上市公司经理人员薪酬的法律规制

【作者】 黄福宁；

【导师】 方流芳；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 民商法学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 本文第一章是导论部分。这一部分主要介绍了上市公司经理人员薪酬问题的状况。指出由于上市公司经理人员的高额薪酬与公司的业绩没有关联性,就不可避免地演变成为公司经理人员侵夺股东利益的方式。这一部分运用了代理成本的理论框架,指出经理人员的薪酬从解决代理成本的手段变成为代理成本问题本身的一部分。基于降低公司制度的代理成本是法律的基本功能的认识,这一部分提出了本文的中心问题,法律应当如何应对经理人员的不合理薪酬问题?第二章主要论述法律对于薪酬问题可能的第一反映,即立法对薪酬水平施加直接管制。本章回顾了我国对于国有企业经营者实施薪酬管制的过程、成因和效果。通过这一历史过程分析指出立法强加管制的效果并不如人意。紧接着这一部分分析了立法管制所面临的正当性、科学性和有效性方面的质疑,指出立法直接管制薪酬水平会面临多重挑战,因而是一项“不可能完成的任务”。第三章的主要内容是探究通过立法的形式影响上市公司经理人员薪酬的另一途径即税法调整。本部分回顾了国外主要是美国运用税法规则对上市公司经理人员薪酬加以规制的历史。从美国税法相关规则的实践结果来看,运用税法来遏制上市公司经理人员的高额薪酬并没有取得明显的效果,甚至还有一定的负面作用。在与税法规则的博弈当中,公司的经理人会占据上风而不是处于被动接受的地位。税法在压缩公司高管人员的薪酬上如果说不是无能为力,那也只能是尽微薄之力,不堪此重责大任。第四章的主要内容是考察司法机构在公司经理人员薪酬问题上的角色。由于现代公司法对于公司机关权力的安排,股东对于公司经理人员薪酬的质疑其实是在拷问公司董事会的相关决策。司法机构应股东的请求介入此问题事实上是对公司董事会的决策进行审查。然而,法院并非作出此方面判断的最佳角色,由股东来判断经理人员的薪酬是否合理是更为妥当的。因此,司法机构虽然无法完全推托自己作为正义的最后一道防线的角色,但是其不情愿、迟疑和保守的态度是毋庸疑问和可以理解的。第五章主要讨论上市公司经理人员薪酬结构变动带来的会计处理问题。伴随更多还原

【Abstract】 This article explores the appropriate approach to the regulation of listing corporations executives’ execessive remuneration. The first part of this article introduce the status of executives’remuneration. It is pointed out that the excess high level of executive compensation depart the interest of shareholder. With the framework of agency cost theory, this part describe the evolution that compensation system become part of agency cost. In this part, the core issue is that what is the appropriate react of law to this problem.Chapter two discuss the constant response to the problem regulation on remuneration. This part retrospect the processand the effect of regulation on the remuneration of executives of state-owned enterprises. Legislation on the level of compensatino confronts many challenges such as its legamacy and effectness. So direct regulation is an mission impossible.Chapter three probe into whether tax rule can cap payment sucessfully. The practice of American tax law demonstrate that tax law can not bring obvious effec. Tax law can even bring out some adverse effect. Tax law can not bear the overweight burden.Cahpter four review court’s function in restricting executives’payment. Judicial review on the decision of board of directors is necessary but not efficient. It is shareholder not court that is the best party to determine whether compensation level is excess high. The judicial decision actually reflect the position of court that judges are reluntant to be involved in the problem of executive remuneration.Chapter five deals with option accounting. With the change of the structure of compensati, option become the important source of income to executives. However, the accounting method for stock option raise battle between investors and executive. After comparing the advantage and disavantage of different accounting metho, it is concluded that fair value approach can be the appropriae method to measure the real cost of remneration.更多还原