【作者】 商立平；

【导师】 江春；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 金融学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 将新制度经济学全面系统的运用到金融学之中进行研究,以创建一个新的研究领域——新制度金融学是一个全新的课题。新制度金融学的研究内容相当丰富,并将成为一个新的理论前沿分支。本文在我国商业银行改革不断向纵深推进这一大的背景下,力图在总结、归纳国内外合约理论的相关成果及分析方法的基础上,以制度因素为切入点,以合约为主线,从一个新的角度,重新解释金融体系中金融合约的相关概念,对我国商业银行体系的改革进程进行系统的实证分析和总结,并对我国商业银行如何重构金融合约关系进行深入系统的研究,从而为新制度金融学的形成作出贡献。 本文的主要创新是:1、将新制度经济学中的合约理论引入金融学,并试图在此基础上重新解释金融体系中金融合约的相关概念、理论,为新制度经济学在金融领域的全面运用,或者说为新制度金融学的形成提供一个分析的理论框架。2、运用博弈论对金融合约的形成机制进行了初步的研究,并特别针对我国银企之间非市场化信贷合约的形成进行了研究,同时解释了该种金融合约的低效率(不良贷款率高)。3、对我国商业银行体系的金融合约问题进行了分类分析。根据我国特殊的银企关系、特殊的银行内部关系、特殊的银行与政府之间的关系,本文将我国商业银行的金融合约划分为市场合约、管理合约、政府合约三个层次。4、对市场合约、管理合约、以及政府合约带来的交易成本首次进行了度量,并提出了完善这三种合约和降低交易成本的具体措施——进行产权改革,培育理性合格的合约主体,完善合约环境。 本文的主要结论是:1、商业银行体系的相关合约分为三种:市场合约、管理合约及政府合约,并建立了三种合约的博弈模型,在一定程度上弥补国内外相关研究的缺陷;2、目前,我国银行体系中真正的市场合约主体还没完全形成,因为金融市场上交易者大多不是真正意义上的产权主体;这就影响了市场合约的规范性和效率。因此,只有进行产权改革,培育理性的合约主体,特别是进行股份制改造,实现产权多元化,明晰产权,才能完善银行与企业之间的市场合约,减少不良资产的产生。3、从银行内部的管理合约来看,目前委托代理关系尚未理顺,金融合约的事前设计机制还不完善,激励机制基本没有建立,由于剩余产权没有真正合理分配,特别是剩余控制权和剩余索取权没有合理匹配,导致金融合约效率低下:因此更多还原

【Abstract】 It is an innovation of introducing new institutional economics into finance, and establishing new institutional finance as a new domain. The content of new institutional finance is plentiful and promising to be a forward branch. In China, commercial banks are innovating widely and deeply. In this background, this paper try to conclude and summarize the related achievements of contract theory and research approaches both domestic and abroad, to re-explain related financial concepts from a new point of view. By taking institutional factor as a point of penetration and taking contract as masterstroke, the paper explains related concepts on bases of achievements in contact theories both demotic and abroad, and gives an interpretation of related concepts in financial system from a new point of view. The paper draws its conclusions by experimentally analyzing the reformation process of commercial banking system in China, and studies deeply and systematically in how to reconstruct the contractual relationship of commercial banks, and contributes to establish new institutional finance.The main innovations of this paper lie in the followed points:(l) Introducing contract theory of new institutional economics to finance, and trying to give a new explanation on related concepts and theories, to apply new institutional economics to the study of finance, or to say, to provide a new analytical framework of establishing new institutional finance. (2) Applying game theory to study the mechanism of contract establishment. Since the establishment of contract affected by government, on-banking enterprises and internal management of banks, this paper analyzes the establishment of non-market-oriented credit-loan contract between banks and enterprises in analytical methods of game theory and explains why such contracts are low efficiency (high ratio of non - performing loan). (3) Analyzing the internal financial contracts of commercial banking system .In the light of the special linkage between banks and enterprises, between internal banks and between banks and government, this paper divides the financial contact into three different levers, namely market contract, management contract and government contract, and fosters a specific measure to consummate thesethree sorts of contract. This measure is to reform property rights, to foster rational qualified and perfect contractual circumstances.The main conclusions of this paper are :(1) The related contracts of commercial banking system can be divided into three kinds of contract, including market contract, management contract and government contract. This paper also sets models of game theory for these three kinds of contract and remedies defects of the domestic and foreign research. (2) So far, the real market contractual subjects haven’t formed completely in the commercial banking system in China. Since the traders in the financial market are not the property right subjects in real sense, the formality and efficiency of market contracts are weakened o In this case, reforming property rights and fostering rational contractual subjects ,and above all, share-formed are essential to fulfill property rights multivariate. to clarify property rights and to consummate the market contract between banks and enterprises.(3) According to the internal management contract of commercial bank, the principle-agent relationship hasn’t been combed smoothly, the beforehand mechanism hasn’t been designed perfectly and the fundamental incentive mechanism hasn’t been established yet. Without the truly rational distribution of residual property rights allocation, especially due to the un-well matched residual rights of control and surplus claim, the efficiency of financial contract is very low. Therefore, it is necessary to complete incentive regulation mechanism, to consummate decision and distribution mechanism, to cut down agency cost and management expenses, and to enhance the general profit-making ability. (4) The contractual relationship between government and banks is special, with the main characteristics of government intervene, government guarantee and government regulation. These informalities of contract are the main reasons of non - performing loan and are also bad to foster formal market mechanism .In this case, we must reform property rights thoroughly and realize the market-oriented contract between government and banks.The main significance and purposes of this paper are to enrich the achievement of new institutional finance, to provide the effective contractual basement of reconstructing state-owned commercial banking system, to point out the direction of contractual optimization of Commercial banking system in China and to provide related suggestionon realization of innovation goals as well as the new idea of commercial banks dwelling with complicated financial circumstances in the transition process of China’s accession into WTO.Due to the above purposes, the paper is organized as follows:Chapter 1 is the introduction. This part provides the background and significance of this paper, introduces the analytical approach and train of thought, summarizes the literatures and points out the breakthrough of this paper.In chapter 2,after combing contractual theories both domestic and abroad, the author introduces the concept of contract to finance and establishes a new theoretical framework, which is the basement of entire paper.Chapter 3 provides three different contractual forms in commercial banking system in China: market contract, management contract and government contract. From the view of transition cost, this part generally looks insight of all these forms and measures the degree of informalities in commercial banks’ contract, by using the ratio of non -performing loan rate as a dominant indicator.The main part of this paper is from chapter 4 to chapter 6.By applying normative and positive statements, game theory and comparison approach; this paper systematically analyzes three problems including the contract efficiency (non - performing loan), the establishment contract mechanism and the process of contract optimization.Chapter 7 analyzes the factors, which influence the contract optimization of Commercial banking system in China, directs the contract optimization of Commercial banking system in China, and gives suggestions on realizing reformation goals.Chapter 8 summarizes the main conclusions of this paper and prospects the further study.更多还原