【作者】 张其山；

【导师】 陈金钊；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 法学理论， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 传统的司法三段论的思维模式过于僵化，使本来应该生机勃勃的司法过程变的呆板僵化。因此，法律逻辑与法律论证理论的研究，多倾向于放弃司法三段论的思维范式，而以某种形式规则或实质标准来替代。然而，这些理论的研究并未使法官判决过程变得的简单，它只在构建理想的辩论模型，而没有考虑如何为法官判决提供一个清楚的判决过程的指引。而通过两大法系及我国的司法实践的考查以及相关的理论探究，我们发现，无论是司法实践，还是理论领域，司法三段论作为法官判决的思维技术，其作用仍然不可替代。我们所要做的，不是抛弃，而是要对其进行结构重构，以克服传统司法三段论的理论缺陷。本文的目的就在于通过重构司法三段论的结构来克服传统司法三段论理论的本质缺陷，并借助法律论证理论的研究成果，对法官的判决过程进行描述。因为对司法三段论以及法律论证理论的研究在我国还非常薄弱，因此本文多借助于国外学者的研究成果，通过比较分析，来完成对司法三段论的结构重建。在第一章中，我考察了大陆法系、英美法系以及我国的司法判决模式。大陆法系采用的是演绎式审判模式，这是与大陆法系法典化的历史传统和世俗自然法及立法至上的司法哲学相一致，而英美法系采用的是例推式的审判模式，这是与英美法系的判例法传统和法律至上的司法原则相一致。现代罗马法的力量则在于抽象概念的逻辑发展，而普通法的力量来自于它对具体争议的解决。表面上，大陆法系的司法运作是在法律文字与案件事态之间的往返对照，而判例法系则是在案件与案件之间的“泛类推适用”；大陆法系注重案件事态与法律规范的契合，英美法系则更多地将案件的处理与先例一致起来，二者似乎迥然不同。但是，判例法系的法官们的判决并非仅仅从表象上注重当前案件与先例的一致，而是深入分析先前法官的判决理由，从中抽出具有概括性的法律原则或法律规则，这些规则有些隐藏于多少年来一脉相承的判例间，有些则被立法机关以法典的形式明确规定出来，因此它与从成文法规范中得到判决理由并无本质的区别。相反，大陆法系的法官也并非像以往学者所言的那样仅从法规出发就自然而然地得到判决结果，而是在法律规范与案件事态之间不断的“目光流转”，因此对每一个案件来说，都是法律规范被“具体化”的过程。因此，两大法系法律思维方式的差别并不在于是否存在三段论的思维形式，而在于大前提来源、表现形式以及小前提的获得等方面存在着重大差异。英美法系的法官判决模式采取的是一种综合性的法律思维技术，尽管其判决也是根据一个隐藏在先例以及成文法等既存法律资料中的普遍性原则，通过先例事实与当前案件事实进行比较，经过归摄和识别技术，对当前案件作出判决的法律过程，在结构上和大陆法系的司法三段论的涵摄模式并无二致。林立教授认为，“两大法系的司法逻辑其实不是有那么大的差别的，正因如此，两大法系的司法逻辑其实是一致的。”只不过英美法系的法官在发现大小前提的过程中所起到的作用比大陆法系要重要的多。“司法近代化过程是实现以形式逻辑为基质的司法形式理性化过程。尽管在世界范围内形成了两种不同的法律体制——制定法体制和判例法体制，但均以司法三段论作为司法技术的基本结构。由于司法三段论在这两种法制体制下所遭遇的问题不同，它们的关注点也不相同，所以形成了不同的具体司法技术。在判例法体制下形成发达的司法推理技术；而在制定法体制下则一直关注着长久以来发展出的法律解释技术。”我国的判决模式和大陆法系以及英美法系的判决模式都有相似之处。我国的判决模式在形式上是采取了大陆法系的司法三段论的涵摄模式，而且在审判中法官也拥有较大的职权，因此在审理模式上也被归纳到职权主义的范畴。在实践运作上，判决的依据上并非优先考虑的是法律原则和法律规范，而是当事人的实际情况以及社会道义的要求，因此又有类似英美法系的地方。这种判决模式虽然有利于个案的公正解决，但却对法律制度带来很大的危害，它造成了规范的虚化；相反，如果严格按三段论，则显得过于僵化，除却三段论自身的弊端之外，它可能以整体正义幌子的掩护下损害个别正义，而每一个案件得以公正解决则正是法律整体正义的基础。在本文的第二章，我将就传统司法三段论的三个特征展开分析。这三个特征是：其一、存在着一个完整无缺的法律体系，或者利用理性的指引人们可以建立这样一个法律体系；其二、法官判决的最终效力来源于一个明确无歧义的客观真理，由于这个客观真理的存在，决定着判决的“唯一正解”；其三，为了防止法官依个人法感和价值承认裁决案件，因此将价值判断从法官裁决的过程中加以排除，也即将应然和实然、规范(价值)与事实二分，其中第一个特征最为重要。为了建立起一个完备的法律规范体系，逻辑学者以及法学家从不同的角度进行努力，逻辑学者试图使司法三段论形式化，抛弃了命题本身真实性，采取了形式化的路径，也即通过形式化的逻辑命题的真值和可推导性来完成。其目的是为了达成这样一个目标，即通过周密的逻辑运算，使根据司法三段论的判决呈现出一种可以掌控的程式，从而排除现实世界对判决的影响，促进判决结果的纯粹化和透明化；法学家则通过司法三段论的规范化来达致目的，即认为可以建立一套完美的概念谱系或规则谱系，该谱系内，各种概念或规则按从高到低的顺序形成一座具有涵摄关系的金字塔。司法判决就是将案件事实归摄到该谱系中去。任何人，只要掌握了这套谱系，都会得到同样的结果。然而，我在文中将要证明的是，这一进路的努力并不十分有效，并且因为离司法生活太远而显得的枯燥无味。从普通三段论的目的来看，它并没有要求大前提的完备性，只是强调如果大前提与小前提存在涵摄关系，那么绪论是必须推出的。之所以传统司法三段论将法律体系看成是一个完整无缺的体系，则是意识形态化的历史产物。司法三段论的这三个特征一度被看成正确的因素，在今天正好成为司法三段论的思维结构遭至反对的理由。然而，正如我所分析的那样，这些特点并非是司法三段论的本质，而是近代法治意识形态化的结果。所有对司法三段论的批评都可以归到被称为形式主义的谬误上。在批评者看来，传统的司法三段论无视法律规范体系的不完备性以及事实涵摄的困难，将程序看成是绝对一致的演绎推理，因而犯了形式主义的谬误。然而，我们将说明这样的结论：传统司法三段论理论将本不属于三段论的内容给强加进去，这是基于对三段论的错误理解。这种错误理解又导致了批评者对司法三段论的错误批评。司法三段论一直为法律世界的存在和运行提供着思维技术的支持。抛弃了三段论，也就抛弃了司法判决赖以存在的形式基础。因此，司法三段论不是被抛弃，而是转化为在何种程度、何种方式上被重新阐述，以适合司法判决的实践情况。大致的思路是，必须是将司法三段论恢复到普通三段论的原有功能和结构上去，并以其作为法官判决的模式或程式的描述，而非仅作为一种论证方法来使用。这一描述的益处是：(1)它将在将各个阶段的证立借助传统意义上的司法三段论的大致结构安排得以衔接，从而保证判决证立的一致性；而相互矛盾的价值论证也会在清楚的过程描述中得以显露，从而保证价值的融贯性；(2)其次，它为法官和当事人提供了一种易于理解的过程描述，从而克服了因为深奥的逻辑表达式和学术概念给当事人带来的判决理论的陌生感；(3)通过统一的证立图式来描述简单案件与复杂案件，这更符合司法实践的判决证立的自然表征。当然，针对传统司法三段论的三个基本特征，必须作出相应的修正：其一，是由客观真理走向价值认识，从而将法官从独断式的真理发现的模式下解放出来，转而寻求当事人和其他法律人的价值认同；其二，通过重构后的司法三段论中的核心概念——裁判规则——来连接事实与价值的分野；其三，在完美体系化努力失败后，人们开始考虑体系的不完备性，体系化研究的作用也由为判决提供一个完美无缺的法律规范体系转变为形成前见所必须的知识谱系。那么作为法官判决模式的司法三段论到底应该是一种什么样的结构?法律事实又到底是什么样的世界?传统司法三段论的黑匣子的隐喻不足以表明事实，山下正男给我们的答案是法律事实是漂浮在事实世界的诺亚方舟。依此图式，本文提出一种司法三段论的结构，并试图用它来描述法官判决的过程：支持规则↓附加规则……↓裁判规则(法律事实)↓↑案件事实↓判决结果这一结构是在第二章的结尾提出，真正的展开论述则构成了本文第三章的全部内容。第三章的内容按照司法三段论的结构分为三节。在第一节的部分我所关心的是作为司法三段论的核心部分——裁判规则的如何得出与证立的问题。我所言称的裁判规则与米勒和埃塞尔都有所不同，它不是指法律规则也不是指个案规则，而是法官直接用于裁判的依据。如果法官能从既定的法律规范体系中发现一个明确的法律规范，那么这个法律规范就是法官直接裁判的依据，此时的裁判规则就是该法律规范。有时法官无从发现一个既有的法律规范，法官就必须根据法理念或原则创制一个裁判规则。从这个意义上讲，法官造法不是别的，而是在创制裁判规则。这一过程不仅仅是法官被动的作出判决所产生的副产品，而是法官主动的充实规则的意愿的体现。法官创制一个裁判规则，就必须遵循一定的原则，在文中，我提出三个原则：可预测性、可普遍化、回应性。可预测性要求法官创制的裁判规则应该是当事人及其律师可以预料到的，它源于霍姆斯的名言：“法律是一种预测”；可普遍化是将裁判规则与个案规则区分开来，它决定着，法官在创制裁判规则时决不是一个就事论事的权宜，而是在创制解决同一类事件类型的法律规范。当然，该创制的裁判规则能否成为法律规范，还需要通过回应性的检验。法官创制裁判规则后，他必须面对三方面的受众：案件当事人及其律师、一般法律人阶层、普通民众。裁判规则创立的过程也进行了本文的视野。在我看来，裁判规则的创立起始于法官的法律感。因为裁判规则是未被普遍化的，因此它必须得到支持规则的支持。支持规则对裁判规则的支持并非依据其强制力，而是依靠认同。因此支持规则可以是一个上位的法理论、原则、规则，也可以是较低层级的被人们认同的解决方案——孙斯坦称之为“未完全理论化协议”。有时，对于裁判规则的创立来说，除了其起点(支持规则)和论述方案需得到普泛公众的认同，而且从支持规则到裁判规则的每一步都能演绎正当。然而，有时支持规则到裁判规则并不连贯，中间存在着跨跃，这时就需要附加一条或几条未普遍化的规则使整个过程演绎正当，我借用佩策尼克的术语称之为“附加规则”。我们可以还会遇到另外的困难，如同时发现几个裁判规则都是可接受的，该如何处理，这会涉及本文的裁判规则的竞争与筛选部分的内容。司法三段论的第二个构成部分，也即司法裁判的第二个步骤，是将案件事实归摄为法律事实的过程。这里我们将要遇到的问题是，案件事实的客观事实是如何一步一步被转化为具有法律意义的法律事实，也即所言的要件事实。这首先仍然涉及到思维方式的转换，由概念化思维向类型化思维转变。这意味着，单纯的要件比对不可能反映出法律的生命，必须从整体意义上把握体现在事物之上的法律意义。虽然单个的因素不徒以完成法律意义的体现，但如何确立案件事实法律意义，我们还是可以将意愿、关系以及社会危害性作为出发点，不断地在案件事实与法律规范之间寻求一种平衡。这一过程在恩吉施那里被称为“事实与规范之间的目光流转”，也可以使用罗尔斯的“反思式平衡”来描述法官思维的具体过程。在司法三段论的结构中，核心问题是如何构建被认同的裁判规则，一旦在以法律感为起点以最终支持规则为终点的裁判规范的确立以后，法官判决的绝大部分已经解决。因为法官所创立的裁判规则是直接对这些具有法律意义的要件事实的处理，所以它不仅仅是发现小前提的过程，而是融入了裁判规则，与裁判规则的创立联系在一起，而在上位上，支持规则、附加规则都是为裁判规则的证立提供支持，判决结果即可以依传统意义上的司法三段论的涵摄关系来解决。然而在此过程中，仍有一些问题需要解决：是否存在唯一正解?判决结果是否真正反映当事人及公众的心理需求?法官的社会背景会对判决行为造成什么样的影响?在我看来，将唯一正解作为法官的高贵的梦想，具有标志性的意义。它作为一个目标，可以促使每一个法官的判决都致力于实现最为恰当的裁判结果的发现，而不是仅仅满足于发现一个可接受的答案；在结果意义的考量下，法官会不是拘泥于裁判规则，而是充分考虑当前案件的各种因素，获得一种审慎的平衡。而法官的社会学调查证明，由于司法三段论的技术支持，以及司法判决过程的程序限制，法官个人因素对司法判决的影响并没有想像中那么严重。至此，本文试图利用司法三段论的结构来描述司法判决的作出过程思想全部表达。但是否证立，则需要回应性的评价。更多还原

【Abstract】 The traditional thinking pattern of judicial syllogism is too rigid to deprive judicial process of the vigor it should have sustained. Against such a background, the theoretical research on legal logic and legal argumentation tends to replace it with some formal rules or substantial standards. However, the research does not expectantly keep the judge from being involved in complicated adjudication; it only aims at building an ideal argument mode instead of providing the judge a clear guideline to follow in adjudication. Through the investigation on the two legal systems and judicial practice in China and related theoretical exploration, we have noted, judicial syllogism, as the thinking technique in the process of adjudication, cannot be replaced both in judicial practice and theoretical field. Rather than casting away judicial syllogism, what we need to do is rebuild it structurally to make up its theoretical limitations.In Chapter I, I examined the judicial patterns of continental genealogy, Anglo-American genealogy and legal system in our country. In continental genealogy, deductive judicial pattern is often employed, a fact that is in line with its history of codification, the common natural law and the judicial philosophy of legislation of supremacy of law. While in Anglo-American genealogy, reasoning by example is the judicial pattern, which agrees with its tradition of case law and judicial doctrine of supremacy of law. The power of modern Roman law lies in the logic advancement of abstract concepts while common law draws its power from the settlement of specific dispute. Superficially, the judicial operation of continental genealogy works through the mutual reference between the legal writing and the case development while case law takes effect through pan-reasoning among cases; the former mainly concerns about tallying case development with legal regulations while the latter involves more than often agreeing the current case with a precedent. Therefore, these two have little in common. However, judges with Anglo-American genealogy background do not stop themselves at focus on the literal correspondence between the current case and the precedent; they go deeper to analyze the judicial reasons of their predecessors and extract from them the recapitulative legal principles or legal rules. Some of them hide themselves many years in cases of the same lineage; some of them are stipulated by legislative bodies in the form of code, and in this sense, they are the same in essence as those judicial reasons obtained from statute law. On the contrary, judges with continental genealogy background do not reach their conclusion from legal regulations as naturally as the scholars have said: they shift their attention between legal rules and case situations until the current case is specified by legal regulations, a process each and every case shall go through.Therefore, the difference between these two legal genealogies do not lie in whether there exists judicial syllogism, and the major difference is in aspects such as the sources of the major premise, its expression forms and the acquirement of the minor premise. Judicial patterns adopted by judges with Anglo-American genealogy background involves a comprehensive legal thinking technique, although adjudication is a process based on a general principle hidden in legal materials as precedents and statute law, in which the judge compares the precedent and the current case, summing up the common and recognizing the different, so as to make a sentence on the case. The process has no difference in structure than the deductive pattern in continental genealogy. Professor Lin-li holds that judicial logic of these two legal genealogies is not substantially different, and because of that, judicial logic of these two legal genealogies is the same in essence. It is just that judge in Anglo-American genealogy play a much more important role in the process of locating the major premise and the minor premise. The modernization of judicature is a process of realizing rationalization of judicial forms based on formal logic. Despite the existence of two legal systems worldwide——the system of positive law and the system of case law, both of them takes judicial syllogism as its fundamental structure of judicial technique. Under such two legal systems, judicial syllogism have met different problems, aroused different concerns and therefore formed different specific judicial techniques. In the system of case law, advanced judicial reasoning has been developed while in the system of positive law legal explanation technique long developed has been closely followed.The judicial pattern of our country has similarities with that of continental genealogy as well as that of Anglo-American genealogy. The judicial pattern of our country has adopted the continental genealogy’s judicial syllogism pattern. Moreover the judiciary has powerful authority in the trial. Therefore the trial pattern belongs to doctrine of function and power. In practice, it is not the legal principle and norms, but the realities of the case and social moralities which are put in the first place when reaching a judgment. Thus the mode is also similar with that of Anglo-American genealogy. This kind of judicial pattern is conducive to the justice in specific cases, but bring serious harms to the legal system, resulting in actual abolition of laws. On the Contrary, if we enforce the judicial syllogism too strictly, it will come into a situation of rigidity. Besides its inherent deficiencies, it may be detrimental to specific justice to apply judicial syllogism under the shield of overall justice. However the justice in specific cases is just the foundation of the overall legal justice.In Chapter II, I will analyze the three characteristics of the traditional judicial syllogism. The three characteristics are generalized as follows: firstly, there is a complete legal system, or such a legal system can be built under a rational guide; secondly, the ultimate effectiveness of the judge’s final judgment comes from a totally definite truth and it is the existence of the truth that decides the only right answer of the judgment; thirdly, value judgment is excluded from the judge’s judging process to stop the judge from making a judgment according to legal feeling or value acceptability. That is to say, what ought to be is separated from it really is, criterions (values) and the truths are separated as well. Among all of the three characteristics, the first one is the most important. To build a complete legal criterion system, logicians and jurists make great efforts from different aspects. Logicians try to formalize the judicial syllogism by deserting the truth of the proposition itself and adopting its formalized way, namely, by the truth and the deducibility of the formalized logic proposition. The ultimate goal is to make the judgment based on the judicial syllogism take on a controllable pattern by careful Boolean calculation, which could get rid of the real world’s effects on the judgment and promote its purification and vitrification. Jurists try to achieve the goal by the standardization of the judicial syllogism. They think that a perfect set of conceptions pedigree or rules pedigree can be built and within which, every kind of conception or rule, with an order of from top to bottom, will form a pyramid of possessing containing and absorbing relation. Legal decisions are to absorb the facts of the cases into the pedigree. Anybody, as long as he masters this set of pedigree, will get the same result. In the thesis, the author is going to prove that all the efforts on the way is not quite effective and it seems terribly dry and dull by reason of its distance from legal life. Judging from the purpose of the common syllogism, it does not call for completeness of the major premise. It just emphasizes that an introduction must be given if there is a containing and absorbing relation between the major premise and the minor premise. The fact that the traditional judicial syllogism considers the legal system as a complete system is an ideologized historical product.The three characteristics of the Theory of the judicial syllogism were ever considered to be the right factors, but they happen to be the reasons why the thinking structure of the theory of three characteristics is subject to arguments against. As I have analyzed, these characteristics are not the essence of the theory of the judicial syllogism, however they are the result of ideology of the latter-day nomocracy. Therefore all the criticisms of the theory of the judicial syllogism are attributed to the falsehood called externalism. In the view of the critics, the traditional judicial syllogism Theory ignored the imperfection of the legal system and the difficulty of involving all the facts and considered the procedure to be the utterly consistent illation, thus there is a formalistic falsehood. However we will come to a conclusion that: the traditional judicial syllogism included the content which didn’t belong to the judicial syllogism. That’s due to the inaccurate apprehension of the judicial syllogism. This inaccurate apprehension led to the inaccurate criticism of the critics.Judicial syllogism all along provides the support of the thinking technique to the existence and function of legal environment. Casting off judicial syllogism means casting off the modal foundation which judicial judgment reckons on. Therefore, judicial syllogism is not abandoned, but transforms to what extent and how to be re-elucidated to accommodate with the practical condition of judicial judgment. The main idea is that restoring the inherent function and structure of the ordinary judicial syllogism and regarding it as the description of the model or the process of judgment, not just using as a reasoning method. The benefits of this description are as follows: (1) it joins the justifications which lie various phases by the traditional judicial syllogism to ensure the consistency of the justification of judicial decisions. Meanwhile the contradictive merit argumentation will unveil during the clear description of the process to ensure the coherence of the merit; (2) it provides the comprehensible process description to the judges and the parties, so it conquers the unacquainted sense which comes from the parties due to the abstruse logic expressions and academic conceptions; (3) It accords with the natural token of the justification of decisions in the practical judicature by the uniform justification modal to describe the simple cases and the complicated cases. Certainly, some corresponding amendments should be made to the three characteristics of the traditional judicial syllogism: first, an emphasis should be transferred from on the objective truth to on the recognitions of values, thus unbinding the judges from the arbitrary mode of seeking truth and turning to the parties and other legal professionals for the recognition of values; second, a bridge should be built between facts and values by the key conception—rules of adjudication in the reorganized judicial syllogism; third, the failure in the perfecting the legal system forces people to accept the imperfectness of the legal system, and the role played in the systematic researches has been changed from providing the judiciary with a perfect legal system to equipping them with a necessary system of knowledge for reaching the decisions.Then, as the judicial pattern of the judiciary, what is the structure of the judicial syllogism? What is it like in the world of the legal fact? The metaphor of a black box in traditional syllogism can not show the whole truth. It’s more like the Noah Ark floating in the sea of reality. As illustrated in the following, a new kind of structure is given to the judicial syllogism and used to describe the process of decisions:Supporting rules↓Rules of Affixation↓…↓Rules of Adjudication (legal facts)↑↓Case facts↓↓DecisionsThis structure is put forward at the end of Chapter II and expounded in Chapter III.Chapter III is divided into three sections in parallel with the structure of the judicial syllogism. In the first section, I focus on the core of the judicial syllogism—how the rules of adjudication is brought about and proved. The rules of adjudication I refer to are different from which of Muller and Esser. The judges make decisions directly under the guidance of it, which are neither legal norms nor the rules that only apply to a specific case. If the judges manage to find a specific legal regulation in the existing legal system, this legal regulation justly is the rules of adjudication. However, being unable to find a proper legal regulation in some cases, the judges must create some rules of adjudication in accordance with the legal spirits and principles. From this perspective, the judges actually create nothing other than the rules of adjudication. This process is not only the byproducts brought about by the judges’ passiveness in making decisions, but also embodies the judges’ will to substantiate the rules.When a judge establishes a rule of adjudication, he must follow some principles. In this thesis, I will put forward three principles: predictability, generalness and responsiveness. Predictability is rooted from a famous saying of Holmes: "Law is a prediction", which requires that the rules of adjudication established by judges should be forecasted by the parties and their lawyer. By generalness, distinction should be made between a rule of adjudication and a specific-case rule. It decides that, when a judge establishes rules of adjudication, he shouldn’t just think of resolving a specific case on his hands but forming a legal norm for other cases of the same kind. Surely, it needs to be tested by the responsiveness if the established rules of adjudication can become legal norms. The established rules of adjudication by judges must face three sorts of audiences: the parties of cases and their lawyer, the other legal professionals, common people.This thesis will also discuss the process of establishing a rule of adjudication. In my opinion, the legal feeling urges a judge to do this work. Because a rule of adjudication has not been generalized, it needs the backing up from a supporting rule. The support doesn’t depend on the compulsive power of the former but the identification with it. So supporting rules may be superior theories, principles, rules, or be inferior ways and means identified by common people—it is also called "incompletely theorized agreements" by Sunstein. Sometimes, for establishing rules of adjudication, it not only need the identification of common people at its starting point (supporting rules) and argument projects, but also must have proper deductive process for every step from supporting rules to rules of adjudication. However, the above process is not always coherent because of the jumps between them. Thus we must add one or several rules that are not generally accepted to make the whole process deductively valid, and I call them "Rules of Affixation" as quoted from Peczenik’s terms. We also would meet other difficulties, for example, how to deal with the situation where there are several acceptable rules of adjudication at the same time. This will be discussed in the part of the article which is about the conflicts and the proper choice of the adjudication rules.The second component part of judicial syllogism, which is also the second step of reaching a judicial decision, is a process of summarizing objective facts into legal facts. The question we will come across is how the objective facts will gradually be transformed into legal facts, i.e. requirement facts. Firstly, this involves the change in the way of thinking, change from conceptual thinking into typological thinking. This means mere comparisons between requirements can’t reflect the essences of law. Instead, we must understand the meanings existing in the facts on the whole. Although one single requirement can not reflect the legal meaning by itself, to find the legal meanings of objective facts, we can gradually seek a balance between the objective facts and legal regulations, basing on the combinations of will, relationship and social harmfulness. This thesis refers to this process as "the move between facts and regulations". This process of judges’ reasoning can also be described as Rawls’ "reflective equilibrium".In the structure of judicial syllogism, the core issue is how to form the rules of adjudication that can be generally accepted. Once the rules of adjudication are established, which begins with legal feeling and ends with "ultimate support" rule, mostly questions about judges’ decisions have been made. The rules of adjudication deal with requirement facts which have legal meanings. It is not only a process of finding minor premise, but also involves rules of adjudication and have connections with the founding of the rules of adjudication with supportive rules and rules of affixation backing up for the proof of rules of adjudication. Hence the judicial decision can be reached according to traditional judicial syllogism. Nevertheless, in this process, there are still some problems to be solved. First, whether there is the only right answer? Second, do the judicial decisions really reflect requirements of parties and social audiences? Third, what will cause to judicial decision by the judge’s social parentage? In my personal point of view, it has marked significance to regard "the only right answer" as the judges’ lofty dream. As a goal, it can drive every judge to reach the most appropriate decision instead of getting an acceptable answer; Under the consideration of the final decision as a core, judges will not be bounded by the simple judicial rules, but have a full consideration of various factors of the case, and try to obtain a balance of prudence. The sociological investigations towards judges have proved that the individual factors of judges exert fewer influences than imagined on the judicial decision, supported by the judicial syllogism and restrained by the judicial procedures. Thus, this thesis tries to describe the whole process of reaching judicial decisions. However, inevitably there are some deficiencies that need your pointing out.更多还原