【作者】 刘俊；

【导师】 曹建明；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 金融是现代经济的核心，金融机构是金融市场的微观单元。1997年亚洲金融危机等实践一再证明，积弱不振的金融机构是国民经济免疫力低下的重要原因，而金融机构失败极易引发系统性风险，需要国家耗费巨额资源。美国20世纪两次大的金融业危机，救助费用高达几千亿美元；日本“失去的十年”中，经济沉疴难起，银行业高达1万亿美元的不良金融资产牵掣最大：近三十年来，发展中国家频繁发生的金融危机，一再提醒各国政府，必须将问题金融机构的处理，提升至维护国家经济安全、政治稳定的高度。中国金融机构累积的金融风险令人忧心：不良贷款高达几万亿人民币的银行业、历经两年“综合治理整顿”的证券公司、经过五轮整顿的信托投资公司和频传“挤兑丑闻”的基层城市和农村信用社等，已经在局部地区，对当地政治、经济造成了严重负面影响。无疑，重视问题金融机构的处理，研究其中的法律问题，已事关中国政治、经济稳定全局，极具现实和紧迫性。论文从金融全球化下问题金融机构与国家金融安全的关联入手，分析问题金融机构的产生原因、各国处理问题金融机构权责机关的分权与合作，讨论各国处理问题金融机构的法律方法，特别对各国金融机构市场退出的法律机制与实践挑战进行挖掘，总结了晚近各国相关改革趋势。最后着眼于中国实践及其法律完善。论文的逻辑顺序是：问题金融机构为什么会产生，即原因及其预防；由谁处理，即权责机关：采用何种方法处理，即法律方法和失败后如何进行市场退出。本文共分八章：第一章的标题是“金融全球化下的问题金融机构”。该章主要观点是：金融全球化下金融机构风险更加集中，应从国家安全高度看待问题金融机构的处置。本章界定了“问题金融机构”的概念，通过概念比较，提出“问题金融机构”既包括没有遵守金融监管审慎法则的“违法违规机构”，也包括财务亏空严重的“陷入困境机构”，还包括经营失败和进入破产程序的金融机构。扩展研究对象的目的在于，督促权责机关及早介入，遏制金融机构濒临危机时道德风险的蔓延。本章分别介绍了发达国家、新兴工业化国家和发展中国家的处理特点，勾勒出各国政府处理问题金融机构机制的历史变化。最后，从比较法上，对各国相关立法例进行分类：即对问题金融机构处理实施普通适用法的国家，以英国为典型；实施特殊适用法的国家，以美国为典型。第二章的标题是“各国问题金融机构的产生原因及其预防”。该章主要观点是：问题金融机构的产生原因中，金融欺诈和内部人舞弊是主要的内部因素；金融监管容忍和政府不当干预是主要外部因素。预防机制应注重内部人舞弊和金融监管容忍因素的监控，相关预防措施应进行成本收益分析。针对内部人舞弊，各国规范金融机构内部人交易的规则日益绵密；针对分散投资风险失败，各国对金融机构的资产负债业务进行总量管制和资本充足规范：为提高监管效率、减少金融监管容忍，各国竞相强化执行机制，引入结构化早期介入规则，构建以资本为基准的风险早期预警机制。第三章的标题是“各国问题金融机构处理的权责机关”，该章主要观点是：问题金融机构处置一定涉及行政与司法的分权与协作，各国处置过程日益强调行政权责机关主导，而司法机关制衡作用也在凸显。由于处理问题金融机构的特点：专业要求高、时间非常紧急、随时可能动用巨额资源等原因，晚近各国日益强调行政权责机关主导处理过程。按照现代法治国理念，为督促行政权责机关审慎行使对问题金融机构的处理权，各国逐步建立了相关行政审查和司法审查程序，并针对行政权责机关行使处理权时的恣意作为和监管容忍，勾勒出其承担责任的法律框架。第四章的标题是“各国处理问题金融机构的法律方法”，该章主要观点是：各国处置问题金融机构的法律方法日益多元，但逐渐强调遵循成本最小化的原则。此外，救助和清算方法应有明确的衔接标准。针对内部人舞弊、违法经营或管理缺失等因素而导致的问题金融机构，处理方法应是控制机构的管理和资产，典型措施如接管等；针对陷入财务困境的机构，处理方法应是注入新的资金，典型措施如并购、购买与承受交易，以恢复金融机构的安全与稳健。因此，一国相关处理方法的制度框架应具备相当的弹性，使得权责机关有较多的选择空间。而面对日益繁复的救助方法，各国晚近金融改革日益强调处理方法的成本最小化要求；更注重重组救助方法的整合；财务援助应确保私主体先用尽自力救助；构建重组救助和破产清算方法衔接的制度性框架。第五章的标题是“各国金融机构市场退出及债务清偿的实践挑战”。该章主要观点是：问题金融机构市场退出的核心在于解决债务清偿问题，而美日等国金融安全网在实践中都遭遇挑战，负面影响不容忽视。比较法上，各国问题金融机构的市场退出，都必须考虑本国固有的政治、经济和法制等因素。相应地，债务清偿这一市场退出的核心问题，更集中体现了各国政党政治、官僚集团和利益团体等博弈的复杂过程，因此必须从政策和法律角度分析。各国为妥善处理债务清偿而建立的金融安全网，日益沦为国家动用公共资源救助债务清偿的工具。论文通过对美日不同金融安全网模式的实证分析，论证各国政府在救助问题金融机构债务清偿的议题上，遭遇了严峻的实践挑战，也有许多教训值得总结。第六章的标题是“晚近各国问题金融机构市场退出的法律改革”。该章主要观点是：晚近各国市场退出改革方向更强调政府干涉与市场约束机制的平衡。由于分别在1980年代和1990年代遭遇了严重的金融业危机，美日等国通过立法发起了力度颇大的金融改革，自然，这些国家晚近金融法制改革的经验最值得借鉴。包括改革金融服务消费者的保护机制、加重问题金融机构负责人的忠实勤勉义务、建立金融机构破产风险的市场化分配机制以及完善国家救助债务清偿的实体和程序规则。上述改革措施中，如加重问题金融机构负责人的忠实勤勉义务，更强调政府对金融机构公司治理的深度介入；而改革金融服务消费者保护机制、完善国家救助规范等强化了市场约束机制。第七章的标题是“中国问题金融机构市场退出的政策与法律问题”。该章主要观点是：中国金融机构市场退出从政策和法律层面都暴露严重问题，特别是政府实际承担无限保证救助义务，亟待改革。如第五章分析，日本的许多教训是中国的“前车之鉴"。特别是美国学者针对日本“住专案”等金融丑闻，提炼的“金融监管卡特尔”分析框架，对我国同样适用。本章以我国处理新疆德隆这家民营金融机构为个案，再引证过去处理问题银行、证券、信托公司和信用社的教训，论证了中国政府过度救助问题金融机构的命题。而金融安全网的法律缺陷，包括相关法律位阶较低，法律授权不足，制度衔接不畅、甚至冲突等问题，亟待全盘整合。第八章的标题是“金融全球化下中国金融安全的法制完善"。该章主要观点是：应在国家安全视野下，着手中国金融稳定的法制完善。该章分析了现阶段中国金融机构的风险集中问题，认为金融全球化下我国政府化解金融风险的任务更加紧迫和繁重。针对金融安全网的政策完善，我国政府长期实施的隐性无限保证债务清偿的传统路径，亟待扬弃。处理思路的转型，应吸取中国治理黄河的“堵不如疏”的教训；应注重行政权责机关之间及与司法机关的权力协调，建立制度化协调框架，完善专业化处置机关的职责履行。切实将金融安全网的完善提升至关系“国家金融安全”的高度。最后，对中国国家救助债务清偿的制度构建，从完善实体和程序规则、中央与地方关系处理和全球性金融机构“太大而不能倒”三方面，提出了建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Financial services are the core of the modern economy, and the soundness offinancial institutions is crucial to the economic stability. While the Asian financialcrisis 1997 was caused in part by weak financial sectors, the affected governmentshave expended enormous resources to promote financial stability.The total loss during the Great Depression and Savings & Loan crisis in USA,amounted to several hundred billion dollars. And the so called ’lost decade’ in 1990sin Japan, can be directly attributed to one thousand billion non-performing bankingloans. Over the past three decades, financial crises have occurred with increasingfrequency in developing countries, warned the domestic governments must pay moreattention to the legal resolution of problem financial institutions, which relates withthe national economic safety and political stability.The accumulated financial risks in the Chinese financial institutions has beenheavyhearted problem, include several thousand billion yuan non-performing bankingloans, the broker-dealers are deep waist in the ’Comprehensive Treatment’ since 2004,five round reconstruction of trust companies, and many bank-run scandals from cityand rural grass-roots credit unions. Obviously, the construction of a good legalresolution mechanism of problem financial institutions, relates not only to the survival of financial institutions, but also to the political and economic stability in China.The thesis starts from the relation between problem financial institutions underfinancial globalization and national financial stability, analyzes the causes of problemfinancial institutions, the responsible authorities, and the legal methods in theresolution, especially highlights the practical challenge confronted with exitmechanism of failed financial institutions, and the recent reform trends. Finally,chapter seven and eight devote on the analysis of Chinese current practice andintroduce reform proposals. The thesis includes eight chapters.Chapter one highlights the problem financial institutions under the financialglobalization. Financial deregulation encourages financial institutions to expand theirinvolvement in the securities and real estate market, and it also intensifies competitionbetween banks and nonbank financial intermediaries. As a result, financialliberalization typically increases the vulnerability of the financial system to suddencollapse in asset values. For these reasons, deregulation has been associated withboom-and-bust cycles and banking crises in many countries since the 1970s. Thechapter defines the concept of ’problem financial institutions’, which includes notonly ’failed financial institutions’, ’institutions in trouble, ’insolvent financialinstitutions’, but the ’illegitimate financial institutions’, which violate prudentialregulatory rules. Why the wider research object, because of the need to minimize oravoid losses to creditors, the legal resolution procedures must commence earlier andtherefore precede general bankruptcy proceedings. In some of these countries therewill exist special proceedings under the financial law, but in some countries, theUnited Kingdom for example, bank insolvencies are dealt with under the generalinsolvency law in a judicial process.Chapter two analyses the causes of problem financial institution and itsprevention. From the internal aspect, the causes of the institutional failures can bedivided into three categories: (1) those that result from financial fraud and insider abuse; (2) those that result from insufficient asset diversification; and (3) badmanagement and illegitimate operation. From the outside perspective, the causes ofthe institutional failures include (1) regulatory forbearance; (2) wrongfulgovernmental intervention. And the recent developments of prevention mechanismsinclude, effective prudential regulation, flexible enforcement mechanism includes notonly a consideration of formal remedial measures but also informal remedialmeasures, and the early warning system. To restrict the regulatory forbearance, thereis a interesting discussion of structured early intervention and resolution procedureswhich provide a system of mandatory graduated corrective measures. Structured earlyintervention and resolution make it mandatory for the regulatory authority to takeearly action which is mandatory and not subject to any discretion on the part of theregulator. Such a course of action is aimed at preventing regulators from acting toolate. For choosing the most efficient preventive actions, the cost-benefit analysismethod is helpful.Chapter three provides a detailed examination of the institutional framework forauthorities involved in resolution of problem financial institutions. The authorities canbe classified into two categories: administrative (regulatory) and judicial authority, theformer includes a long list, such as financial supervisory authority, central bank anddeposit protection agency. After a thorough comparison of advantages anddisadvantages of regulatory and judicial insolvency procedures, the conclusion istransferring certain judicial functions to an administrative authority may result inincreased efficiency. The chapter is concerned with the control of regulatory decisionsand considers such matters as administrative review and judicial control of actions ofthe financial regulator, examines the liability of the financial supervisory authority,and it has both the nature and legal basis of potential liability, including such mattersas possible exemption for policy decisions and who will have a cause of action.Chapter four is concerned with legal methods used in the course of resolution ofproblem financial institutions. Upon the initiation of a closure and insolvency procedure, the insolvent institution ceases to exist. If possible, the ongoing businessmay be maintained by regulatory taking control of the problem institution’smanagement and/or assets. Also the financial assistance, includes merge andacquisition, P& A, should be encouraged as preferable to a piecemeal liquidation,which can improve the financial condition directly. Restructuring through state aidmust be limited to exceptional situations where the failure of a institution present to arisk to the financial system as a whole.Chapter five deals with exit mechanism of problem financial institutions. Inpractice, the successful exit will be confronted with many difficulties, which arerooted in the political, economic, and legal traditions. And the core difficulty of exit isthe debt payment, which is closely relates to the governmental safety net. In essence,the safety net is the governmental bailouts of debt payment with the public resources.The different paths dealing with the debt payment, can be classified into explicit andimplicit government-run safety net, which represented by USA and Japanrespectively.Chapter six introduces the recent legal reform trends in exit mechanism. Firstly,as to the relation between the protection mechanism of financial services customersand governmental safety net, the author draws the following principal conclusionsfrom the USA and Japanese experience, include (1) deposit insurance, for all its flaws,is superior to the real-world alternative—implicit government protection of depositorsand discretionary regulatory intervention in bank distress, (2) a well-designed explicitdeposit insurance system that includes a credible bank closure policy is the startingpoint for the design of effective private alternatives to a government-run safety net,and (3) the trend toward greater institutionalization of the Japanese safetynet—culminating in recent legislation to address the financial crisis—reflects increasedpolitical competition and greater emphasis on legal as opposed to reputational systemsof economic ordering in that country. And the other legal reforms in exit policyinclude: emphasis of the expanding obligations of the principals of financial institutions, construction of insolvency risks distribution mechanism based on themarket orientation, and the formation of the substantial and procedural rulesconcerning the governmental bailouts.Chapter seven analyzes the exit of problem financial institutions in China fromthe policy and legal perspective. Based on the analysis of chapter five, Japanese’Financial Regulatory Cartel’ framework introduced by the American scholars, alsocan be applied in China. The chapter concentrates on the recent case of governmentalbailout of ’Xinjiang Delong’, a private financial holding company, and combines withthe past lessons from the governmental bailouts of problem banks, broker-dealers andtrust companies since 1995, and comes to the conclusion that the Chinese governmenthas provided unlimited guarantee on the debt payment implicitly.In the last chapter, the author proposes some legal and institutional reformsuggestions concerning the financial stability in China. Firstly, government mustmonitor the aggregated financial risks under financial globalization closely, andhighlight the early prevention. Secondly, government must abandon the traditionalbailout approach, the transparent ex ante ground rules for governmental intervention,are preferable to protections based on the noninstitutionalized reputation anddiscretionary intervention of financial regulators. Finally, the reform trend ofgovernmental bailout shall toward greater institutionalization of the Chinese safety netas a promising development reflecting significant changes in our country’s politicaland legal structures. To minimize the negative impacts of TBTF policy, governmentmay take three steps to deal with large international financial groups in distress.更多还原