【作者】 赵全军；

【导师】 竺乾威；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 行政管理， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 本文运用制度经济学的相关理论，从行政学的角度出发，在规范与经验的层面上，对改革后中国农村义务教育供给制度的运作机理、变迁过程、内在逻辑及其行政后果进行考察与分析。同时，本文把对农村义务教育供给制度的研究置于转型时期中国农村社会治理方式的历史演进之中，试图通过义务教育的个案研究，探寻出诸如此类的农村公共物品治理的普遍规律，为理解和分析当前中国农村问题提供一个新的视角。本文从考察和分析我国农村义务教育供给的历史入手，在分权化和市场化改革的社会背景下，对改革后我国农村义务教育供给制度及其变迁过程的运作机理与内在结构进行研究。研究认为，自义务教育制度确立以来，“城乡有别”、“以基层政府为主”、“农民负担”一直是我国农村义务教育供给过程中一个不变的传统，但在不同的制度环境下，具体的微观制度设计可能会有所不同。与改革前一元化的政治空间相比，改革后我国农村经济体制、社会结构以及组织方式的变革极大地改变了我国农村治理的经济基础与社会基础，在制度环境发生巨大变化的条件下，农村义务教育供给制度的变革势在必行。从供给责任配置的纬度来看，改革后我国农村义务教育责任体制发生了两次显著的变迁：一是改革初期“以乡为主”的责任体制的确立；二是税费改革中“以县为主”责任体制的建构。但无论是“以乡为主”还是“以县为主”，改革后我国农村义务教育筹资责任主体与管理责任主体始终是统一化、基层化的，而且农村义务教育供给责任的划分也始终是在中央政府的主导下进行的，尽管这一过程中有着不同层次政府之间、政府与公民之间的博弈，但中央政府发挥的是一元化的建构作用。而从供给方式的纬度来看，在改革之初的20世纪80年代，我国仍处在计划经济体制之下，国家采用行政垄断的方式来供给农村义务教育；而90年代以后，伴随着市场化改革进程的推进，我国农村义务教育市场逐步形成，市场的机制及其相关的运作方式开始介入我国农村义务教育领域，公立学校自主权的扩大、新的供给主体的出现以及学生自主权的增长等使得农村义务教育的供给由完全的行政垄断走向了政府主导下的市场局部参与。但在穷国办大教育和农村义务教育供给责任基层化的背景下，尽管我国农村义务教育的市场化改革也存在着对供给质量和效率的追求，但大多数地方政府对它的热衷更多的是对让渡义务教育筹资责任的渴求，这显然与通过市场机制的引进来全面改善和提高义务教育质量和效率的动因是不一致的，正因为如此，使得我国教育市场化改革出现了诸多的问题与困境。基于上述的分析，本文认为，一方面，在我国国家的现代化进程中，教育始终只是边缘性而非核心化的结构，有关这一物品治理的制度会不会发生变迁或会发生什么样的变迁主要取决于中央政府对现实政治、经济生活的考量而非义务教育本身的发展规律。所以，改革后我国农村义务教育供给制度的变迁不仅始终都只是国家政治、经济体制改革的“配套工程”和“附产品”；而且所有的变迁也始终都是在政府的主导下进行的，尽管在变迁的过程中不乏各种诱致性因素的诱导，但行政权力才是其中的支配性力量，整体的制度变迁过程呈现出强制性变迁的特点。另一方面，在经济分权已经发生、但行政集权没有根本改变的条件下，改革后我国的行政体制仍是一个压力型的体制，行政权力在我国农村公共物品的治理中仍占据着支配性的地位，其不仅是我国不同层级政府间事权与财权范围划分的依据，而且是支配地方政府及其其他社会主体行动的主导力量，横向的政府对社会资源的动员、纵向的上级对下级的动员大都是依靠行政权力、通过行政方式来进行的。所以，在压力型的体制下，政治结构与行政权力仍是主导我国农村义务教育以及诸如此类农村公共物品治理及其制度变迁的支配性力量，与之有关的事权的划分、供给机制的建构以及所需资源的筹集与动员主要是由高端的政府通过行政的方式来确立和推行的。而从制度实施的后果来看，这种治理机制在国家资源或体制内资源比较匮乏的条件下，不失为一条有效的路径选择，但同时其也存在着内在治理激励缺失的缺陷，并由此导致了诸如基层政府财政危机、农民负担增加、干群矛盾激化等非预期的负效应的产生。因此，从某种意义上讲，这一体制已经成为诱发当前农村治理困境的一个非常重要的诱因。更多还原

【Abstract】 Adopting the relevant theories of institution economics, from the perspective of administration science, on the base of standardization and experience, the writer of this thesis investigates and analyzes the working mechanism, evolution process, internal logic and the administrative results of China’s rural compulsory education after China’s reform and opening-up to the outside world. Meanwhile, by putting the research of the supply institution of China’s rural compulsory education against the background of the mode of social governance of China in transition being in the historical process of evolution, the author attempts to work out general rules which apply to other rural public products from the investigation of the individual case of rural compulsory education, so that they can offer a way to look at the problems occurring in the countryside.Starting from the investigation and analysis of historical development of China’s rural compulsory education, under the circumstance of power division reform and marketizatin reform, this thesis goes into the working mechanism and internal structure of the supply institution and its revolution process of China’s rural compulsory education after China’s reform and opening-up to the outside world. The research finds that, since the establishment of the institution of China’s rural compulsory education, the traditions has always been "differences existing between cities and rural areas", "grass-root governments playing a leading role", "burden being on peasants", but differences may exist in the design of concrete micro-systems under different system environments. Compared with the political centralization before China’s reform and opening-up, the reforms of rural economic system, social structure and mode of organization has significantly changed the economic and socialfoundations of China’s rural governance. In the condition of great changes taking place in the broader system environment, it is essential to reform the supply system of rural compulsory education.Horizontally speaking, the responsibility system has undergone two striking reforms after the reform and opening-up: one is the establishment of the "town-centered" responsibility system; the other is the construction of "county-centered" responsibility system in the free-to-tax reform. However, in both "town-centered" and "county-centered" responsibility system, the subject of raising funds resources and administration are unified and from the grass-root. In addition, the division of supply responsibility is accomplished under the control of central government. Though there exist competitions among governments of different levels and between governments and citizens, the central government plays the role of uniting them.Vertically speaking, in 1980s when China had the planning economy, rural compulsory education is exerted by means of administrative monopoly, but since 1990s, with the marketization reform advancing, the market of rural compulsory education has been emerging, the working mechanisms of market has entered into the field of rural compulsory education, the autonomous right of private schools has been enlarged, new supply subject has turned up, the autonomous right of students has increased. All these factors contributes to the supply of rural compulsory education switching from governments controlling absolutely to market playing a limited role. However, under the circumstance of operating education in an underdeveloped country and the government of grass-root taking the responsibility of supplying resources, most local governments are keen on handing over the responsibility of raising resources, which obviously opposes to the motives of fully improving the quality and efficiency of compulsory education by introducing market system. Thus, that causes lots of difficulties and problems for maketization reform.Based on the above analyses, the writer believes that, on the one hand, in the process of national modernization, education is always a fringe but not staple in it, so whether its governance will evolve or how will it evolve is determined by the political and economic reality in the eyes of the central government but not theevolving rule of rural compulsory education itself. Therefore, the development of the supply system of rural compulsory education is only a by-product of national political and economic reforms. In addition, all evolutions take place under the control of the central government. Though there are some factors triggering the above developments, but on the whole they take on a compulsive character since the central government is the determining force during this process.On the other hand, the writer holds that in the condition of power division and insufficient administrative decentralization, Chinese political system is still a system of pressure, in which administrative power has a dominating position in the governance of the supply of rural public products. The administrative power is not only the measure for dividing operating power and financial power among different levels of governments, but the leading power dominates local governments and the behaviors of other social subjects. The government mobilizing its parallel social organizations as resources and the upper level mobilizing the lower level as well are realized by administrative means. Therefore, in a system of pressure, administrative power and political structure still play the leading role of the governance of China’s rural compulsory education and other rural public products, and the related power division of affairs, construction of supply system, the raising of required resources are mainly accomplished by the central government using administrative power. But from the results of its implementation, we find that, under the circumstance of the lack of national resources and external resources within the system, it is a not ineffective choice, but it has the weakness of internal motives deficiency, which lead to unexpected side-effects of the contradiction of supply system, fiscal crisis of grassroots governments, increasing burden on farmers, the upgrading of the conflicts between cadres and the public and the like. Therefore, this sort of system, in a certain sense, has become an essential factor triggering the crisis in rural governance.更多还原