【作者】 徐献军；

【导师】 庞学铨；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 外国哲学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 现象学对于认知科学的意义这一问题，是近年来国外现象学研究的一个热点，而目前国内学术界尚无相关研究论文或著作。而这一问题本身具有很重要的学术意义。在这种情形下，通过探讨现象学对于认知科学的意义，来推进现象学和认知科学的研究，就显得非常必要，也富有价值。本文的论题由此得以确立。当前认知科学正在发生由无身认知到具身认知的范式转型，而本文致力于从两方面来探讨现象学在这种范式转型中的作用：一方面是现象学对无身认知的批判意义，而另一方面是现象学的身体理论对具身认知的建构性意义。 本文导言部分提出，当前认知科学正在发生的由无身认知向具身认知的范式转型，与现象学已发生的从胡塞尔的超越现象学向梅洛-庞蒂等人的身体现象学的发展非常类似，或者说是同型的。这意味海德格尔、梅洛-庞蒂等人对传统哲学和胡塞尔思想局限性的批判同样适用于无身认知。另外，绝大多数认知科学家对于身体的理解是含糊的，而现象学的身体理论可以帮助他们更好地理解什么是身体以及身体在认知活动中至关重要的作用。 在第一章中，本文致力于对作为认知科学主导范式的无身认知做出现象学的批判。无身认知的实质是在考虑认知活动或智能活动时，以表征为核心，而忽视身体的关键作用。在以无身认知思想为指导的人工智能研究背后，有三个未经检验的哲学假设：心理学假设、认识论假设和本体论假设。再将无身认知的哲学思想加以深挖后，会发现胡塞尔的意向性思想与无身认知具有类似的主张和局限性，因为它们都试图意义和可理解性奠基于抽象精神结构之上。另外，本章提出，在具身认知思想的产生中，海德格尔是一个关键的中介环节。因为海德格尔对胡塞尔以及整个传统哲学的批判，正是对无身认知思想的批判。 第二章提出，现象学的身体理论对于认知科学的建议是认知的具身性。首先，由于模式识别这种基本的智能或认知活动，是一种身体技能，所以人工智能是否可能的问题，就变成能否制造出人造身体主体的问题。其次，从神经科学的角度来看，所有的认知最终以身体的神经结构为基础。这就是神经具身观，而它一方面支持了现象学的建议，另一方面对身体的神经结构的强调，有遗漏现象学意义上的身体的危险。再次，从专家技能的角度来看，技能的本质特征是身体性，因为接受技能的是身体，而新手与专家的本质区别在于他们拥有能对情境做出不同反应的身体。无身的专家系统无法达到技能的最高阶段。最后，从身体性与社会性孰先孰后的角度来强化本章主题观点，即认知的具身性。身体性才是基本的，因为拥有一个身体是能被社会化的前提。 第三章首先指出，绝大多数具身认知研究者们都有这样的局限性，即他们都更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, phenomenology’s contribution to cognitive science has become a research hot in phenomenology study of America and Europe. Though this problem is very important, there are no relevant articles and books in China. In this case, it is very necessary and valuable to study this problem in order to advance work on both phenomenology and cognitive science. And that brings about the thesis of the dissertation. There is a paradigm shift from disembodied cognition to embodied cognition in cognitive science, and the thesis commits itself to discussing phenomenology’s contribution in this paradigm shift including criticizing disembodied cognition and accounting for how embodied cognition can benefit from phenomenology’s theory on the body.In introduction, the paper puts forward that the paradigm shift from disembodied cognition to embodied cognition in cognitive science is similar to the development from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to Merleau-Ponty’s and others’ body phenomenology, or they are isomorphic. It means Heidegger’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and other phenomenologists’ critics of the limits of traditional philosophy and Husserl can apply to disembodied cognition. Moreover, most of cognitive scientists don’t understand the body properly, and phenomenology’s theory on the body can help them to comprehend the body and how body plays a critic role in cognitive activities.In the Chapter 1, it seeks to criticize embodied cognition which is the dominant paradigm in the cognitive science from a phenomenological perspective. According to the central hypothesis of embodied cognition, cognition is the manipulation of representations and the body can be ignored. The artificial intelligence which reflectsdisembodied cognition attitudes has three unexamined philosophical assumptions------psychological assumption, epistemological assumption and ontological assumption. At the root of the philosophy of embodied cognition, it is noted that Husserl’s intentionality theory has the similar idea and limitations as disembodied cognition, because they all try to base meaning and intelligibility on the abstract mental structure. Moreover, Heidegger is a critical bridge between disembodied cognition and embodied cognition since his criticism of Husserl and the whole traditional philosophy is just criticism of disembodied cognition.In the following Chapter 2, it holds that according to phenomenology’s theory on更多还原