国际贸易救济法律制度中的非市场经济规则研究

【作者】 陈力；

【导师】 陈治东；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 国际法学， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 美国与欧盟是世界上两个最大的经济体，同时也是中国最大的贸易伙伴，中国实行经济体制改革和对外开放政策以来，中美与中欧贸易关系迅猛增长，但伴随着这种增长的是中美与中欧双边贸易不平衡的扩大以及由此引发的不断升温的贸易摩擦。美国与欧盟频频对中国出口产品采取反倾销和保障措施等贸易救济措施就是这种贸易摩擦的重要表现。目前，美国与欧盟已经成为对中国发起反倾销调查数量最多的两个经济体，截至2005年底，美国与欧盟对中国启动的反倾销调查已经分别达到118起和111起；2005年全年国外对我国启动的16起特殊保障措施案件均由美国和欧盟启动，产品均涉及纺织品，其中，欧盟对华启动的特别保障措施为9起，美国为7起，中国出口贸易因此受到严重损害。在各种贸易救济措施中，美国与欧盟贸易救济法律制度，尤其是反倾销法中的非市场经济规则是中国出口企业在应对时最为关注的问题和面临的最大法律障碍。在WTO允许各成员方合法采用的三种贸易救济措施——反倾销、反补贴和保障措施中，都涉及到针对非市场经济国家的特殊规则。在反倾销领域，由于中国的非市场经济国家地位，美国与欧盟对中国出口产品正常价值的确定和反倾销税率的计算分别适用歧视性的替代国制度和一国一税原则；在反补贴领域，由于中国的非市场经济地位，中国暂时侥幸豁免了美国与欧盟反补贴法的调查，但各种迹象表明，美国与欧盟随时可能修正其国内法，对非市场经济国家(特别是中国)启动反补贴调查；在保障措施领域，由于美国将专门适用于共产主义(非市场经济)国家的《1974年贸易法》第406条款转换为专门针对中国的特殊保障措施并在《中国入世议定书》中加以确定，使得中国原本仅对美国承担的特别义务转化为对所有WTO成员方的国际法义务。国际贸易救济法律制度中的“非市场经济”问题表面上看是一个经济学命题，但它的产生有着深刻的历史和政治背景，它是第二次世界大战以后东西方冷战的产物。按照西方学者的主流观点，国际贸易中的自由贸易理论(比较优势理论)无法作为市场经济国家与非市场经济国家进行贸易的理论依据，因此，他们用“接合理论”、“经济优势”理论或者“国家利益”理论来诠释与非市场经济国家的贸易关系，并试图从理论上说明运用反倾销、反补贴或“市场扰乱”中的非市场经济规则的合理性。国际贸易救济法律制度中的非市场经济规则缺乏充分的国际法依据。1947年GATT第6条注释条款仅仅提出了在对“贸易完全或几乎完全垄断”并且其“国内所有产品价格由国家确定”的国家进行反倾销调查时，决定价格可比性存在特殊困难，但是并没有指出确定这类国家产品正常价值的具体方法。反倾销法中的替代国制度是美国和欧盟在其国内法中自行“发明”的一种用以判断NME国家出口产品正常价值的方法，同时，主要是在美国的主导之下，该规则又在波兰等国家入关(关税与贸易总协定)议定书和中国入世(世界贸易组织)议定书中被合法化，成为中国承担的一项特殊的国际法义务。而一国一税原则更是美国与欧盟行政主管机关自由裁量的结果，明显缺乏国际法甚至国内法的依据。美国与欧盟反倾销法中的非市场经济规则具有明显的歧视性和不合理性，这不仅体现在行政主管机关对“市场经济”判断标准的灵活掌握上极易受到政治因素的干扰(如美国行政主管机构关于非市场经济国家的裁定不受法院的司法审查)，而且行政主管机构在替代国的选择和分别税率的裁定上具有非常大的随意性，其自由裁量权难以受到完全制约。在寻求应对策略时，中国政府与企业均责无旁贷，应当采取政治和法律两种手段，从宏观和微观两个层面进行积极应对。首先，政府应当通过双边磋商或借助多边谈判机制，争取及早获得美国与欧盟对我国市场经济地位的承认或者修改WTO相关协议中的不合理规定；其次，中国应当继续深化经济体制改革，使中国经济进一步市场化，有针对性地抗辩美国与欧盟的市场经济标准；第三，中国政府应积极协助企业应诉，必要时可以将相关争议提交世贸组织争端解决机制解决。企业在面对美国与欧盟的反倾销调查时，应当积极应诉，充分利用美国与欧盟法律赋予的实体权利与程序权利(包括提请司法审查)进行市场经济地位、替代国与一国一税的抗辩。更多还原

【Abstract】 The United States and the European Union are the two largest economic entities in the world. Both of them are the most significant trade partners of China. The bilateral trade relations between U.S and China as well as EU and China have developed more and more rapidly and deeply since China’s economic reform and opening to the outside world. However, in the meanwhile, the trade imbalance between China and U.S. as well as China and EU have been expanded and such imbalance has led to the hot trade frictions between their bilateral trade relations. There are still a lot of trade barriers for Chinese export products entering into the markets of both the U.S and EU. Antidumping and product specific safeguard are among a number of current issues raising significant problem in US-China and EU-China trade relations. By far, The U.S. and EU have been the top economic entities that have ever applied antidumping measures towards China. According to official statistics, the U.S. and EU have initiated 118 and 111 antidumping investigations respectively toward Chinese products by the end of 2005. Besides that, both of them become the only economic entities that initiated the product specific safeguards against Chinese textile products in the year 2005. In both the U.S. and EU trade laws, particularly their antidumping laws, The Non market economy (NME) rules have become the main concerns and difficulties of Chinese exporters when responding to the trade remedy proceedings, especially the antidumping proceedings. Anti-dumping, subsidy and safeguard measures are the only legal trade remedies WTO members can utilize according to the WTO law, and the NME rules are related with all of them. In both the United States and EC Anti-dumping law, China has been treated as a NME country or state trading country. With this perception, in taking antidumping measures against Chinese products, both the United States and the European Union authorities adopt the so-called "surrogate approach" to determine the fair (normal) value and the countrywide duty rule to determine the dumping margin, by disregarding micro-economic elements like cost of production, level of economic development, lower labor costs, and so on; The NME status exempts China from the countervailing duty investigations in both U.S. and EU Countervailing duty laws, but China’s good fortune may not last forever since the Congress of U.S. are thinking to amend the case law rule fixed in Georgetown Steel Corp v. United States; in the safeguard field, the U.S. has revised its 1974 Trade law to transfer the Section 406 (implicating to Communist countries, including China) to Section 421 and Section 422 for the purpose of applicable specifically to China. Section 421 and 422 has been incorporated into Article 16 of Protocol on the Accession of China and it become China’s international duty to all WTO Members.The NME treatment toward China rooted deeply in the early Cold War and have not changed since China adopted its open-door policy and even acceded to WTO. According to Article 15 of "Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic China", the United States and the European Union will continue to treat China as a Non market Economy country until the year of 2015. According to the main views ofsome U.S. authorities, the Comparative Advantages theory are not appropriate to explain the trade relationship between the Market and Non market economy countries. They try to provide a sound basis of NME Rules in market economy country’s antidumping and other trade laws by the Interface theory, theory of Economic Advantages and the theory of State Interest.The international legal basis of NME rules in both U.S. and EU antidumping laws are not sound enough, since the 1955 Interpretative Note to the first paragraph of Article VI (GATT) only stated that: "It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph I, and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate." As follows from the text of the interpretative note, it is no more than a statement of fact providing no specific indications as to what course of action investigating authorities should take in dealing with centrally planned economy countries. In practice, the issue was left to the discretion of the national administrations.The NME rules of U.S. and EU antidumping laws are unreasonable and discriminate to China, the Market Economy criteria of U.S. and EU are mainly explained and controlled by the administration and are easily influenced by political considerations (e.g. under U.S. law, the decision of the U.S. Department of Commerce to designate a trading partner as a non-market economy is not subject to judicial review), the administrative authorities have broad discretion to decide the selection of surrogate countries and the requirements and procedures to apply for separate rate.There are two possible solutions to resolve the NME issues. The first one is the diplomatic method. Under the motion of Chinese government, the U.S.-China Joint Commission Commerce and Trade Working Group on Structure Issues has been established to discuss whether to graduate China from NME to ME as a whole and Chinese government has also formally applied for the recognition of MES by EU; besides that, as a member of the WTO, China can suggest to revise the related provisions of WTO Antidumping Agreement in the new Doha Round negotiation; the second is the legal method. Chinese exporters or government can resort to legal remedies respectively from the Domestic court of U.S. and EU or the WTO Disputes Settlement Mechanism. The rule that NME designating is not subject to judicial review in the U.S. court may not block Chinese exporters to bring complaints on issues such as surrogate country selection or single countrywide duty to the U.S. court. Besides that, according to the WTO rule, Chinese government has the right on behalf of Chinese export producers to bring such complaints to the WTO disputes Settlement Mechanism.更多还原