【作者】 殷红；

【导师】 王先甲；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 系统工程， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,各国政府越来越多地通过拍卖方法实现公共产品的市场化和公共资源的私有化、重塑竞争性基础设施产业(电信、电力、天然气、交通等)、配置公共稀缺资源以及以低成本供给公共产品、增加财政收入渠道等,私人部门也更多地通过拍卖转让资产所有权或者采购原材料。在这些环境下,居于垄断地位的政府部门或者私人采购者都渴望寻求一种最有利的拍卖交易制度来销售商品或权利,他们在选择和设计最优的拍卖制度时都迫切地需要得到关于这方面的更多的咨询和专业性的建议。而且随着拍卖市场参与范围的不断扩大,竞争将更加激烈,拍卖交易制度也将日趋复杂化,这些更强化了市场资源的垄断者对于拍卖机制设计的现实需求。另外,通过了解拍卖机制的设计过程,有助于人们对拍卖这种简单而又独特的交易机制及其价格形成有一个本质的认识,也可以对其他价格形成方式(比如标价与议价)有所理解,并力图对拍卖机制的设计与改进从实践上给出指导。 已有的最优拍卖机制设计研究都是建立在简单的基准模型之上:卖主只有单件不可分物品;每个竞买人至多有单位需求;竞买人的报价是一维的;拍卖市场是由卖主单边垄断的。而实际拍卖问题经常会破坏这些假设,于是传统的最优拍卖设计理论将不再有效。自从20世纪90年代以来,经济学家们已经同渐意识到,拍卖理论对于许多真实市场的解释能力正在慢慢减弱,传统的拍卖方式已不足以指导突飞猛进的新兴拍卖市场实践。因此,需要设计出一些更加符合真实市场特性的有效拍卖机制,以适应不断变化的市场复杂性。 本文试图放松传统拍卖机制设计所规定的这些基本假设,考虑更为一般的情形:(ⅰ) 卖主拍卖的是多个具有互补或替代关系的异质物品;(ⅱ) 竞买人的报价不是一维的,即卖主不仅关心价格还关心物品其他方面的属性;(ⅲ) 拍卖市场不是被一方垄断的单边市场,而是使得买卖双方供求地位平等的双边拍卖市场;(ⅳ)卖方所拍卖的物品是可分割的并且每个买方对物品的需求可以是多单位的。本文应用机制设计的理论和方法,借鉴单物品最优拍卖设计的思想,研究了一般情形更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, the governments of various countries, more and more through the auction market, implement the privatization of public resources and public goods, refigure the competitive infrastructure industry (telecommunication, electricity, natural gas, traffic, etc.), configure rare public resources and supply public goods with low cost, increase the channels of the fiscal revenues. The private departments transfer their ownership of the assets or purchase the raw materials more through auctioning, too. Under these circumstances, government department and private monopoly procurers are eager for seeking an auction institution that is the most profitable to sell their goods or rights. They need urgently to get more consultations and professional suggestions on this aspect when selecting or designing the optimal auction mechanism. Moreover, along with the enlargement of market participation scope, competition will be increasingly fierce and auction institution become more and more complicate, which further strengthens the monopoly’s current desires for mechanism design. In addition, learning the design process of auction mechanism is helpful for people to understand not only the auction (such a kind of simple and particular transaction format) and the forming process of its price, but also other price-forming ways (such as marking-price and bargaining), which is expected to provide practical guidance to the design of auction mechanism and its improvement.The traditional theory of auction design bases on such assumptions that the seller has only one indivisible goods and each bidder has at most one unit of demand. However, the most situations observed in reality are not coincident with these basic assumptions and the optimal auction results will be no longer effective. Since 1990s, the economists have already realized that the explanation ability of auction theory for real markets is weakening slowly, and the traditional auction format has fallen short of guiding new booming auction markets. So, it is urgent to design some efficient auction mechanisms that accord with the characteristics of real markets, so as to adapt to the complexity of the constantly changing market.Therefore, we strive to loose those basic assumptions and consider more general situations: (i) The objects auctioned are heterogeneous (complementary or substitutable); (ii) The buyer’s biddings are multi-dimensions, that is, the buyers care about both the price and the other attributes of the objects auctioned; (iii) The auction market is not a market monopolized by one side but double auction market that keep an equal relation of supply and demand between buyers and sellers; (iv) The objects auctioned are divisible and each buyer demands multiple units. In virtue of the design idea of the benchmark auction model, this paper reseaches the optimal design of auction mechanism under more general situations: complementary or substitutable object auction, multi-attribute auction, double auction of indivisible and divisible goods. In addition, since electric energy is a kind of typical divisible goods, we apply the double auction mechanism of divisible objects to the sale of electric energy, which accords with the requirement of the market reform of power system in our country.The paper consists of seven chapters, which are organized as follows:In chapter 1, the research background and signification are introduced. We review briefly the mechanism design theory and the auction theory, and introduce thetheory development of the auction mechanism design. The main contents in this paper are also summarized here.In chapter 2, we introduce briefly the basic theory of mechanism design in discrete and continuous cases, also including the revelation principle, the revenue equivalence principle and the auction mechanism design principle, which are all the research bases of this paper.We study mainly the mechanism design for the complementary or substitutable goods auction in chapter 3. Firstly, we describe the problem of heterogeneous goods auction, set up the basic model and make simplification. Further, to get some detailed and valuable conclusions, we solve the especial case that there are only two kinds of heterogeneous objects and analyze the influence of complementarity on the optimal auction mechanism from the results. In addition, we also discuss the allocation efficiency of the optimal mechanism and explain the reason that results in inefficiency. Finally, under the Branco model, this chapter compares the optimal auction mechanism with several simple and common auction formats — the simultaneous second-price auction, sequential second-price auction and multiple round ascending bid auction — not only on the expectation revenue of sellers but also on allocation efficiency.In chapter 4, we study the mechanism design for the multi-attribute auction. Firstly, the problem of multi-attribute auction is described and in this model the competitor’s biddings are multi-dimension and the costs of the enterprises are correlative. Since it is difficult to solve the multi-dimensional optimization problem, we can merger all non-price attributes into one quality dimension and solve the optimal mechanism only for the model of two-dimensional attributes. But the form of the optimal result gained is still complicated, implicit, and difficult to implement in reality. Therefore we propose a simple two-stage auction format to implement it: in the first stage, the "winning" enterprise and its payment are determinated; in the second stage, the quality of the project to be carried through is renegotiated. In the end of this chapter, we proof that the two-stages auction format can surely implement the allocation and payment of the optimal auction mechanism.The mechanism design of double auction of indivisible objects is researched in chapter 5. Firstly, the double auction model for the indivisible objects is built. This model is an optimization problem with four constrains and two objective functions, namely to maximize the expectation residual of participants of both sides under the individual rationality constraint, incentive compatibility constraint, market clearing constraint and budget balance constraint. By solving this model, we get the optimal double auction mechanism, which is consistent with the mechanism proposed by McAfee. Under this mechanism, it is the weakly dominate strategy for buyers and sellers to reveal their truthful values or costs. And the compution of this strategy doesn’t need to know the value distribution of buyers and the cost distribution of sellers in advance, which is one of the reasons that the application of the game theory in double auction hasn’t been paid much attention. In addition, in this mechanism the auction organizer can gain residual, which can be used to increase fiscal revenues and decrease the welfare distortion brought by tax. Finally, the allocation efficiency of the optimal mechanism is analyzed through numeral examples.In chapter 6, the double auction mechanism is designed for the divisible objects. This mechanism can guarantee auction market clearing and realizing the most effective allocation. Furthermore it also can guarantee the incentive compatibility for buyers and risk-averse sellers. Since the electric energy is a typical kind of divisiblegoods, we can apply the mechanism designed in this chapter to the sale of the electric energy. This mechanism can induce truthful revelation of values or costs from rational consumers and risk-averse power suppliers and realize the economic dispatch of generation. According to real-time character of supply of electric energy, the implementation of this mechanism by adopting 4-heaps data structure is proposed in the end of this chapter.Finally, conclusions and highlights for future work are presented in the last chapter.更多还原