【作者】 曾文慧；

【导师】 朱国宏；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 跨行政区流域污染是我国当前水资源危机中的严重问题之一，长期的流域污染治理并没有改善流域整体的水质，跨行政区的水污染冲突日益激化。跨行政区流域污染是一种越界外部性，这种外部性的解决不能单纯依靠环境的末端治理技术，必须从社会经济因素出发，就流域污染的内在原因及越界外部性的规制方案进行考察，从而建立具有持续效果的环境管理制度。空间维度的环境经济学研究虽然注意到了流域污染的越界现象和环境规制的政府层级问题，但这一新兴的研究领域对越界水污染的规制制度问题的考察依然有待深入。处在制度转型时期的中国为考察财政分权背景下流域越界污染的规制问题提供了一个极有特色的研究案例，对中国越界水污染规制问题的研究不仅能够弥补现有理论研究的不足，还能够为我国水污染规制制度的发展变革提供借鉴。本文以我国跨行政区流域污染为研究对象，通过对我国流域污染及其规制效果的经验考察和理论分析来研究越界水污染规制制度的治理效率和变革趋势。本文首先对中国流域污染的规制现状进行了实证研究，对我国越界水污染的影响因素进行了探讨。在此基础上，本文构建了一个“均衡污染”模型，以1994．2002年中国各省的面板数据为样本，对中国省级水污染规制加以考察。研究表明，以污染定价为主要特征的省级政府规制对控制本区域污染具有显著影响，但省级规制存在明显的地区差异。越界外部性是影响地区规制差异的重要因素之一。上游地区存在放松环境规制，搭便车将水污染转移到下游的倾向。基于上述经验研究成果，本文以新制度经济学的产权理论为基础，结合国际流域治理实践，对越界水污染的环境规制制度、环境规制结构和环境规制工具进行了理论探讨。本文的研究表明：用水顺序权和水环境属性的公共物品性质是国家拥有流域水资源所有权的经济原因，对水污染的规制可以视为国家对水资源环境属性拥有所有权的体现，环境规制的政府层级反映了水资源环境属性所有权的具体管理方式。结合越界水污染的单向外部性特点，本文的理论研究部分首先改进了以往文献对越界污染的建模方式，对单向越界污染下的集中规制结构和分权规制结构下的规制效率进行了比较分析，得出了在要素流动下分权规制有效性的结论。其次，在上述理论研究基础上，本文探讨了越界水污染的地区合作规制制度和流域补偿机制的问题，讨论流域补偿原则与成本分摊方案、合作规制的稳定性等问题。随后展开了对越界污染的环境规制工具研究，讨论跨越行政区边界的水权、水定价、水权交易以及环境责任问题，突破了以往在单一政府下讨论环境规制工具的局限。最后，本文对越界污染的非政府规制进行了分析，探讨对越界水污染的自愿规制动因、方式及其效果，提出了越界水污染的多中心治理方案。以往的污染规制研究没有考虑政府之外的规制主体，在实践过程中所出现的水用户、消费者团体以及非政府组织的污染规制行为在环境经济学理论中缺乏系统探讨，本文力求在此问题上有所突破。研究表明，自愿规制并不一定与经济理性相冲突，自愿规制在一定程度上能够补充政府环境规制的不足，实现对越界污染的有效治理。对流域越界污染的规制需要从控制走向合作，逐步实现真正意义上的广泛参与。本文共分八章。第一章导论就研究缘起、研究意义和本文的结构安排进行说明。第二章对越界污染的性质及其规制特点进行分析，并对有关越界污染的经济学研究文献进行了梳理，对相关文献已有的成果和不足之处进行了总结，进而确定了本文的研究方向。第三章就中国跨行政区流域污染问题进行考察，就越界水污染的外部性特点、财政分权下的政府规制取向和水污染环境规制绩效进行案例分析和理论研究。第四章展开了对越界水污染规制制度的详细研究，从环境产权的角度对环境规制制度的选择加以解释，并给出了单向流域越界污染条件下集中规制与分权规制的分析框架，讨论具有外溢效应的地方性公共物品的供给问题。第五章则是在第四章研究成果的基础上，就地区合作与流域补偿问题进行探讨。第六章进而对越界水污染的规制工具进行考察。第四章到第六章的研究在探讨有效的政府规制制度的同时，也揭示了政府规制在我国越界水污染治理问题上的局限性。第七章结合市场经济转轨条件下公共管理的发展趋势，对越界水污染的自愿规制问题加以探讨。本章主要考察水用户、利益团体或者非政府机构(NGO)作为第三方参与越界污染控制的可能性。通过政府单边规制、政府多边规制和自愿规制的比较研究对“以志愿提供公益”的组织形式进行越界污染治理的效果进行讨论。第八章为结论，对全文进行总结，分析研究结论所包含的政策意义，并对论文不足之处和未来的研究方向加以说明。更多还原

【Abstract】 Interjurisdictionary river-basin pollution is one of the most serious problems of the water crisis in China. Long-term efforts on pollution control have not brought about the improvement of water quality on the whole and the interjurisdictionary water disputes are getting more and more intensified. Interjurisdictionary river-basin pollution, as a kind of transboundary externality, cannot be simply solved by the end-of-pipe technical treatment. Instead it should be settled down under the sustainable institutional system of environmental regulation, which calls for a insightful and deep study on the social and economic factors behind this kind of externality so as to find the efficient regulation schemes. One new branch of environmental economics which concentrates on the space-dimension has noticed the transboundary character of river-basin pollution and also mentioned the problem of governmental hierarchy in environmental regulation, but the theme of environmental regulation institutions need to be explored more profoundly. China, a society experiencing profound institutional transition and market reform, offers a specific research case for us to examine the regulation of transboundary river-basin pollution under the background of fiscal decentralization. The study on the interjurisdictionary river-basin pollution in China not only offsets the existing literature but also can be used for the reform of China’s environmental regulation institutions as reference. The thesis aims to investigate the determinant factors and to explore the efficiency of transboundary water pollution regulation in China so as to identify the reform trend of the regulation system. First of all, the thesis makes an empirical study on the status quo of river-basin pollution regulation system in China and identifies the factors that influence the transboundary water pollution. Then based on a constructed "equilibrium pollution" model and a sample of a 1994-2002 panel data on provincial regulation, the thesis analyzes the characters and performance of the provincial water pollution regulation which is presented mainly by the indicator of pollution pricing. This empirical study indicates that the provincial regulation does play a significant role of controlling the pollution and there exists great regional regulation differencebetween jurisdictions. The difference reflects the self-interests of those provinces and transboundary externality is an important determinant factor for this difference. The upstream provinces tend to ease environmental regulation, adopting the free-rider behavior to transfer water pollution to the downstream ones.Based on the research results above and the worldwide river-basin management practices, the thesis examines the regulation institutions, regulation structure and regulation instruments of transboundary water pollution from the perspective of property rights theory in the new institutional economics. The analysis shows that water priority and the public good character of water quality are the economic factors that explain the state ownership of the river-basin water resource. The water pollution regulation embodies the state ownership and the multiple governmental levels of environmental regulation reflect the substantial management regime of the state ownership.Combined with the characteristic unidirectional externality of transboundary water pollution, the theoretical part of the thesis first of all modifies the approach of model construction on transboundary pollution, making it more explicit to compare the regulation efficiency under centralized and decentralized regimes. It finds that the decentralized regulation regime can be socially efficient in the presence of worker/consumer mobility. Secondly the regional regulation cooperation and river-basin transfer mechanism are examined, such as the principles and approaches of regional transfer and cost sharing, the stability of the cooperation. It is followed by the discussion on the choices of regulation instruments on transboundary pollution, which focuses on the efficiency and limitation of water rights, water pricing, water trading and environmental liability under interjurisdictionary context, breaking through the traditional analytical assumption that there is only one government holds the regulation authority.Last but not least, the thesis probes into the social regulation of transboundary pollution, examining the incentives, approaches and efficiency of volunteer regulation. The results support a regulation framework of multi-centered governance on transboundary water pollution. The current literature on environmental regulation generally ignores the non-government regulation agents, failing to explain the regulation behavior of water users, consumer groups and NGOs. The thesis attempts to make up the theoretical deficiency. It shows that non-governmental regulation is economically rational to some extend and contributes to the abatement oftransboundary pollution. Regulation on the interjurisdictionary river-basin pollution needs a transformation from control to cooperation so as to achieve the object of widely participated regulation.The thesis consists of eight chapters. The introduction briefly discusses the research background and motivation for subsequent chapters, along with the structure arrangement of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the economic literature on transboundary pollution, identifying some dark and gray spots in the literature so as to justify our study. Chapter 3 presents an empirical study on the interjurisdictionary river-basin pollution in China with case study and theoretical analysis, which examines the externality properties of transboundary water pollution, the behavior of environmental regulators and the performance of environmental regulation. Chapter 4 develops the research on the regulation institutions on transboundary water pollution. It explains the choices of regulation regimes from the perspective of environmental property rights. This chapter analytically depicts and mathematically models the centralized and decentralized regulation regimes of the unidirectional river-basin transboundary pollution, discussing the provision of local public goods with a spillover effect. With the research results above, Chapter 5 explores the theme of regional cooperation on environmental regulation and river-basin transfer. Chapter 6 concentrates on the question of how to design the regulation instruments on transboundary pollution. The results from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 show the efficiency and limitation of governmental regulation. Chapter 7, combining the trend of public management in transitional economies, evaluates social volunteer regulation on transboundary pollution. It mainly examines the possibilities of regulation participation for water users, interest groups and NGOs, and discusses the efficiency of "providing the public goods with voluntarism". Chapter 8 concludes by identifying the major implications of this study for environmental regulation theories and river-basin management policy.更多还原