【作者】 张飞；

【导师】 李元； 曲福田；

【作者基本信息】 南京农业大学 ， 土地资源管理， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 农地非农化是经济发展中不可避免的趋势，但由于农地是一种不可替代的自然资源，不仅具有生产的经济价值，还具有粮食安全保障、生态安全保障等社会价值，能否保有足够数量的农地资源直接关系到一个国家能否实现社会经济的可持续发展，因此大多数国家普遍采用各种措施干预农地非农化进程。我国政府也一直很关注农地非农化问题，并制定了世界上最严格的耕地保护和土地管理制度来控制农地非农化进程。但与一般市场经济国家不同，我国政府的权力直接介入农地非农化进程之中，使农地非农化成为一种政府行为。因此，在我国，政府行为直接关系到农地非农化状况，它既可能是实现农地有序非农化的关键，也可能是造成农地无序非农化的根源。而现实中，政府行为、尤其是地方政府行为往往是农地无序非农化的重要原因。所以要研究我国农地非农现状及存在的问题，就必须将政府作为一个重要的研究对象。我们有必要知道当前我国政府在农地非农化中的行为特征及其制度成因。本文从中央与地方政府之间博弈的视角，分析了这些问题，以期为完善政府行为、促进农地有序非农化提供一个有益的参考。文章首先简要地阐述了研究问题的背景、研究内容、基本概念、研究思路、研究方法和数据来源；回顾了关于农地非农化中政府行为问题的研究动态，并对这些成果进行了简要的评述。接下来文章重点分析了农地非农化与我国政府行为目标之间的关系，以期得出中央政府与地方政府在农地非农化中行为取向。研究表明，农地非农化不仅是土地资源分配的过程，也对政府行为目标的实现产生重要影响。农地非农化的规模、速度，以及农地非农化过程中的土地收益分配、土地价格、程序等都与中央政府、地方政府目标的实现有着密切的关系。根据农地非农化与中央政府、地方政府行为目标之间的关系，笔者认为改革开放之前，中央政府在农地非农化中的行为取向主要为降低农地非农化的成本；改革开放之后，中央政府在农地非农化中的行为取向主要有：控制农地非农化规模，降低农地非农化的成本，推进土地市场化改革，维护失地农民利益。至于地方政府，改革开放之前，其在农地非农化中的行为取向主要是认真执行中央政府的农地非农化政策，降低农地非农化的成本。改革开放之后，由于地方政府追求的目标多样化，因此，其在农地非农化中的行为取向也多样化，具体来说包括：认真执行中央政府的农地非农化政策；追求农地非农化规模最大化；在土地市场化改革方面，地方政府存在矛盾的行为取向。总之，地方政府希望从农地非农化中获得更多的非农建设用地和资本，以便获得更多的经济和政治利益。显然，改革开放之后，中央政府与地方政府在农地非农化中的行为取向存在着不一致，这也意味着二者在农地非农化中可能存在博弈关系。在分析农地非农化中的政府行为取向后，文章分析了中央政府与地方政府在农地非农化中的行为方式，即它们是采取哪些方式来实现自己的目标、体现自己的行为取向。研究表明，中央政府主要通过制定、修改农地非农化政策，监督地方政府的农地非农化行为等方式来实现其目标。改革开放之前，中央政府通过取消土地市场，制定农地资源非农化计划配置制度来达到降低农地非农化成本的目的。但这一制度安排，也使在农地非农化中，中央政府与地方政府形成特殊的委托代理关系，地方政府具有与中央政府博弈的能力。改革开放之后，中央政府则通过继续维持土地征用的强制性、建立土地市场制度、世界上最严格的耕地保护制度等来达到自己的目的。对于地方政府而言，在改革开放之前，其主要通过认真执行中央政府的农地非农化政策来达到自己的目标；改革开放之后，虽然执行中央政府的农地非农化政策也可以获取正常利益，但在相关制度激励下它们大多会采取违规或创新的方式来获取额外利益。至于中央政府与地方政府在现实中究竟采取什么样的行为方式，则取决于双方博弈的情况。为了更真实地反映中央政府与地方政府在农地非农化中的行为，文章构建了一个中央政府与地方政府在农地非农化中博弈模型，主要对中央政府的监督行为、制度变革行为及地方政府行为进行了分析。研究表明，中央政府对地方政府违规农地非农化行为的查处力度与国民经济形势息息相关。当国民经济处于紧缩状态时，中央政府的查处力度并不高；而当国民经济处于过热状态，中央政府的查处力度就会加大。传统的发展观念、现行农地非农化政策的缺陷等是造成这种现象的主要原因。对于地方政府而言，在一般情况下，“违规”是地方政府的最优选择，这主要因为现行农地非农化政策没有满足激励相容约束条件，主要表现在对地方政府违规农地非农化行为约束机制的非刚性及对地方政府的农地非农化行为的激励机制扭曲。不过当中央政府加大查处力度时，“违规”可能不是地方政府的最优选择。由于在现行制度下，中央政府并没有实现效用最大化，因此其存在制度变革的动机。其实改革开放以来，中央政府已对农地非农化政策进行过多次变革，但由于没有根本改变地方政府的成本收益格局，而使改革并没有达到预期目标。因此，将后应从增加地方政府的违规农地非农化行为的成本、减少地方政府农地非农化收益等方面进行改革。在理论分析之后，文章还对“××事件”这一案例进行了细致的分析，以印证前面的理论分析。基于以上的研究结果，文章提出了完善政府行为的政策建议，如加强教育，使广大政府官员树立科学的发展观和正确的政绩观；将中央政府查处行为变为“可置信”的威胁；健全地方政府农地非农化行为的激励机制；中央政府要尊重已有的农地非农化政策制度；转变农地非农化中的政府职能等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Land non-agricultural conversion is an inevitable trend during the economic growthprocess. However, as indispensable natural resource, farmland has such societal value asfood and ecological security, besides economic value. Enough farmland is the guarantee acountry achieves sustainable development. As a result, many countries intervene in thecourse of land non-agricultural conversion. Our government has also been concerning itand constituted the strictest system of cultivated land protection and land management tocontrol it. Different from general market economy country, our country directly intervenesinto the course of land non-agricultural conversion and makes it behavior of government.So in our country, the behavior of government directly influences the land non-agriculturalconversion, it may be the key or foundation of the land well-regulated conversion.However in the real life, the behavior of government, especially local governmentssometimes becomes the significant reason of the land out-of-order conversion. Thereforegovernment should be an important object in the study on the land conversion in ourcountry. And it is necessary to know the behavior characteristic of the government and itssystem causation. From the view of game between the central and local governments, thisthesis analyses these problems in order to offer references for perfecting the governmentbehavior and accelerating the land well-regulated conversion.Firstly, the thesis expatiates on the background, content, basic concept, train ofthoughts, method and data source of the study. It reviews and appraises the existingcorrelative study.The main part is concerning land non-agricultural conversion and the government goal.This part is to explain the orientation of the central and local governments. The resultsshow that land non-agricultural conversion is not only the process of land resourceallocation, but also the process of affecting the government behavior objective. Its scale,speed, procedures, distribution of land income and the land prices are all related to the central and local governments objectives. According to the relationship between the landnon-agricultural conversion and the government objectives, the author thinks that, beforereform and opening-up the orientation of central government is to reduce the cost of theland non-agricultural conversion and since that it turns into restraining its scale, reducingits cost, promoting land market reform and protecting the behalf of farmer without land.Accordingly, before it the orientation of local governments is to implement the centralgovernment’s policy. Since reform and opening-up, it becomes multiplex includingimplementing the central government’s policy, seeking to maximize the scale of landnon-agricultural conversion and self-contradictory orientation in land market reform. In aword, the local governments hope to gain more land and capital for non-agriculturalconstruction, in order to obtain greater economic and political interests. Apparently, there isdisaccord between the behavior orientations of central and local governments since reformand opening-up, which means there may be game between them during the process of landnon-agricultural conversion.After that the analysis of the orientations of the central and local governments in theprocess of land conversion, the article analyzes their modes. The study shows that thecentral government achieves its goals mainly through the formulation and revision of thepolicy of land conversion, monitor the local governments’ behavior. Before reform andopening-up, the central government achieves its goal by the way of canceling land marketand making land confiscation the main approach of land non-agricultural conversion.However this system arrangement also enables the local governments game with the centralgovernment. Since reform and opening-up, the central government maintains thecompelling land confiscation, the strictest farmland protection system and so on, toachieves its goals. As for the local governments, they achieve their goals throughimplementing the central government’s policy before it and out-of-line or innovative waysafter it. The choice of concrete behavior mode lies on the game status between them.A theoretical game model is constructed in order to explain local governments’behaviors as well as the monitor and innovation of the central government during theprogress of the land non-agricultural conversion. The results show that the centralgovernment punishment is related to the national economic situation. When in a balancedor constrictive situation, the central government may relax; when in a overheated situation,the central government will intensify the punishment. The cause is the conventionalconcept of development and limitations of the existing system. As for local governments, "illegal" is commonly the best choice. Under the existing system, the central government has the motive to change the system because it has not made the avail maximum. In fact, the central government has carded out transformation several times since reform and opening-up, but invalid. From now on, the cost of local governments for "illegal" should be increased and the benefits of local government from the land non-agricultural conversion should be reduced.After the theoretical analysis, the thesis investigates the“××Event" in order to verify it.Based on the aforementioned study, the thesis finally advances suggestions to perfect the government behaviors, such as strengthening education to make officer building up correct views of development and achievement, making the punishment of central government believable threaten, transiting the governments’ function during the course of the land non-agricultural conversion.更多还原