节点文献
股权分置改革经济学解析
Economic Explanation of Shareholder Structure Reform
【作者】 耿玉新；
【导师】 赵振全；
【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 数量经济学， 2006， 博士
【摘要】 本文基于现代金融学无套利分析理论框架和数理模型方法,结合两批46家试点公司的实际,从公司绩效与股权分置关系、合理对价方案设计、投资主体间的博弈分析以及财富再分配效应等方面,系统研究股权分置改革所涉及到的经济学问题。在对前人文献进行充分总结的基础上,采用分量回归模型研究了不同业绩水平上市公司股权结构对其绩效的具体影响关系;基于政策中性原则、利益均分原则、历史回溯原则和行为金融学的市场投资主体惯性行为与非齐次预期假设,从不同的角度研究证券市场中均衡对价的确定原则,并利用市场中试点公司的数据对理论分析的结果进行实证检验。另外,还基于流通股东与非流通股东之间的博弈关系,采用讨价还价模型和逆向递推方法,分析在有限期条件下,股权分置改革对上市公司的总体财富创造效应以及财富在不同投资主体之间的再分配效应,并比较不同形式对价方案的差异。研究结果不仅具有理论价值,同时将为政府在后股权分置时代和进一步开放的市场条件下进行科学决策提供参考依据。
【Abstract】 Shareholder structure as a systemic error left over from history and our capital markets unique structural problems besetting China’s long-term development of capital markets. Excessive concentration of state-owned shares in the securities market in our country seriously affected the efficiency and the optimal allocation of resources in scientific management structure of listed companies to establish. May 2005, has more than 10 years of China’s securities market, Shareholder structure issue finally started. As of late 2005, completed and entered the reform process listed companies had more than half the total market value, and ShenZhen SME board had achieved fully circulation. All show that shareholder structure reform which resolves the largest historical problem besetting our stock market is in full swing, the Chinese capital market is in a profound institutional change.In the process of this historic institutional change, systematic study of Economics involved in the shareholder structure reform, will be the important guarantee of protecting the interests of parties investors, reducing costs and the successful completion of the reform. This paper study shareholder structure reform systemically and provide reference basis for government decision-making in the era after shareholder structure reform and the further opening up of market conditions, based on non-arbitrage analysis theoretical framework in modern finance and quantitative methods, in conjunction with the actual situation of two groups of 46 experimental companies, from companies’ performance and their shareholder structures, rational design of consideration schemes, game analysis between parties investors and the effects of wealth redistribution etc.