中国地方政府收入行为与地方收入制度优化研究

【作者】 苏永军；

【导师】 俞忠英；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 收入是地方政府推行各项工作的财力基础，地方政府具有实现收入最大化的倾向。同时，地方政府掌握很多资源来实现收入最大化的目标。如果缺乏一个合理的收入制度，地方政府的收入行为就会对经济社会运行产生突出的负面影响。本文就是要通过研究中国现行地方财政收入制度下地方政府的收入行为，寻找中国现行地方财政收入制度的缺陷，为优化中国地方财政收入制度提供借鉴和参考。中央政府、其他地方政府和纳税人是地方政府收入的利益攸关方，本文将围绕地方政府与这三个利益攸关方的收入博弈来分析地方政府收入行为。中国地方政府获得收入是在既定的财政体制下进行的，这个既定的财政体制从很大程度上是中央政府与地方政府博弈的结果。在两者的博弈中，地方政府和中央政府都存在较强的机会主义倾向。中央政府掌握了规则的制定权和修改权，而且经常利用这些权利修订财税体制，以实现中央政府的收入目标。地方政府因此缺乏一个比较稳定的收入制度框架，也采取一定的机会主义行为，普遍隐藏自己的收入情况，扩大体制外的收入规模。中央政府和地方政府的机会主义行为使得两者陷入“囚徒博弈”困境，一方面造成了中国的“分权悖论”和“非正式分权”，另一方面造成了处于政府底层的县乡政府普遍出现收入困难。因此，解决中央政府和地方政府“囚徒博弈”困境的问题，必须从宪法和法律上，对财政体制进行明确，为地方政府确立一个相对稳定的收入制度。在地方政府之间的收入博弈中，地方政府在扩大税源和优化产业结构方面展开收入竞争。虽然地方政府之间的收入竞争有利于约束地方政府滥用权利，有利于降低企业税负水平，但是，地方政府之间过度竞争导致地区间财力水平不均衡呈现“马太效应”，导致地区之间产业结构趋同，也产生了较为严重的地方保护主义和市场分割问题。要减少地方政府之间收入竞争的负面影响，关键是改变目前中国地方政府收入过于依赖生产领域的局面，使地方政府收入来源转向非生产领域，减少地方政府干扰市场资源配置的激励。另外，还要改革地方政府的绩效考核机制，改革对地方政府财政决策监督机制，并改善财力薄弱地区收入状况，改变财力薄弱地区在地方收入竞争中的不利地位。地方政府还通过其他手段扩大收入，这部分扩大的收入归根到底来自于纳税人，从而产生地方政府与纳税人之间博弈的问题。这种博弈中，纳税人缺乏基本反应能力，地方政府存扩大收入的过程中受到的约束相对较小。地方政府善于使用歧视性的收入政策，对那些对税负水平不敏感、流动性差的纳税人，地方政府倾向于增加其税费负担以扩大收入。同时，地方政府还经常利用掌握的公共资源，比如国有非经营性资产获得收入，推动地区房价上升以扩大来自于房地产业的收入，运用地方政府信用获得收入，等等。地方政府的这种收入实际上最终来自于纳税人，最终侵犯了纳税人的权利。因此，必须对地方政府的收入行为进行限制，减少地方政府扩大收入的体制诱因，探索改变低级别地方政府的收入模式，降低届别主义对地方政府收入行为的扭曲，采取更加有效的措施保护私人财产权，并且探索完善地方政府的财产权利。在研究地方政府与中央政府、其他地方政府和纳税人之间博弈的基础上，本文就如何优化地方政府财政收入制度提出基本思路。首先是确立中国非对称性分税的税收划分目标模式，确定科学的税收划分方式，并加大低级别地方政府主体税种的培养力度，加快财产税制改革。其次是明确转移支付的目标定位，确定转移支付在地方财政收入体系中的补偿地位，进一步完善中国转移支付制度。最后，要从宪法和法律层面对中国地方政府收入制度框架进行确定，加强对地方政府主体地位和相关权利的保护，促进地方政府收入行为的合理化、规范化。更多还原

【Abstract】 The income is the financial foundation of the local government to carries out its work, so the local government has the tendency to maximize the income. At the same time, the local government grasps many resources that can achieve such goal. If there is no reasonable income system frame, the local government’s income behavior would have prominent negative influence at the society’s economy. This article tries to find the flaw of present China’s local finance income system through studying the local government’s income behavior. And then it will provide some references to optimize the China’s local finance income system.The China local government obtains the income under the pre-existed financial system, so there must be a game situation between the local government and central government about the income, which needs analysis. Both The local government and the central government have strong opportunism tendency. The central government has the power to formulate and revise the rule. Moreover it frequently uses such rights to revise the finance and taxation systems, and then achieves its income goal. Therefore the local government lacks a relatively stable income system and has to adopt some opportunism behavior. So the situation as hiding own income to expand income scale outside the system is generally. On the one hand, the central government and local government’s opportunism behavior created problems like " the paradox of dividing power " and "unofficially dividing power"; on the other hand, the lowest governments of county or township generally appear to be difficult with income. Therefore, we must nail down the financial system from the constitution and law, and establish a stable income system for the local government, to solve such "Prisoner’s dilemma".There also has obvious competition for financial revenue between the local governments. In such game situation, the local governments compete at expanding tax sources and optimizing the industrial structure. Though such income competition is advantageous to restrain the local government to abuse its right and reduce enterprise’s tax burden level, but the over-competition will cause the " Matthew’s effect " of the unbalanced financial resources level between areas, and cause the convergence of industry structure between areas, even led to the more serious question like regional protectionism and the market division. To reduce the negative influence of local governments’ income competition, the key is to change the aspect that present China local government relies its income too heavily on the tax from the productive sector, and to turn it to the non-productive sector, reduces the local government to disturb the market resources disposition the drive. Moreover, we must also reform the assessing mechanism of local government’s achievements, reform the surveillance mechanism of local government’s financial decision-making, and improve the income condition of these tough areas, change their disadvantageous places in income competition.The local government also expand its income through other methods, such part of income finally comes from to the taxpayer, thus cause the game situation betweenthe local government and the taxpayer. In this kind of game, the taxpayer lacks the basic capacity to response, so the local government would face relatively less restraints in the process of expanding income. The local government is good at using the discriminative income policy to expand income through increasing the tax burden of these taxpayers who are insensitive to their tax burdens or having no chance to move away. At the same time, the local government prone to use the public resource such as the state-owned but non- management property to obtain income, or drive the local house price rising to expand tax revenue from the real estates, or obtain income from its credit, etc. In fact this kind of income finally comes from the taxpayer, and will encroach upon taxpayer’s right. Therefore, we must limit such local government’s income behavior, reduce the system cause for local government to expand income, and the explore the change of preliminary government’s income pattern, reduce the distortion of local government’s income behavior, adopt more effective measure to protect personal property rights, and consummate the local government’s property right.Base on the studies of the game between local government and central government, and between local government and taxpayer, this article will propose the basic way of analysis on how to optimize the local government’s financial revenue system. The first is to establish an asymmetry pattern to divide the tax revenue, confirm a scientific way to divide tax revenue, and increase the preliminary government’s exertion to raise principal tax category, and speed up the reform on the property tax system. The second is to clear out the target of the transfer payment, ensure the compensating status of the transfer payment in the local finance income system, furthermore to consummate China’s transfer payment system. Finally, we must carries on the determination of the China local government income system from the constitution and legal stratification, strengthen the protection of the local government’s principle status and correlation right, then to rationalize and standardize the local government’s income behavior.更多还原