【作者】 常庆；

【导师】 唐守廉；

【作者基本信息】 北京邮电大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 组织腐败、不切实际的形象工程、不管全大局的地方主义、不遵循自然规律违反科学发展原则的行为、“上有政策，下有对策”等，种种政府失灵现象严重侵蚀了政府职能与政府能力，造成公共资源滥用和严重浪费，使社会付出高昂的成本代价，导致政府效能低下，产生政府危机(政府信用危机、公共物品供给危机、政府治理危机等)。政府危机是传统政府管理体制不适应市场经济内在要求所产生的问题，随着改革不断向纵深推进，政府管理体制对其他改革的牵制作用日益明显地体现出来，政府管理体制改革也日益成为我国改革的重心，而如何有效地解决种种政府失灵问题，建立起切实可行的激励监督机制，也就成为政府管理体制改革的中心之一。本论文正是在这种背景下，应用组织激励理论、博弈论、新制度经济学、信息经济学、契约经济学、组织经济学、破窗理论、公共选择理论的相关理论，深刻地剖析了种种政府失灵现象产生的内在根源和动力机制，从而为彻底解决政府失灵现象铺平了道路，并针对不同的政府失灵现象，均提出了相应的治本解决措施，就某些解决措施而言，尤其详尽地、创新性地进行了阐述，对建构公共部门组织中的激励监督机制进行了深入的研究。论文共由10章组成：第一章，绪论。本章介绍了论文的研究背景、内容架构以及论文创新点。第二章，公共部门组织激励理论综述及分析。本章通过公共部门组织激励问题综述；公共部门组织激励的理论分析；公共部门组织激励的实证研究等三节，全方位、多层次地对组织激励理论在公共部门的应用、发展进行了系统的总结及分析，从而深刻地揭示了公共部门组织激励理论的本质特征及其重要意义。第三章，公共部门组织中的委托—代理关系研究。委托—代理关系的实质就是设计一种机制或合同，从而给代理人提供一种激励和监督。本章重在厘清我国公共部门组织中的委托—代理结构，分析公共权力在此的委托—代理运行的方式及特点，在此基础上，进而分析公共部门组织中的委托—代理问题。最后引出政府失灵问题，并对有关政府失灵方面的文献进行了详细的总结及分析。第四章，转轨经济中腐败的制度解析。本章用数学建模的方式，构建了一个统治者、官员、企业家构成的两阶段动态博弈模型，并分别对在完全信息下的契约与腐败之间的关系与不完全信息下的契约与腐败的关系进行了模型博弈，从而阐明了腐败本身是官僚体制下一种特定的契约与激励机制的产物。这就为我们如何消除腐败指明了方向：要进行制度变迁，完善制度建设。第五章，公共部门组织腐败的经济学解析。本章对公共组织内部运转的组织特征及其如何与组织腐败相关联进行了深入的剖析，公共组织作为一种政治科层制组织，在给腐败提供的可能性条件和组织诱因方面进行了实质性地探究。从而推断出：权力配置结构问题是反腐败机制设计和反腐败战略选择的根本问题；改善权力配置的信息结构、提高透明度也是反腐败的一项根本性措施。第六章，地方政府无效竞争的制度解析。本章分别从政策博弈的均衡、产权制度的疏漏、财政制度的负反馈、政绩考核制度的缺陷这四个不同的角度对地方政府无效竞争的问题进行了深刻的剖析，并从不同侧面阐明了导致地方政府无效竞争的制度根源及动力机制。从而推断出：需从整个制度环境建构上对地方政府行为加以规范，为建构制度创新机制提供了有力的理论支撑。第七章，中央与地方政策执行博弈解析。本章分别从制度变迁博弈、资源支配博弈、经济增长速度博弈、财税博弈这四个不同的角度对中央与地方博弈的主要领域及其效益进行了深入的探究。并对在政策执行过程中的“上有政策，下有对策”这一突出现象进行了界定，并结合实际案例进行了博弈分析。从而进一步推断出：要从根本上消除这种政策执行博弈的不良影响，则必须加强制度建设、完善博弈规则，以通过制度的创新来使地方政府与中央政府在政策执行过程中形成有效的博弈均衡解；并进一步提出了具有针对性的措施。第八章，破解“条块矛盾”的路径选择。本章首先阐述了“条块分割”的政府管理体制的种种弊端，进一步指出了“条块关系”的症结之所在——职责同构，通过深入的探究，提出了破解“条块矛盾”的突破口——打破职责同构，要进行职责再设计、机构再设计、过程再设计，并且提出了有针对性的、创造性的措施和原则，从而实现从“每一级政府都要管所有事情”向“只负责特定事情”的转变。第九章，破窗理论与“零度容忍”反腐机制。本章首先详细阐述了破窗理论与“零度容忍”的发生、发展，并介绍了破窗理论在社区治安上的成功运用。更进一步，从马克思主义哲学和心理学的角度，对破窗与腐败的关系从三方面进行了深入分析，进而创造性地提出“零度容忍”反腐机制，即：教育预防机制，使人不想腐败；监督控制机制，使人不敢腐败；制度约束机制，使人不能腐败；金融监控机制，及时遏制腐败。第十章，公共选择理论与激励监督体系构建。本章首先详细阐述了公共选择中的委托—代理理论：国会控制理论，提出委托人可以采取四种措施来克服代理问题。接着深入地分析了公共选择理论中的两个学派——“弗吉尼亚学派”与“芝加哥学派”，这两个学派分别从“宪制经济理论”与“重新创造市场”两个不同的角度，对政府失灵矫正方面进行了卓有成效的理论研究。通过对两个学派、两种观点的比较，对于构建激励监督体系具有积极的启示作用，并进行了有益的探索。由于学识和能力有限，研究中存在一些不足之处，有待进一步完善。更多还原

【Abstract】 Organization corruption, impractical image engineering, the sectionalism of ignorethe general situation, the behavior of disobey the natural regulation and breach theprinciple of science development, "central policy, local countermeasure" and etc.Above all these phenomena eroded the function and the ability of governmentseriously, induced government efficiency to fall, produced government crisis (thecrisis of the reputation of the government, the crisis of the public product supply, thecrisis of the government management and etc).The government crisis is the matter thattraditional government management system don’t fit the intrinsic demand of themarket economy, the phenomena that the government management system limitsother reform are increasingly and clearly to appear, the reform of the governmentmanagement system becomes the center of our country reforms along with reformspush forward deeply. How resolve various problems on the government failureavailably and establish the mechanism of incentives and intendance is becomes one ofthe centers of the government management system reform.This thesis is exactly written under this kind of background, applied the theory oforganizational incentives, the game theory, the new institutional economics, theinformational economics, the contract economics, the organizational economics,broken-window theory, the theory of public option and etc, anatomized the internalspringhead and the dynamic mechanism that lead to government failure, thus forresolve the problem of government failure to spread thoroughly even road, putforward resolve measures originally according to different government failures, somemeasures are innovative. The research on the mechanism of incentives and intendancein the public section organization to be carry on thoroughly.The thesis consists of 10 chapters:Chapter 1, "introduction", this chapter introduces the background of the research,the article structure and the innovation.Chapter 2, "dissect the theory of incentives in the public sector organization", thischapter sums up and analyzes the application and progress of the organizational incentives in the public sector, shows us the essence and its important significance,through analysis of three sections, as follows, existent special problem in the publicsection organization incentives, academic analysis of the public sector organizationincentives and substantial studies in the public sector organization incentives.Chapter 3, "the principal-agent relationship in the public sector organization", theessential of the principal-agent relationship provides some incentives and intendancefor agent through some mechanism designed. This chapter distinguishes theprincipal-agent framework in the public sector organization and analyzes the way andthe characteristic that circulate public power, then analyzes the principal-agentproblem in the public sector organization, finally fetch out the government failureproblem, summarizes and analyzes the literature in the government failure field.Chapter 4, "the institutional analysis of corruption in the change of economy", thischapter uses the technique of math modeling, constructs a two-stage dynamic modelof game theory that consist of ruler, official and entrepreneur, analyzes the relation ofperfect information contract and corruption and the relation of incomplete informationcontract and corruption, consequently illuminates corruption is the outcome of somespecial contract and mechanism of incentives under bureaucrat system. Above allthese indicate a direction for us to eliminate corruption. Carry on institutional changeand perfect institutional construction.Chapter 5, "the economic analysis of corruption in the public sector organization",this chapter distinguishes the characteristic of public organization and carries onthorough analysis of the relation of the characteristic of organization and thecorruption of organization. As a kind of bureaucrat organization, the publicorganization provides feasibility condition for corruption, so we explore theorganization inducement substantiality and conclude that the problem of powerstructure is the basic problem in designing the mechanism of anti-corruption and thestrategy of anti-corruption, ameliorating the information structure of powercollocation and enhancing diaphaneity are also fundamental measures ofanti-corruption.Chapter 6, "the institutional analysis of invalid competition in local government",this chapter anatomizes the problem of invalid competition in local government,through analysis of four sections, as follows, the equilibrium of policy game, theoversight of property right system, the negative feedback of the public finance systemand the disfigurement of the achievement of government estimate system, illuminates the intemal springhead and the dynamic mechanism of invalid competition in localgovernment from different angles. Above all these conclude that need to constitutelocal government behavior norm from constructing the whole system environmentand provide powerful theories support for constructing the mechanism of systeminnovation.Chapter 7, "analysis of the policy performance game between the centralgovernment and local government", this chapter explores in-depth its benefit and itsmain realm of central and local game through analysis of four angles, as follows, theinstitutional change game, the resource allocation game, the economy growth speedgame and the finance and tax game, defines this outstanding phenomenon of "centralpolicy, local countermeasure" in the process of the policy performance, carries out theanalysis of game by combined the actual case. Above all these conclude that muststrengthen system construction and perfect game rules for eliminating the badinfluence of the policy performance game radically, make central government andlocal government in the process of the policy performance become valid equilibriumsolution, and put forward the measures of pertinence.Chapter 8, "the choice of approach to resolving ’tiao-kuai conflict’", this chapterexpatiates on various abuse of the government management system, further indicatesthat the sticking point of ’tiao-kuai relation’ is ’isomorphic responsibility’governmental system, only after the ’isomorphic responsibility’ governmental systembe broken, and carry on the responsibility design again, the organization design againand the process design again, besides put forward the measures and the principle in acreative way, consequently actualizes transformation from ’each government wants totake care of all affairs’ to ’each government is responsible for a particular affair’.Chapter 9, "The broken windows theory and the anticorruption mechanism of’zerotolerance’", this chapter introduces the origin of the broken windows theory and thesuccessful practice of the ’zero tolerance’ policy in neighborhood safety. Then, itanalyzes the common grounds between the broken windows and the corruption fromthe points of view of philosophy and psychology. Based on these, preventing andpunishing mechanism of ’zero tolerance’ in anticorruption is proposed, which includeseducating and preventing mechanism that make the person don’t think corruption,intendance and controlling mechanism that make the person dare not to corrupt,institution and restricting mechanism that make the person can’t be corrupt, financeand supervising mechanism that suppress corruption in time. Chapter 10, "the theory of public option and the construction of the system ofincentives and intendance", this chapter elaborates the principal-agent theory of publicoption, namely the national legislature control theory, put forward the client can adoptfour kinds of measures to overcome agency problem, and then analyzes in-depth twoschool of thoughts in the public option theories——"Virginia school of thought" and"Chicago school of thought" to carry on a fruitful theories research in the aspect ofcorrecting the government failure, respectively from two differentangles——"Constitution economic theories" and "Re-create a market". We comparetwo schools of thoughts and two kinds of standpoints in order to have an aggressiveapocalypse for us to establish the system of incentives and intendance, and furthercarry on beneficial quest.Due to the limitation of the author, there is some shortage in the research need tobe improved.更多还原