【作者】 江乾坤；

【导师】 宋玉华；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 本文关注的是企业的债务融资问题。现代资本结构理论的发展只是证明了债务融资方式的必要性和重要性,新兴的证券设计理论则深入到债务融资各个环节并对其进行具体契约设计。从这个角度来说,企业债务融资工具实际上具有内生性,它可以被事前设计出来,其中现金流收益分配与控制权安排是两个最重要的方面。债务融资过程中存在股东与债权人、多个债权人之间的两类冲突,债务设计理论致力于有效缓解这些冲突,如何对风险债务定价、债权人治理、监督借款人与破产法则进行最优设计构成了它的四大发展方向。 企业能够实际使用的债务融资工具非常广泛,但是它们的融资功能各不相同:(1)银行贷款的融资优势在于银行能够减少信息处理的费用、降低监管企业的费用和进行独特性服务;银行贷款的非线性定价是为了缓解道德风险问题,这说明贷款利率不能主要反映违约风险;而简化中小企业的破产程序、减小其高破产成本将有助于缓解它们的信贷配给问题。(2)公司债券的融资优势在于它可以降低公司借款成本、发挥价格信号作用和降低市场参与者的金融风险;基于Menon的相机索取权模型,APR侵犯、策略性违约和相对谈判力等因素成为公司债券定价模型的重要变量;新兴市场经济国家的公司债券市场发展迅猛,巴西的自我实施机制理念与韩国的结构性重组经验值得中国借鉴。(3)商业信用具有融资比较优势,即信息获取优势或监督比较优势、对客户的控制力优势和财产挽回优势;信贷配给理论也可以解释它的存在。(4)可转债可用来解决企业的风险移动、风险评估、信息不对称和阶段融资等问题;企业设计赎回条款主要是为了满足短期融资灵活性的需要。(5)国际项目债券含有两类项目专用性条款,即激励条款与制度环境条款;它的发行信用价差反映了东道国的制度环境是如何影响投资者的风险意识与该国基础设施发展的债务成本。 债务融资工具的选择问题包括:(1)在种类选择上,投资不足的代理成本、信息不对称、清算效率、生命周期效应和管理层相机理论提供了不同解释。(2)在期限结构选择上,可从契约成本、信息不对称、税收、期限匹配与监督激励这些角度来考虑。(3)在优先权选择上,高级银行债加上次级市场债是最优形式。从相对谈判力因素来看,弱势企业最好只采用银行债融资,强势企业最好采用银更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation emphasizes the debt financing problem in the enterprise. The development of modern capital structure theory only proves the necessary and importance of the way of the debt financing, but new security design theory deeps into the every process of debt financing and design the relevant provisions. According to this perspective, debt financing instruments are actually endogenous, and its can be ex-ante designed, in which the distribution of cash flow and the arrangement of control right are the best important thesis. There are two types of conflict among shareholder-creditors and among creditors, and debt design theory applies itself to effectively alleviate the conflict. How to optimally design the price of risk debt, creditor governance, monitoring debtors and bankruptcy rules consist of the four directions of debt design theory in the future.In reality, many debt financing instruments can be used by enterprises, but the financing function of its is different: (1) The relative advantage of bank loan financing lies in that bank can reduce the fee of dealing with the information, save the cost of monitoring debtors, and uniquely serve its customers. The non-linear pricing of bank loan aims at alleviating moral hazard problem, which proves that the loan rate can’t mainly reflect the default risk of debtors. For small and middle enterprises, shortening the bankruptcy procedure and reducing the high bankruptcy cost would alleviate its’ severe credit rationing problem. (2) The relative advantage of corporate bond financing appears that corporate bond can save debt financing cost, play the role of price signaling, and reduce market agents’ financial risk. Based on Merton’s contingent claim model, APR violation, strategic default, relative bargaining power and so on are the important parameters in pricing corporate bond model. The corporate bond markets in emerging market economies rapidly grow in recent years, China can lesson the belief of self-enforcing mechanism in Brazil and the experience of structural reorganization in Korea. (3) The relative advantage of trade credit financing includes the advantage of obtaining information or monitoring the enterprise, controlling the customer and retrieving the property. The credit rationing theory also can explain the existence of trade credit. (4) Convertible bond can be used to solve risk transfer, risk valuation, asymmetric information, stage financing and so on. In order to satisfy the need of financing flexibility in the short run, the enterprise designs the call provision. (5) International project bond includes two types of project-specific provisions, such as incentive provisions and institutional environment provisions. The at-issue credit spreads of emerging market project bonds over US Treasuries reveals how legal, regulatory, economic, and financial institutions in host countries influence risk perceptions and , hence, the cost of debt for infrastructure development.The choice of debt financing instruments remarks: (1) On the choice of debt types, agency costs of underinvestment, efficiency of liquidation, effect of life cycle and managerial discretion make different explanation. (2) On the choice of debtmaturity structure, debtors maybe consider contracting cost, asymmetric information, tax, maturity matching or monitoring incentive. (3) On the choice of debt priority, senior bank debt and junior market debt consist of the optimal debt structure. Based on the relative bargaining power factor, weak firms utilize bank debt exclusively, and strong firms use a mixture of bank and market debt, with bank debt senior. Based on the cost of financing, the monopoly power of bank, the provision of convertible bond and the quality factor of financing project determine insiders’ financing instruments choice. In view of the whole capital market equilibrium, bank loan means a intermediation cost, bond financing imply an inefficient liquidation cost and equity financing bears an informational dilution cost. Firms’ capital structure choice may vary considerably with the overall efficiency of the bank sector, so it is the key point to make the intermediation cost clear.The basic function of the optimal debt structure of enterprises is that it could tradeoff two different types of debt default and affect the renegotiation result from debt default. Economists almost agree to the mixture of bank debt and market debt. LBO is a obvious example. The optimal debt structure theory based on the monitoring incentive concludes: when a firm issues only one class of debt, it is best to have only one lender. Issuing more than two class debt contract cannot do any better than the optimal two-class debt contract. It is best to have only one senior lender whereas the number of junior lenders does not matter. Financial intermediaries will hold senior debt, whereas junior debt can be held widely. It is never optimal for a senior lender to hold part: of the junior debt. The optimal debt design theory based on the role of bankruptcy concludes that having multiple creditors thus helps to raise the firm’s debt capacity by distinguishing between individual foreclosure rights and joint liquidation rights achieved under bankruptcy.Repayment security mechanism consists of contract security and law security. Two kinds of securities are mutual and contract security bases on law security. The exact covenant designed can be divided into avoiding the decrease of management’s value, regulating control right, securitizing bond claimers’ payment and so on. Reputation mechanism and court are the two ways of enforcing debt contract. LLSV supports that law origin is important, but endogenous law theory insists on the actual efficiency of law enforcement. For the optimal bankruptcy rules design, AHM bankruptcy reform scheme proposes a automatic debt-equity swap plan, Bigus and others think that collusion problem between creditors and shareholders should not be ignored, and Berkovitch&Israel emphasize bankruptcy reform should depend on the special information structure in every economic system.The imbalance of financing structure in China enterprises is very serious, bank loan still plays the main role and the share of direct financing is low. Though the corporate bond market is getting better, it should take the moderate strategy to develop at the present stage. The convertible bond market grew from hot to cool, now it is normal on the whole, but some problems are still to be rooted out. The issue of international project bond is worth taping, the successful case of China mobile reflects that global investors have recognized the market value of it. The difficulties of implementing LBO or MBO in China at present are the law environment restriction更多还原