【作者】 贺向明；

【导师】 殷孟波；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 金融学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 中国的改革开放一场微观经济主体逐渐担负起经济发展的主力军的过程,商业银行也从服从政府指令的出纳人转变为寻求利润增长的微观金融主体。在这场波澜壮阔的经济转轨过程中,商业银行的行为始终受到各界的关注,其中尤为受到争议的是商业银行在信贷市场上的诸多表现。企业对银行贷款的依存性很高,在银行的贷款发放中,商业银行为何如此偏好担保贷款?国有性质的企业容易获得银行的贷款,非国有性质的企业为何受到银行的歧视,获得贷款费尽周折?尽管有些行业和部门产能已经过剩,但是银行贷款还源源不断的流入,银行为何倾向某些行业、部门和企业贷款?在信贷市场上,一方面中小企业获得银行贷款如此艰难,另一方面银行又不断向大企业发放贷款,银行的这种规模偏好行为是否合理?总之,我国的信贷市场呈现出不同于西方发达国家信贷市场的特征,典型表现为担保偏好行为、信贷歧视行为、信贷羊群行为。正确回答这些问题,对于进一步促进我国经济的快速发展,提高信贷市场效率,优化银行信贷行为,提高储蓄转化为投资的效率,加快我国市场化改革的进程,尽快实现改革开放的战略目标有着重要的理论和现实意义。“他山之石,可以攻玉”,论文将基于西方学者对成熟市场经济体制中信贷市场和商业银行研究的基础上,从微观的视角和商业银行的角度,结合我国经济体制和银行改革的现状,剖析我国商业银行的信贷行为。商业银行信贷行为,就是银行在一定的制度框架下,基于所掌握的信息,为达成某种经济或者政治的目标,在与企业进行的一系列信贷交易活动中所表现出来的行为。论文基于如下研究思路:理论铺垫——研究框架——现实行为表现——理论解释——总结与建议。商业银行信贷行为的研究涉及到交易、交易成本、信贷合约、制度与信息,不确定性等诸多理论。第二章将通过梳理相关的理论来引出商业银行信贷行为研究的诸多关键要素。信贷交易与瞬时内完成的一般市场交易不同,它是交易双方的跨时交易活动,它既涉及到时间因素,又涉及到不确定的将来,因此,信贷交易存在着极大的风险。不确定性影响者信贷交易双方的行为选择,但是信贷交易主体——商业银行受到的影响更大些,因为信贷交易的基础是信贷主体预期企业在未来的一定时间内偿还银行贷款,企业的行为选择直接关系到银行的交易结果——利润。因此,为了防范信贷交易风险,银行要搜集信息,耗费一系列的成本。商业银行的信贷行为都在信贷交易过程中得以体现,信贷交易是一种不确定性的交易。不确定性与信息具有紧密关系,正是信息的不完全和不对称性才给信贷交易主体带来了不确定性。而不确定性与信息又因不同制度环境与经济环境而存在差异,在不确定较高的环境中,信贷主体搜集、处理信息成本较高。第三章建立商业银行信贷研究的基本框架,以不确定性以及信息的不完全和信息不对称为起点,以商业银行与企业的信贷交易过程为主线,集中研究商业银行的信贷行为。要解释商业银行的信贷行为必须考虑两个方面:一是商业银行有限理性和行为目标;二是商业银行的约束条件——不确定性和信息。商业银行的有限理性使得商业银行不可能完全了解企业,商业银行行为目标是降低信贷交易的成本下的经济利润最大化。商业银行的约束条件就是商业银行的行为受到信息不完全性和信息不对称性的影响,信贷交易的整个过程是不确定的。商业银行通过一系列合约以及一系列行为获取信息,降低信贷交易的不确定性。第四章将通过商业银行信贷数据来揭示商业银行的信贷行为表现。商业银行具有担保偏好行为,即偏好发放担保贷款。商业银行具有信贷歧视行为,即经济性质歧视和期限歧视。商业银行具有信贷集中行为,即规模集中和行业集中。第五章解释了担保偏好行为。认为在商业银行的信贷交易中,信贷风险控制是商业银行面临的一个重要问题。在经济转轨时期,由于我国商业银行与企业之间存在事前和事后的信息不对称,加上金融产权和企业产权的不明晰,使得“逆向选择”和“道德风险”演变为严重的信用问题,还有一个问题是经济转轨过程中,信息不完全使信贷交易存在很高的不确定性,银行为了降低不确定性,有两种方案可供选择,一是,商业银行进行较强的筛选、监督和审查活动,获取企业的信息;二是,商业银行依靠担保,节约筛选成本、监督成本和审查成本。有限理性的商业银行当然会选择后者。但是,担保行为不能完全替代银行的筛选、监督和审查活动,因为担保品本身也存在诸如价值波动等不确定性。第六章解释了信贷歧视行为。银行偏好对国有性质的客户发放贷款,并对非国有性质的客户收取较高的利率加成,因此,银行表现出根据企业经济性质发放贷款的信贷歧视行为。银行按照企业的经济性质来发放贷款,这是银行的理性选择。企业与政府有某种关系,对银行来说这是一种重要的“软信息”,能够降低银行的筛选成本、监督成本和审查成本。银行对国有性质的客户银行偏好发放中长期贷款,即“喜长厌短”,对非国有性质的客户银行偏好发放短期贷款,即“喜短厌长”,也就是说银行具有信贷的“期限歧视”行为。期限歧视可以说是经济性质歧视的一种期限表示。国有性质的企业由于与政府的关系,能够获得经济中较好的项目,项目投资的不确定性低于非国有性质的企业。银行充分利用这些信息,对国有性质的企业给予长期信贷支持。非国有性质的企业虽然也能高效率完成这些项目,但是由于政府的歧视而不能获得。而且即便非国有性质的企业也有长期项目,由于非国有性质的企业在经济中的受到不确定冲击较大,银行也一般偏好对此发放短期贷款,即缩短贷款期限,增加交易次数,不断获取企业信息,降低不确定性和交易成本。信贷歧视的制度基础依然是政府给予的两类企业非公正的市场地位。因此,公平的市场竞争环境对于改善银行信贷歧视具有重要意义。第七章解释了商业银行的信贷集中行为。研究表明商业银行的信贷集中行为有两方面原因:一是银行认为制度性信息一种软信息。经济转轨阶段政府的政策和隐性担保机制作为一种重要信息降低了银行和企业之间信贷交易的不确定性。二是商业银行信贷集中行为降低了商业银行信贷交易成本,增加了信贷交易的收益。第八章为论文总结。本章对论文的分析框架和结论进行了总结,并提出了一些商业银行信贷行为优化的建议。本文从研究视角、研究内容、研究结论三个方面具有创新。1.研究视角创新研究商业银行的信贷问题一般主要研究商业银行银行的信贷配给行为。本文认为信贷配给只是商业银行信贷行为的一种表现。商业银行在一定的目标和外部信息约束下,为了降低信贷交易的不确定和信息不对称程度,还会有其他表现,如担保偏好行为。本文在研究视角上不再局限于信贷配给,而是通过数据观察信贷表现,然后对信贷表现进行理论解释。本文意在通过研究银行的信贷行为,为信贷行为的优化提出可行的指导建议。2.研究内容创新信贷行为研究既涉及到商业银行的信贷决策过程和决策的外部环境,也涉及到商业银行的偏好以及收益和风险态度。本文并没有研究商业银行信贷决策的整个过程,而是抓住银行信贷决策过程的一些重要阶段——信贷交易进行研究。在借鉴前人研究的基础上,本文运用交易成本和信息经济学的理论研究商业银行的信贷行为,将信贷交易和信贷行为一并作为本文的研究内容。3.研究结论创新本文的研究结论也有创新。通过对商业银行三种典型的信贷行为的研究,本文得出如下结论:商业银行目前的信贷行为具有充分的合理性,符合其自身的利益原则,担保偏好、信贷歧视、信贷集中都是商业银行在有限理性和外在约束下,节约信贷交易成本,降低不确定的理性选择。论文针对商业银行信贷行为研究提供了一个初步的框架。该框架的核心要素是信贷交易的不确定下和交易双方的信息不对称。更多还原

【Abstract】 Enterprises take on the role of the main force of developing economy during the reformation. Commercial banks do not obey government’s orders and become self-governed financial institution. During the reformation, commercial bank’s behavior has been noticed by all kinds of corporation and institution. Banks prefer to provide loan with security and loan to state-run enterprises. Banks have the discrimination to many enterprises which are not state-run enterprises. Many banks loan to the same location and industry and enterprise. In China’s credit market, the credit behaviors of commercial banks are different from that of developed countries. Small and medium-sized enterprises have difficulties in acquiring the loan and large enterprises are easy to acquire the loan. To solve these problems has theoretical and practical significance to accelerate the economic development and to improve the efficiency of credit market and to optimize the credit behavior and to advance the transformation efficiency from saving to investing and to realize the strategic aim. To be based on mature market economy system and commercial bank, the dissertation explains the China’s commercial bank’s credit behavior from microeconomics and commercial bank, with the background of China’s economic reform.The definition of credit behavior is that banks carry credit trade with enterprise for economic and political aim according to information on credit and enterprise.Study on commercial bank’s credit behavior touches on trade and transaction cost and credit contract and financial institution and information and uncertainty etc. Chapter 2 will spread out these theories. Credit transaction is different from common market transaction. Credit transaction is a transaction that involves different time and uncertainty. So, credit transaction has high risk. Uncertainty influences the choice between the commercial bank and the enterprise. But commercial bank shoulders the higher risk than enterprises. Credit transaction must spend some cost. There are compact relationship between uncertainty and information.Chapter 3 will establish basic frame of commercial bank’s credit behavior. The frame starts with uncertainty and information. The frame involves two dimensions which are limited rational and restriction. Because of limited rational, the aim of commercial bank is to reduce the transaction cost. Commercial bank must obtain information and reduce the uncertainty.Institution is a important soft information.Undercertainty and information are key factors of the frame of credit behavior.Credit transaction is risky transacton.Commercial bank is the undertaker.Chapter 4 gathers many credit data and post the credit behavior through these data. They involve preference for loan with security, credit discrimination and credit herd effect.Chapter 5 explains preference for loan with security. The chapter thinks loan with security can reduce transaction cost and uncertainty.During the credit transaction, commercial banks get good enterprises relying on collateral and transfer screening cost and monitoring cost and auditing cost.But collateral and screening /monitoring functions are not substitution.Because screening /monitoring functions are bank’s important function which is a reason why banks can exist.Chapter 6 explains credit discrimination. The chapter thinks institution is a soft information, which can reduce the uncertainty of credit transaction.Banks prefer to loan to state-run enterprises. State-run enterprises are easy to get long-run loan.The foundation of credit is present economic institution.The institution make the result of the enterprises’s investment uncertain, including exogenous and endogenetric. Credit discrimination is rational choice of commercial bank.Chapter 7 explains credit herd effect. Credit herd is a rational choice of commercial bank during the present condition.The behavior can save credit transaction cost, especially screening and monitoring cost. Credit herd effect will bring high risk to the credit market.Government should lead the direction of credit fund.Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation.The Chapter also put forward some advice on optimization of credit behavior.In the dissertation, there are three innovations that are angle of view, content and conclusion.The angle of view of the dissertation is novel.The theories of economics can explain the behavior of consumer and the behavior of producer, which are consumer theory and producer theory separately.But at present, there is not a theory that can explain the credit behavior of commercial banks.The dissertation specializes theory of credit behavior of commercial banks.The dissertiation will aim at establish the frame of the study on credit behavior.The content of dissertation is novel.The dissertation studies the credit transaction between commercial banks and enterprises and some credit behaviors of commercial banks.The dissertation explains three behaviors china’s commercial banks.The conclusions of the dissertation are novel.Through study, the dissertation makes some important conclusions.Credit behavior is rational for commercial banks. Credit mechanism can reduce transaction cost and uncertainty of commercial banks.更多还原