【作者】 张勇；

【导师】 胡培；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 尽管一些学者对公司经营者代理行为进行了研究并取得了一些成果，但由于种种原因，直接应用其中某些结果可能并不适宜我国公司治理现状。另外，公司经营者人力资源在现实生活中的稀缺性、可塑性和与其主体的不司分离性，无疑让研究既具有重大的理论意义又具有重要的实际意义。论文运用现代企业理论的原理和方法，主要对公司经营者的激励约束机制、公司经营者的代理行为、公司经营者优化组合激励、国有股权代表的代理行为等四个问题进行了较为系统和深入地研究。 在公司经营者激励约束机制的研究方面：首先，分析了经营者道德风险行为的产生原因，指出了防范道德风险行为的关键在激励。其次，指出了防范经营者道德风险行为必然要面对信息租金抽取与获取工作效率之间的冲突。再次，讨论了一个可以显示私人信息的报酬激励机制，在委托代理模型框架内给出了最优解。另外，构造了一个防范经营者在签约后隐匿信息的模型，并给出了模型的最优解。论文还基于有限执行的假设，扩展了代理人逆向选择模型，并运用扩展模型改进了最优报酬契约。最后，对审计机制进行了分析，指出了概率性审计机制能够显著地改进经营者的最优报酬契约。 在经营者代理行为研究方面，论文对若干问题进行了扩展研究：首先，探讨了经营者的机会行为，改进了经营者的效用函数并建立了激励模型。其次，分析了经营者的行动组合，认为传统委托—代理模型得到的利润分享系数偏低。再次，在多项委托任务情况下分析了代理人的努力成本函数，分析了任务相关性对替代性任务和互补性任务中最优分享系数的影响。第四，对激发经营者努力与治理经营者机会行为进行了综合探讨，得到了经营者对利润分享系数和监督资金的优化表达式。第五，将业绩的隐性激励作用引入经营者的效用函数后建立了对经营者的最优报酬激励模型，分析了业绩隐性激励对最优报酬契约的影响。最后，分析了不确定性对经营者努力与公司价值创造的影响。 在经营者优化组合激励问题方面：首先，对经营者报酬结构的优化问题进行了探讨，建立了优化分配模型，得到了优化分配比例。其次，对经营者长期报酬和短期报酬的优化组合激励问题进行了探讨，建立了组合激励的两更多还原

【Abstract】 Although there are worldwide achievements in the studies on agency behavior of company manager, it is unfeasible to apply directly some of them to the practices of corporate governance in China. Furthermore, because the humane resource of company manager in reality are scarce, plastic and inseparable from its subject, undoubtedly the topics of this paper are of theoretic and pragmatic significance. Based on the principles and methods of modern enterprise theories, the paper makes a relatively systematic and in-depth study on four topics: incentive constraint mechanisms for company manager, agency behavior of company manager, optimization of combined incentives to company manager, agency behavior of the representatives of state-owned equities.About the incentive constraint mechanisms for company manager: first, the paper points out that incentive is the key to prevent moral risk behavior after analyzing the reasons for them; second, it points out that there are inevitable conflicts between abstracting information rent and obtaining working efficiency in preventing manager’s moral risk behavior; third, it discuses a reward incentive mechanism which can display personal information, gives the first-best solution within the framework of principal-agent model; fourth, it establishes a model that can prevent manager from concealing information and gives the first-best solution; fifth, it improves the optimal reward contract by using expanded model on the hypothesis of limited enforcement; finally, it points out that probability auditing mechanism can improve significantly manager’s optimal reward contract.The paper makes an expanded study on a series of problems about agency behavior of company manager. Firstly, it discusses manager opportunism behavior and sets up an incentive model by improving manager utility function. Secondly, it analyzes manager behavioral combination and regards that the coefficient of profit sharing in traditional principal-agent model is a little low. Thirdly, it analyses the cost function of agent’s effort under the situation of multiple entrusted tasks and the influence of task relevance upon the optimal更多还原