【作者】 徐昕；

【导师】 章程；

【作者基本信息】 清华大学 ， 民商法学， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 本文从一个民间收债个案调查切入私力救济问题,以此为线索对纠纷解决机制进行深入探讨,挑战了学界有关私力救济的流行观念,并论及民事诉讼、司法、以及法治的基本问题,提出了司法改革和法治建设的思路。本文坚持方法论多元主义,试图打通民事诉讼法学与社会科学的隔阂,并注重方法论的探索,运用并总结了一种小叙事大视野的研究进路,即从原点到场域、从细微到宽广、从个案到法理、从单线索到多角度、面对中国问题、坚持价值中立、倡导跨学科研究、由诉讼至法理通思想而达社会的研究方法。本文共分九章。第一章提出问题、梳理理论、概述方法。第二章考察华南一个民间收债个案,描述一种没有法院的纠纷解决机制。第三章分析私力救济的表达、概念、特征和类型。第四章回到实证调查个案,从经济学、社会学等视角解释人们为什么选择私力救济,提出私力救济内含着一种经济逻辑。第五章运用博弈论解释,为什么在私力救济的框架下债务人合作,而在公力救济的情形下债务人更倾向于诉讼对抗,即私力救济为什么行之有效。第六章分析国家对民间收债和私力救济的态度。国家有关民间收债的表达与实践之间存在差异,在以民间收债为例的私力救济问题上,国家与社会达成了一种默示的共谋,国家对私力救济适“度”的政策正是公权力通过私人实现社会控制的技术。第七章基于法律执行的经济分析,将民间收债人视为私人执法者,从私人执法的角度阐释私力救济,并提出在中国应强化私人在法律执行中的作用。第八章论述私力救济与公力救济的交错与互动。私力救济中有“公力”因素,公力救济中也有“私力”因素。在它们之间,还存在一种融合两者特征的社会型救济,如调解和仲裁。第九章以社会契约论为核心阐释私力救济的正当性及其限度,并试图建构性地协调私力救济与法律的关系,提出通过法律实现私力救济的社会控制。本文最后提出,认真对待私力救济,发挥其积极功能,限制并疏导其消极倾向,构建公力救济、私力救济、社会型救济相互并存、良性互动的多元化纠纷解决机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on a field study of an informal debt-collection practice, the dissertation explores self-help, judicial remedy and dispute settlement mechanisms, and puts forward some significant proposals for judicial reform and rule of law. The dissertation insists on methodological pluralism,and tries to bridge the gap between civil procedure and social science. Furthermore, it develops a perspective of “micro-narrative and macro-field”,by focusing on China’s own issues, advocating interdisciplinary research, from origin to field, from particulars to generalizations, from specific cases to theories, from a mono-thread to multi-perspectives, from litigation to jurisprudence, then ideology, to society.The dissertation falls into ten parts.Chapter 1 is the introduction.Chapter 2 describes the informal debt-collection practice in Southern China, a dispute settlement without court.Chapter 3 analyzes the concept of self-help.Chapter 4 turns back to the informal debt-collection practice, and endeavors to disclose why some people choose self-help.Chapter 5 applies the game theory to reveal the reasons that the debtors are inclined to choose cooperation when the creditors take self-help remedies, in short, why self-help is so effective.Chapter 6 addresses the official policies to informal debt-collection and self-help. There are discrepancies between official representation and practice. As for the informal debt-collection I surveyed, state and society come to a tacit conspiracy, and the state tolerates the existence of self-help to a “proper extent”, which is a kind of the art of government that public power attains social control through private individuals’ actions.Based on the economic theory of law enforcement, chapter 7 takes the informal debt-collector as private enforcer of law.Chapter 8 discusses the interplay among self-help, judicial remedy and social remedy.Chapter 9 discusses the legitimacy of self-help, tries to achieve social control on self-help through law. Finally, I call on to take self-help seriously, make it function positively, limit and channel its negative functions, and construct a multiple dispute settlement mechanism under which judicial remedy, self-help and social remedy interplay conducively.更多还原