论会计标准的实施

【作者】 姜英兵；

【导师】 谷祺；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 会计学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 对会计欺诈(或会计信息违规性失真)治理机制的研究广泛牵涉到会计标准建设、信息披露技术、道德伦理、会计监管等诸多层面,这已然构成了我们当前会计学术研究极其重要的主题之一。本文意在,把我对纷纭复杂的会计实践和理论研究的观察和思考,做一个阶段性的清算和总结。 写作就是对写作重新选择一次,和克劳斯的“等待写作(上一次写作)过时为止”是一个意思。正因为如此,我才考虑和熟视无睹的东西保持距离,跳出“就会计论会计”的狭小圈子,与会计信息披露技术、会计标准完善等研究划清边界,克制和收敛于制度分析,以期高屋建瓴地从本质上把握和理解会计标准的实施。 本文以会计标准的实施作为研究对象,以新制度经济学、法律经济学、社会资本理论、机制(激励)设计理论、公共选择理论和博弈论等为分析依据贯穿全文,参照欧盟及英国会计标准实施机制设计,结合中国会计标准实施现状和制度环境,深入剖析会计标准实施系统中的关键制度和主要环节,在此基础上,系统构建了会计标准实施的总体制度框架。全文共9章,各章要点如下。 第1章:以会计标准的国际协调这一当前热点问题作为切入点,引出协调的会计标准并不一定能带来协调的会计实践这一初步论断。接着在分析中国的会计标准实施现状基础上,归纳了支持与强化会计标准实施的相关经验证据和规范分析结论,并从制度经济学角度进一步论证了将研究重心由会计标准转向会计标准实施的必要性。 第2章:借鉴制度经济学的基本理论,分析会计标准实施的制度涵义,为全文奠定理论基础。 第3章:介绍和评价欧盟就统一会计标准实施的经验和做法,特别提到英国的会计标准实施机制。提炼欧盟和英国经验的启示和借鉴意义,为构建我国的会计标准实施环节提供参考。 第4章:运用社会资本理论分析信任、财务报告网络、资产专用性等社会内容提要资本核心要素之于会计标准实施的基础性作用和意义。 第5章:在分别讨论了会计标准实施过程中的管制和激励问题以后,创造性地提出“激励性管制”这一新思路。 第6章:详尽分析会计标准实施中的法律与信誉这两种机制,尤其对这二者的替代性与互补性予以关注。 第7章:从会计标准实施的主要环节人手,研究会计标准的自我实施,其中具体分析了会计标准自我实施中的关键环节:信誉机制、公司内、外治理机制和媒体监督机制的作用机理。 第8章:研究会计标准实施中的强制实施,主要包括制度化的监督体系和司法诉讼。 第9章:在第7、8两章论证的基础上,探讨会计标准自我实施与强制实施的互补;以及会计标准实施与会计域秩序;从博弈论的观点和秩序建构的观点出发构建会计标准实施的制度框架;最后对全文进行简要的总结。 在此还想就全文的结构安排做一说明。文章的结构安排,与最终形成会计标准实施制度框架的逻辑层次与顺序是一致的。第1章“话语与视角的转换:由会计标准到会计标准的实施”,是作为引论,文章选题的背景、动机和意义等包含于其中。第2章“会计标准实施的制度分析基础”,为全文的分析论证定下基调和理论基础,始终结合制度分析的意图有迹可寻地贯穿全文。第3章“会计标准的实施:欧盟的经验”,帮助笔者大致澄清了会计标准实施的主要环节。第4章“会计标准实施的社会资本理论分析”,尝试着应用社会资本理论思想,对会计标准实施的信誉与财务报告网络关系进行别样的解读,以区别于会计道德和伦理学分析的传统思路。第5、6章则集中分析了会计标准实施体系中的两对关键范畴:激励与管制、法律与信誉,它们对立而统一,互补又替代。第4、5、6三章充分体现了会计标准实施制度中的精髓—支撑性的、统率性的制度安排—以深化对会计标准实施问题的认识和理解。通过第7、8两章,会计标准的自我实施与强制实施,梳理与廓清会计标准的实施环节和具体实施机制。最后,第9章则是在前夕J寸理论基础、实施环节和制度支撑进行充分探讨的基础上,构建会计标准实施的制度框架。更多还原

【Abstract】 Research on governance mechanism of fraudulent conduct in financial reporting extensively involves accounting standards setting, information disclosure practice, moral principles, corporate governance and accounting regulation. These subjects have constituted an extremely important theme in current accounting academic research.Managers or preparers will follow prescribed accounting and disclosure rules to a greater extent thus increases the reliability of the financial reports when enforcement of accounting standards is stronger. Strong enforcement can presumably constrain potential abuse or manipulation of the flexibility stemming from being able to choose from a number of accounting methods. In some environments, for example, firms behave towards "mandatory" requirements as if they were voluntary. Absent adequate enforcement, even the best accounting standards will be inconsequential. If nobody takes action when accounting rules are breached, the rules remain requirements only on paper. The extent to which accounting standards are enforced and violations prosecuted are as important as the standards themselves. In particular, the quality of financial information is a function of both the quality of accounting standards and the regulatory enforcement or corporate application of the standards. Few, if any, papers have systematically investigated the potentially important role of enforcement of accounting standards.The high quality of accounting information depends not only on high quality accounting standards through accounting reform but also on efficient enforcement mechanism to support it In contrast to previous research, this paper begins by concluding empirical and normative evidence and expounding significance of enforcement of accounting standards from the point of view of institutional economics. It follows up by introducing steps of a unitary enforcement mechanismof EU in applying IFRS. Thirdly, the author analyzes some critical issues on enforcement of accounting standards including financial reporting network and social capital theory, incentive and regulation, reputation and law, self-enforcement and mandatory enforcement It closes by structuring a framework on enforcement of accounting standards for the above mentioned reasons. This paper entitled with "on enforcement of accounting standards" is organized as follows:Chapter 1 provides an international perspective on enforcement of accounting standards. Although differences in accounting rules across countries have diminished significantly in recent years owing to the harmonization efforts of the IASB and other organizations, there has not been a corresponding trend in the enforcement of accounting standards internationally. Accounting information quality is determined in large part by the underlying economic and political factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives, and not by accounting standards per se. One interpretation of this result is that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for transparency, but it is not a sufficient condition. Adopting IFRS does not in itself ensure high transparency. Therefore the point that enforcement of accounting standards is much more important than accounting standards is highlighted through the prologue of the international harmonization of accounting standards. While academics and practitioners agree on the importance of enforcement as an essential element of the financial reporting infrastructure, there has been little, if any, research on enforcement in an institutional setting.Chapter 2 then made further study on the institutional implication of enforcement of accounting standards on the basis of institutional economics. It is necessary to look beyond the formal accounting standards to the underlying institutional determinants of enforcement of accounting standards, it also supports the more general hypothesis that the demand for accounting transparency varies internationally as a function of economic and political institutional variables. Thus the chapter lays a theoretical fo更多还原