the basis of theoretical analysis, at last this paper from the level of the retailindustry discussed the competition policies in China. Because of relatively fewinternational theoretical researches as well as the uncertainty of research findings,adding some special issues in China’s retail industry, all these factors led to theWestern theories less useful for competition policies in China’s retail industry. Atpresent, China’s anti-trust law has not yet made a formal appearance, so the domestictheoretical researches in this area are rarer. Therefore this paper combining somespecial circumstances at home systematically studied this topic. To a certain extent, itmade up for the gap between the theory and the reality and provided reasonablerecommendations and guidance for the formulation of competition policies in retailindustry in China.更多还原