【作者】 叶迎；

【导师】 杨河清；

【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 ， 劳动经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 目前,在企业经营者激励问题的研究上,我国理论界对于国企经营者的年薪、奖金、期权、期股等显性激励手段已有较为充分的探讨,而针对激励机制的另一重要方面——基于经理人市场隐性激励的系统研究却显相对不足。同时,在数量有限的关于经理人市场隐性激励的研究文献中,其研究范畴也未能涵盖民营企业、三资企业等“体制外”经理人市场,忽视了经理人市场的充分竞争性和统一开放性。本文所研究的经理人市场对企业经营者的隐性激励,是指通过经理人市场竞争与声誉机制,而形成的一种内生于企业经营者的自我驱动性激励。本文在综合评述国内外关于经理人市场隐性激励研究文献,对隐性激励的基本原理和基本模型进行梳理的基础上,结合从“北京市企业经营者激励与约束问题调查研究”课题调研中所获取的实证材料,对我国经理人市场(包括“体制外”和“体制内”经理人市场)隐性激励现状和隐性激励低效原因进行深入分析,并基于以上研究提出一些希望能对职业经理人市场建设以至我国国有企业改革有意义的对策建议。本文在研究过程中作了以下创新性的探索:(1)以经营者人力资本价值为线索,阐明了经理人市场隐性激励的存在性及其作用机理,搭建了经理人市场隐性激励的理论模型架构。本文在考虑经营者未来人力资本价值及其动态贴现因素的基础上,通过模型改进量化地证明了经理人市场隐性激励的存在性。然后通过对两阶段声誉模型、无限期限声誉模型和引入触发战略均衡的声誉模型的分析,阐明了经理人市场隐性激励的作用机理。(2)以国有企业经营者的多任务特征为主线,构建了国有企业经营者隐性激励问题的分析框架。本文将袁江天的国企经营者多任务假说引入严建苗的国企经营者效用函数之中,推导出国企经营者的效用最大化的两个条件,并据此阐明了国企经营者遴选问题上引入经理人市场的意义所在。之后,将王珺“经营者与政府间的重复博弈和经营者与企业间的一次性博弈”的观点模型化,借鉴多任务委托代理模型分析框架,对我国国企经营者的激励现状进行分析。(3)以经理人市场整体发展为视角,贯穿经典模型分析,构建了基于统一竞争的经理人市场隐性激励的系统分析框架。本文以经理人市场隐性激励中的经典模型为分析工具来研究我国经理人市场的隐性激励状况。在研究角度上,本文把包括国有企业、民营企业、外资企业经营者在内的整个经理人阶层作为一个群体,研究如何构建一个统一、开放、竞争、有序的经理人市场以实现对该群体的隐性激励。本文通过理论研究和现状分析,得出了如下主要结论:(1)经理人市场的引入能节约委托人对代理人的激励成本,实现对经营者的隐性激励。隐性激励作用发挥在很大程度上依赖于经理人市场的公平竞争以及经营者与经理人市场之间的重复博弈。(2)我国国企经营者与国企和政府关系的特殊性,导致“经营者与政府间的重复博弈和经营者与企业间的一次性博弈并存”,使经营者将更多本应该付诸企业经营的努力转移到满足上级偏好上来,由此产生的多任务委托代理关系使我国国企经营者的行为发生行政化扭曲。(3)体制化和地域性分割降低了我国经理人市场的竞争水平,中介组织功能不健全导致我国经理人市场的信息传导机制失灵,这些都使隐性激励机制难以发挥作用。(4)在转型经济中要提高我国经营者隐性激励效率需从三个方面着手:使经营者具有长远预期、营造经营者与所有者之间的重复博弈环境以及完善经营者市场的竞争与配套机制。我国企业改革过程中的大部分问题都与管理层激励有关,解决这一问题有助于巩固中国经济长期稳定发展的微观基础。本文对经理人市场隐性激励的研究,希望能为国有企业改革探寻内外治理结构共同完善以及中国职业经理人市场建设的实践作出贡献。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the past two decades and more, great changes have taken place in the management system of the state-owned enterprises in China. But the reformation in the property structure and the corporate governance structure still needs to be improved. Thus people have paid more and more attention to the peifection of the incentive mechanism of the managers. For the moment, the research on the incentive problems of the manager of the state-owned enterprises focuses on such explicit incentives as annual pay ,bonuses, options and so on, but lacking the research of the other part of the incentive mechanism-systimatic research on the implicit incentives which based on Managerial Labor Market.The classical explanation of our theorists about the short-term gains of the managers in the state-owned enterprises is that: it is lack of explicit incentives which causes the mismatch of payment and merit that leads to the short-term gains. The shortcoming of this view lies in the omition of the important fact: the low efficiency of the explicit contract, such as options, partly because there are some drawbacks in the designation and operation of explicit incentive mechanisms. On the other hand, more important, it is because of the ineffective of the explicit incentive mechanisms, which makes the explicit incentive mechanisms inefficient.During the economic transiton period, because of the imperfection of the outside macket system, the managers of the state-owned enterprises need not to face the menance or strain which comes from the marcket. In the mean time, the cost of pure explicit incentives is rather high. So only explicit incentives it is not enough to make the managers work hard. If we only pay attention to inner incentives of the enterprises with out pay any attention to managerial market and its influence on the behavior of the managers, This "disease" of the distortion of incentives could not easily be rooted out. So the status of implicit incentives become more and more important and necessary to explicit incentives.General corporate governance structure includes inner governance structure and outer governance structure. The former means to indirectly control the behavior of the manager through the managerial labor market, while the latter means to stir up and also control the managerial behavior by the owner of some specific enterprises, also the designation of payment systerm. Inner governance structure based on outer governance structure, and it can be efficient only under the condtion of matching the outer market competition. With out the pefection of outer market, any method borrowed from other countries can not bring out ideal result. Incentives with high efficiency must be the organic combination of both explicit incentives and implicit incentives.With consideration of the recent condition of China, and aim at pefection the environment of market and building up the competitive managerial labor market, use market methods to carry out effective implicit incentives become more and more important. We can find enough resources about explicit incentives, but find that, the research on implicit incentives streams from the early 80s—the researchers in the name of Fama,Holmstorm, based on market competition, built up the reputation model to make some research on implicit incentives. In the author’s sphere, we can find many articles focus on implicit incentives, but with out any systematic research on the problems of implicit incentives. Pay sufficient attention to implicit incentives can help to thereticly solve the problem of managerial market development. The development of managerial market is critical to the reformation of our state-owned enterprises, without which can leads to the failure of MBO,ESO and so on. So attach importance to the research of implicit incentives which based on the managerial market can be a hot topic of the reformation of our state-owned enterprises.As already stated in our previous letter, to build up the reputation machanism should based on perfect managerial labor market, which is the premise of wasetrn researcher’s theory achievement. In our country, the managerial labor market needs further perfection to support the operation of reputation machanism. What’s more, managerial labor market is a huge system, the paticipant in which not only includes state-owned enterprises, but also private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. Domestic researchers payed more and more attention to the affection of reputation machanism on state-owned enterprises, but neglect the private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. But the performance of reputation machanism Depends on a united, open, competitive and ordly managerial labor market. So the research sphere of this paper includes not only state-owned enterprises, but also private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment. How can we neglect the development and perfection of the whole managerial labor market which includes state-owned enterprises, private enterprise and the enterprise of foreign investment?This paper focuses on the implicit incentives of managerial labor market. Based on a panorama of the theory achievement of wasetrn researchers and domestic researchers, to elucidate the machanism of the implicit incentives which comes from the managerial labor market. The author has taken part in the project of "Drive and Control of the managers of the enterprises of Beijing", and hold responsible for the relative research of a sub-project. The sub-project began at January,2006, with 300 questionaires(173 valid) and face to face interview. Valid questionaires include 23 state-owned enterprises, 129 private enterprises and 21 enterprises of foreign investment. In this paper, the author will combine the resource of questionaire and interview with reputation theory and model, deeply analyse the implicit incentives in China managerial labor market. And hope to draw some constructive conclusions which is useful to the perfection of our profetional manegerial labor market.更多还原