【作者】 张晓晴；

【导师】 邹东涛；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 政治经济学， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 自1985年中国首次引入了“创业投资”概念以来，创业投资在中国的发展已有二十余年，但无论从创业投资业自身的发展还是对科技产业化和经济发展的贡献来讲，制度引入后并未充分发挥应有的绩效。其中一个重要原因就是，我国长期以来注重创业投资形式上的引入，轻视创业投资公司内生治理机制的构建，最终解决不了高运营成本、高代理成本和弱激励机制等基本问题。论文力图从理论上揭示中国创业投资公司治理机制实践中存在的问题，提出解决这些困扰中国创业投资业发展的问题的政策建议，为繁荣创业投资公司治理机制理论、推进和完善中国创业投资公司治理机制的实践做出贡献。 创业投资涉及投资者、创业投资家和创业企业家三个行为主体和两层委托—代理契约，面临着特定的公司治理问题。委托—代理关系的存在带来了公司治理问题，创业投资高交易费用的运行特征引起人们对创业投资治理机制研究的高度关注。论文将交易费用理论、信息不对称理论、委托—代理理论、共同治理理论以及金融契约理论进行理论综述，作为研究创业投资公司治理机制的理论基础。 论文采用了制度经济学的研究方法，在简述创业投资的起源、发展历程与现状的基础上，分别从政策、法律法规、金融、社会中介服务和文化等环境要素方面对中国创业投资发展的外部环境进行描述和分析，并对中国创业投资的微观治理机制的困境和面临的主要问题进行概括和总结。论文提出，中国创业投资的发展历程可以分为制度变迁的认知阶段、兴起和缓慢发展阶段、完善和调整制度结构阶段、制度创新阶段；中国创业投资微观治理机制的主要问题包括运作问题、投资主体问题、人才资源稀缺、组织制度滞后等。 论文以创业投资公司运作中两层激励约束契约的设计为切入点，探讨与此相关的创业投资机构组织形式、创业投资契约和创业投资风险管理机制等问题。投资者与创业投资家之间的委托—代理关系是创业投资中的第一层委托—代理关系。论文对创业投资组织形式的变迁和有限合伙契约形成的制度环境进行分析，在此基础上考察了有限合伙契约的历史、产生原因及其制度框架，揭示了有限合伙契约对创业投资家的激励约束机制及其制度优势。论文对创业投资家激励约束机制在中国的探索与实践进行分析，包括中国创业投资组织形式的历史考察、中国有限合伙契约的实践及适应性分析和中国创业投资家激励与约束机制存在的问题。论文提出，由于大多数政府创业投资机构都是公司制，不能实现有限合伙制有效的激励约束机制，经营管理人员缺乏激励，经营者没有长远的职业规划与经营打算，比较注重眼前利益，与创业投资者中长期投资的属性相悖，导致创业投资机构缺乏发展后劲，影响创业投资的效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since China initially imported the concept of venture capital, it has involved for more than twenties. Nevertheless in terms of its development level and its contribution to either the technology industrialization or the economy, it has not entirely exerted its deserved effect. One of important reasons is China merely concentrates on importing venture capital’s models rather than the internal corporate governance at venture capital company. Therefore it can not eventually resolve the conflict between its high transaction cost, agent cost and its weak incentive mechanism. This paper in theory tries to reveal the problems of corporate governance at venture capital companies in China and to bring forth the constructive advice in order to prosper the theory of internal corporate governance at the venture capital company and to benefit improving their contributions in practice.Venture capital involves three main relevant parties: venture investor, venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur, and meanwhile it relates to the agent contracts at two levels. The agency relationship with double contract causes a series of difficulties at venture corporate governance. The natures of information asymmetry and high transaction cost make more attentions on the corporate governance at venture capital companies. This paper applies to the transaction cost theory and information asymmetry hypothesis to reveal the specific characteristics of agency contract at venture capital, and it comprehensively states the theories of agency, integrated corporate governance and financial contract. This paper will form a theoretical foundation on corporate governance at venture capital companies.This paper adopts the researching method of institutional economics. It describes and analyzes the outer circumstance of venture capital in China based on its relevant policies, legal regulations, finance, social agency service and culture. At the same time it summarizes and concludes the difficulties and problems regarding micro corporate governance of venture capital. This paper puts forward this option that the whole phases of the venture capital development in China include the stage of recognition of institutional transition, the stage of institution innovation, the stage of institution improvement and the stage of institution stabilization. The problems existing in the micro corporate governance of venture capital in China relates to the更多还原