【作者】 刘伟华；

【导师】 季建华；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 生产运营管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 服务供应链是供应链研究的新趋势之一,而物流服务供应链则是服务供应链研究的重要分支。它是当代物流产业发展的重要趋势,也是物流学术界研究的重要课题之一。物流服务供应链是随着物流服务产业的不断发展而形成的,它是指以物流服务集成商为核心,以功能型物流服务提供商→物流服务集成商→客户为基本结构,通过提供柔性化的物流服务保证产品供应链的物流运作的一种新型供应链。物流服务供应链本质上是一种以能力合作为基础的供应链,因此,研究物流服务供应链能力合作的动机与协调策略对于提高整个物流服务供应链运营绩效不仅具有积极的理论意义,也具有良好的现实意义。论文首先研究了物流服务供应链的形成动因以及物流服务供应链的结构与内涵。通过文献研究表明,产品服务化的兴起,服务外包的不断增长,供应链管理研究已经开始从产品供应链走向服务供应链,服务供应链正成为供应链研究的新趋势。通过对国内外物流能力研究现状的分析,论文对物流能力的定义和度量进行了界定。论文利用分工理论分析了物流服务供应链分工的演进过程,提出了物流服务供应链形成动因机制模型,并利用物流外包边界理论对物流服务供应链两级能力合作的动因进行了经济学分析。论文还对物流服务供应链的两级和多级结构进行了分析,提出了决定物流服务供应链多级结构的长度的三个因素,并对物流服务供应链的内涵进行了剖析。为了反映中国物流服务供应链能力合作的现状,论文进行问卷调查,并对调查结果进行了分析。结果表明物流服务供应链中能力合作是非常重要的,物流服务供应链的能力合作对于物流企业的良好运营具有诸多的益处,物流服务供应链的能力合作也存在诸多的风险。因此,深入研究能力合作的协调策略是有意义的。作为能力合作协调策略的重要组成部分,在能力合作前,论文考虑物流服务集成商面对多个物流服务提供商时如何进行订单任务分配的问题。由于不同的供应商其分配的地位不同,论文建立了不确定需求情况下,面向多个重要供应商的两级物流服务供应链任务分配模型。论文首先建立了基于单一物流能力的任务分配模型,然后将该模型拓展到基于多种物流能力的任务分配模型(物流能力之间不存在匹配情况),进一步的,建立了基于多种物流能力的任务分配模型(物流能力之间为完全匹配情况),然后,给出了基于多种物流能力的任务分配模型(物流能力之间为非完全匹配情况)。上述模型是多目标求解问题,论文给出了模型的具体求解方法,并给出了具体的算例,探讨了不确定程度大小对任务分配结果的影响。研究结果表明,随着不确定程度的增大,物流服务集成商的总成本将增大,物流服务提供商的总体满意度将降低,而总体的惩罚强度将增大;物流服务集成商关系成本系数对物流服务提供商总体满意度和惩罚强度有紧密的关系。关系成本系数越大,则物流服务提供商的总体满意度越大,惩罚强度则越小。在客户订单分配后,论文研究了两级物流服务供应链能力合作的数量协调问题。论文分析了供应链能力合作研究的现状,论述了物流服务供应链上下游合作的类型,并基于有无能力匹配约束和三种合作模式(松散型、弱战略型和强战略型,其中松散型是弱战略的特例)将供应链能力协调类型分成六类。在已有的产品供应链能力协调模型的基础上,研究了在无能力匹配约束弱战略型合作情况下(即协调类型Ⅰ),基于stackelberg主从决策的物流服务供应链能力合作的两级协调问题,构建了物流服务集成商的成本模型和功能型物流服务提供商的利润模型。然后扩展到有能力匹配约束弱战略合作的情况(即协调类型Ⅱ)。然后扩展到研究强战略型合作模式下有无能力匹配约束情况的能力协调问题,即协调类型Ⅲ和协调类型Ⅳ。论文研究了在需求不确定的情况下四种协调类型的模型求解问题,利用Matlab7.0软件进行了数值仿真,给出了在stackelberg主从决策下物流服务集成商和功能型服务提供商的协调结果,并对弱战略和强战略下的四种能力协调类型的结果进行了比较;论文也给出了联合决策情况下的仿真结果,并将该结果与stackelberg主从决策下的结果进行对比,结果表明,联合决策下的总利润大于stackelberg主从决策下的总利润。在能力合作的过程中,物流服务质量监督策略非常重要。论文研究了物流服务供应链能力合作的质量监督与协调问题。论文分析了物流服务供应链能力合作的质量监控与协调过程,考虑一个物流服务集成商和一个功能型物流服务提供商的两级供应链结构,结合服务产品质量难以测量的特点,论文提出了两级能力合作的质量协调基本博弈模型(即模型1),其中物流服务集成商可以选择质量监控和不监控,提供商可以按质量合同完成合作也可以选择欺骗,论文给出了该博弈模型的混合策略纳什均衡解。然后研究了物流服务集成商本身也可能受到惩罚时的质量协调的情况(即模型2)。论文进一步考虑了提供商之间的竞争情况对质量协调的影响(即模型3)和集成商与服务提供商存在能力匹配时的质量协调模型(即模型4),给出了新的纳什均衡解。此外,作为质量协调的重要组成部分,论文还探讨了物流服务供应链两级能力合作的质量评估决策过程模型,对三种决策模式进行了探讨,给出了算例来说明模型应用。论文基于上述的分析,给出了如何加强质量协调的五点相关建议。在能力合作后,合理的利润分配机制关系到物流服务供应链的长期稳定运作。论文主要研究了物流服务供应链两级能力合作的利润分配问题。论文分析了物流服务供应链两级合作的利润分配机制设计的要求,总结了常见的三种利润分配模式(共享报酬模式、固定报酬模式和混合报酬模式),对目前国内外利润分配机制研究现状进行了综述。在已有研究的基础上对利润分配机制进行了深化研究,探讨了混合报酬模式下的利润分配合作情况,通过引入外控变量,对原有的混合报酬模型进行了扩展,结果表明分配系数随着外控变量的方差的增大而减小,并得到了相关推论。研究了共享报酬模式下的利润分配情况,结果表明,只有收益分配系数大于某一个数值时,双方才可能开始合作。研究了固定报酬模式下的利润分配机制,提出了三种利润分配模式的相互过渡条件,其中,混合报酬模式与共享报酬模式的临界条件是分配系数为0.5,固定报酬模式与共享报酬模式的边界条件是固定报酬必须满足某一特定条件。论文提出了在不同收益分配情况下双方将采取何种利润分配机制,并通过象限方式给出了不同组合情况下的合作模式选择图。基于混合报酬的模式,论文将模型扩展到物流服务供应链的更一般情形,即当存在物流服务组合能力匹配约束时,且在一个物流服务集成商和多个功能型物流服务提供商的情况下,每个主体自身的产出受到他人努力水平的影响时,运用委托代理理论求解物流服务集成商提供给每个提供商最优的分配系数和固定支付,并给出了算例进行分析验证。论文利用前文提出的相关理论分析了天津宝运物流股份有限公司如何加强运输资源供应商管理,提高运输服务质量的案例,也分析了鲁能帆茂物流公司采用多种利润分配模式,积极整合社会资源的案例。分析结果表明,实际企业的案例较好地验证了前文提出的有关理论。最后,给出了论文研究的主要结论以及未来进一步研究的展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 Service supply chain (SSC) is a new research trend in the field of supply chain, while logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is an important branch of SSC. As a prospective development trend, LSSC is one of the hot points in the field of logistics research.LSSC is formed as long as the development of logistics industry. LSSC is a new supply chain of which logistics service integrator (LSI) is the core enterprise. The basic structure of LSSC is: functional logistics service provider (FLSP)→LSI→customer. The main purpose of LSSC is to provide the flexible logistics service for product supply chain. LSSC is a supply chain based essentially on the capacity cooperation. Therefore, doing research on the motivation and coordination method will not only improve the performance of LSSC but also have practical policy-guiding significance for logistics industry.In this paper, the LSSC’s forming reasons, structure and essence were discussed. From the literature review, with the rise of product service and service outsourcing, the research on supply chain is turning from product supply chain to SSC, SSC is becoming a new research trend. After analysing logistics capacity from the domestic and abroad literature, the definition and measurement of logistics capacity was given in this paper. Then, the logistics service development history was discussed by the work dividing theory. The forming reason model of LSSC was put forward. The economic analysis of capacity cooperation in two-echelon LSSC was also made by logistics boundary theory. Two-echelon and multi-echelon structure of LSSC were brought out. Three important factors which determine the length of LSSC were presented. In order to understand the capacity cooperation status of LSSC in China today, a logistics enterprises survey was made. Results from survey shows that capacity cooperation is important in LSSC and capacity cooperation will benefit logistics service operation while some risks of capacity cooperation in LSSC exist. Consequently, it is very significant for the capacity coordination research method in LSSC.As a key part of capacity coordination, before starting the capacity coordination, how to make order allocation when one LSI faces many FLSPs was discussed firstly. Considering the importance of FLSP and indeterminate environment, an order allocation model facing many LSIs in two-echelon LSSC was built in this paper. An order allocation model based on the single logistics capacity was given firstly, then, an order allocation model based on the multiplicate logistics capacities (without capacities matching constraint) was also proposed. Further, an order allocation model based on the multiplicate logistics capacities (with capacities matching constraint) was brought out, and an order allocation model based on the multiplicate logistics capacities (with better capacities matching constraint) was also advanced. These models discussed above are multi-aim plan problems. The detailed solution methods were provided and model solutions were put forward as well. The results shows that with the augmentation of indeterminate environment, the cost of LSI will rise, the general satisfaction degree of FLSP will fall and the general punishment intensity of FLSP will increase. The relationship cost coefficientδhas close connection with the satisfaction degree and punishment intensity of FLSP. With the enlargement ofδ, the satisfaction degree will increase while punishment intensity will decrease.After order allocation was discussed, quantity coordination of capacity cooperation in two-echelon LSSC was analyzed in detail. Firstly, the research on status of capacity cooperation in supply chain was given. And the upriver and downriver capacity cooperation types of LSSC were put forward. The capacity coordination was divided into six types as with/without capacities matching constraints and three cooperation models (including loose cooperation, infirm strategy cooperation and strong strategy cooperation). On the basis of the former researches, the capacity coordination modelⅠ(without capacities matching constraints and infirm strategy cooperation) under the Stackelberg decision in two-echelon LSSC was analyzed. The cost model of LSI and profit model of FLSP were brought out. Then, the capacity coordination modelⅡ(with capacities matching constraints and infirm strategy cooperation), the capacity coordination modelⅢ(without capacities matching constraints and strong strategy cooperation) and the capacity coordination modelⅣ(with capacities matching constraints and strong strategy cooperation) were also put forward. The solution method of these four coordination models under indeterminate environment was proposed. Data simulation was carried out by the software MATLAB 7.0. The coordination results were given. The four coordination results under four coordination types were compared. The coordination result under combination decision was compared with the result under Stackelberg decision. It was founded that the general profit under combination decision is superior to that under Stackelberg decision.During the course of capacity cooperation, logistics service quality supervision and control is very important. Therefore, the quality control and coordination of logistics capacity cooperation in logistics service supply chain is studied. Considering that a two-echelon LSSC includs a logistic service integrator and a supplier and considering the measureless characteristic of service product, this paper established a basic game theoretic model (modelⅠ) for quality supervision of capacity cooperation. In the model LSI can choose to make quality supervision or not, and FLSP can accomplish the task according to the quality contact or choose to cheat. The paper presented the result of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium firstly, discussed the modelⅡin multi-echelon quality coordination when LSI is being punished. Then, the modelⅢconsidered the influence on quality coordination which is caused by the competitions between FLSP. At last, the modelⅣwith the matching capacities was also put forward. Then, the new results of the Nash equilibrium for those models above were given. As a key part of quality control, the coordination, quality evaluation & decision and its three models in LSSC were analyzed. A practical example was given to identify its application. Based on the analysis above, this paper proposed the suggestions about how to intensify the quality coordination and finally gave the conclusions.After the capacity cooperation, rational profit distribution is very significant for long-term stable operation in LSSC. Research on the choice of profit distribution mechanism in the two- echelon LSSC was made on the basis of former researches. Three profit distribution mechanisms (including sharing profit distribution mechanism, fixed profit distribution mechanism and mixed profit distribution mechanism) used in the two-echelon LSSC were summarized and literatures were reviewed in this chapter. This chapter considered the two-echelon LSSC consisting of a manufacturer and a seller. Based on the principle-agent theory, the mixed profit distribution mechanism model was expressed. The result of this model shows the distribution coefficient is a function of the risk aversion coefficient. Then, the sharing profit distribution mechanism model and fixed profit distribution mechanism model were also discussed. The transition conditions among three mechanisms were put forward in this paper. The transition condition between mixed profit distribution mechanism and sharing profit distribution mechanism is that distribution coefficient is equal to 0.5. The transition condition between fixed profit distribution mechanism and sharing profit distribution mechanism is that fixed profit must suit to a certain condition. At last, how to choose the profit distribution mechanism under different cooperation conditions was proposed in detail. Based on the mixed profit distribution mechanism, this paper extended it in more general case. When LSSC has a LSI and many FLSPs and one’s effect is affected by others’ endeavor, this paper gives the optimization distribution coefficient and fixed payment by the principle-agent theory. A practical example was given to identify its application.Case study method was used in this dissertation. How to manage the transportation resource supplier and improve the service quality in Tianjin Baoyun logistics Co.Ltd was analyzed in detail. What’s more, how to integrate the social resources by multiple profit distribution model in Luneng Fanmao logistics Co.ltd was also discussed. Case studies show that it was well consonant with the theories provided in this paper.Finally, the main conclusion and future researche prospect were given.更多还原