【作者】 蒋东荣；

【导师】 李群湛；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 电力系统及其自动化， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 电力工业市场化是世界各国在社会经济发展过程中都不可避免的问题。电力系统的供需平衡同步、难于大量存储、技术和资金较密集、建设周期较长、垄断性较强等特性决定了电力市场绝非是简单的普通商品贸易市场。这也使得电力市场化的过程远远复杂于其它行业的市场化过程。电力市场化在取得巨大成功的同时也存在有不少问题亟需解决,电力市场环境下发电容量充裕性问题就是其中之一。文中致力于研究如何解决电力市场环境下发电容量的充裕性问题。主要研究工作包括:设计了一种考虑电力合同的激励性机制,建立了考虑合同电量或还考虑热备用容量的购电商调度策略和发电厂商发电策略,以市场均衡和猜测变量为基础对合同电量问题进行了研究,构建了一种动态价格上限新方法等。 首先,电力市场中无论是统一竞价机制还是按报价支付机制都难于激励发电厂商上报真实成本,其策略性报价严重危及电力系统的安全和经济运行。文中以机制设计理论为基础,设计了一种考虑电力合同的激励性机制。所设计的机制能在实现经济调度的同时有效的激励发电机组上报真实成本,以引导发电容量投资,实现社会资源的合理配置。该机制对边际、边际附近或以上机组的激励更为有效,既能保证各机组合理回收容量成本又能抑制其暴利行为,从市场机制上确保电力市场有增加发电容量和投资的动力。 其次,现今的电力市场中,电网公司常作为电力用户的单一购电商代表,调度分配电量的核心问题是,既要使电网公司的购电成本最小化,又要使发电方利益得到保护,有利于保证系统有充足的发电容量,以使电力市场稳定发展和电网安全运行。电网公司在进行购电交易时,既要考虑各发电厂商申报的现货电价和竞价电量,又要考虑与发电厂商原有的购售电合同,甚至还要兼顾系统的热备用问题。因此,购电商不可避免的要对预测发电量进行合同电量、竞价电量和热备用容量进行经济分配。文中针对这一问题建立了考虑合同电量和同时考虑合同电量与热备用容量这两种情况下的购电商的预测交易日经济分配模型,并用线性规划和逐步淘汰相结合的方法对该模型的合理简化模型进行了求解,使求解过程变得简单合理、易行可靠。 第三,同其它市场一样,电力市场的参与者中同样不可能缺少供应者。对发电厂商而言,在制定日发电策略时,不但要考虑竞价投标问题,而且还更多还原

【Abstract】 With the socioeconomic development, deregulated the power industry is inevitable for each country in the world. The power supply must synchronize with power need and the power is difficult to be saved. The power system techniques are very complex. The project of power industry needs a vast sum funds, the building period is long. There is strong monopolization in the power industry. These factors decide the power market is more complex than the common commodities market. So, the reform of power industry is more difficult than the other industries. The power industry reform has been a great success, at the same time, many problems must be resolved immediately;for example, the generation capacity adequacy in the deregulated electricity market. This dissertation is to resolve the generation capacity adequacy in the electricity market. The main research work include: designing an incentive mechanism considering contract;building the dispatching strategies of power companies and the generating strategies of the units considering the contract and spinning reserves;studying on the question of contract volumes in electricity market on the market equilibrium and the conjectural variations and designing a novel method of dynamic price capping for the regulation of electricity market etc.Firstly, in electricity market, it is very difficult to inspirit the generation companies to bid the true cost with the uniform price auction or pay-as-bid auction. The tactful pricing of generation companies will be harmful to the security and economical operation of power system. The dissertation showed an incentive mechanism considering contract, based on the mechanism design theory. This mechanism is able to inspirit the generation companies to bid the true cost effectively and carry out economical operation as well, so it can attract the generation capacity investment and configure the social resource reasonably. The new mechanism can more effectively inspirit the generation companies on, near or over the system marginal cost, and it is able to not only ensure reasonable capacity cost recovery but also restrain the sudden huge profits of all generation companies. The motivity of increase in generation capacity and investment isensured on the electricity market mechanism.Secondly, in many electricity markets, the power company, the singular buyer represent as the users, has the core of its power dispatching, which is minimizing the purchase cost and protecting the benefit of power plants. Only in this way, the power system generation capacity adequation can be ensured, power system operate can securely and the electricity market can develope steadily. Before the electrical transaction, the power companies not only consider the power plants’ competitive bidding spot price and volume, but also pay attention to the original purchase contract with the original power plants and the spinning reserve of power system. Therefore, it is necessary to coordinate the volumes among the contract bid, the competitive bids and the spinning reserve for the predicted generation volumes. Aiming at this, the dissertation puts forward a new model for the economically apportioning strategies among the competitive bids, the purchase contracts and the spinning reserve volumes. At the same time, a simplified model is taken for the seeking process. Linear Programming and the approach based on phase-out were used to solve the model, so the process became simple and credible.Thirdly, the participators of electricity market can’t lack of power suppliers like other markets. The power plants consider not only the competitive bids in spot market and the original purchase contracts with the power companies, or the users, but also the spinning reserve when programming the daily generation strategies. So, it is an important problem deserving of study how to tactful dispatch the competitive bid volumes, the contract volumes and the spinning volumes of power plants together and carry out maximum profits. Aiming at this goal, the dissertation puts forward a novel daily generating model. The mathematic model, which is difficult to solve it directly, is a nonlinear programming model containing the integral and continual variable. So, a reasonably simplized model is introduced for the seeking process. Then, the units’ sequence on efficiency and the Quadratic Programming are used to seek the model step by step. The analysis of the case proves this approach is reasonable and practicable.Fourthly, it is important way to set up electric contract market for mitigating the market power in electricity markets. In the dissertation, a novel optimizationmodel was put forward to the balance spot price, contract prices, contract volumes and competitive bidding volumes between the generation companies and the single power purchaser. The model bases on the market equilibrium and the conjectural variations. It aims to control the spot price and maximize the profits of generation companies. The discussion clearly shows the influences of the adjustable factor of contract prices, the conjectural variations of contract volumes and the number of generation companies in market on the spot price, the optimum contract volumes and the cost price of purchaser. What’s more, it proves the electric contract is very important to mitigate the market power and maintain adequate generation capacity.Fifthly, at present, the price cap as a measure of regulator is widely used in the power markets on the world, but the existing methods of price capping couldn’t control the price spikes and evade the risk effectively. Thus, a novel model called Dynamic Price Capping Model(DPCM) is proposed, which absorbs the merits of the British Retail Price Index(RPI) and the American Rate of Return(ROR), reserves the dynamic adjusting feature of Price Capping Model(PCM) and achieves fair return of the investment. The calculation for profit factor and the incentive mechanism for new or old power plant about this model are discussed. It shows the approach is more reasonable and practicable solution for the dilemma of price cap in the power market.更多还原