【作者】 马理；

【导师】 江曙霞；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 金融学， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 国有金融机构在我国金融经济体系中占有举足轻重的地位，但它也具有产出效率低下、违规操作严重、运营成本高昂等缺陷，因此研究国有金融机构的行为特点并加以诱导规范是一个具有重要理论与现实意义的课题。 本文首先分析了国有金融机构行为扭曲的原因。我国的国有金融机构内生于实行多年的计划经济和不恰当的赶超策略，受政府的影响极其深刻。政府不恰当的规制一方面破坏了分离均衡的甄别机制，导致国有经济低效率与社会剩余减少：另一方面又引起其演化的时间路径出现非正常振荡，迫使监管收敛于最大成本。同时，政府对国有金融机构的“偏爱”，导致国有金融企业的规模与边界不正常扩张，社会交易成本上升，运作不效率，违规日益严重。 然后解释了监管的两难困境并进行相关制度设计。笔者以为当前监管效果之所以不尽人意的原因，一方面是由于规则的漏洞与执行弱化诱发新的违规，另一方面则是由于规制没有最终落到“人”的头上，缺乏有效性。因此笔者分析了国有金融机构经营者的经济学身份，建立起一个有中国特色的国有金融机构经营者的官僚与代理人模型，并尝试引入子博弈精炼纳什均衡寻求监管进程中的合理均衡。 为了从微观定量的角度进一步诠释监管，本文还引入了“监管度”的概念。监管本质上是对市场的一种扰动，由于存在非线性迭代，它有可能导向市场有序和市场混沌两种截然不同的结果。结合复杂的动力学模型，笔者证实市场混沌确实可以从外部进行约束，并从理论上预言了任何市场秩序，都能通过监管主体的干预最终走向有序，同时为监管的前瞻性、外生性、审慎性、时滞性提供了新角度的解释。 最后，强调了在国有金融机构的治理中道德与文化约束的重要性。从律己、律人和法治三个方面论证把传统文化精华运用于国有金融机构的公司化治理并辅之以对先进文化的弘扬，尝试进行正式制度与非正式制度的有机统一，希冀搭建起一个恰当而全面的国有金融机构公司化治理的理论框架。 拙文致力于对国有金融机构行为扭曲的微观产生机制与相应的制度设计进行研究，其创新之处主要有：分析了政府不恰当干预下国有金融机构行为扭曲的微观产生机制；尝试从系统论、法学与犯罪经济学的角度解释金融监管的效果为何差强人意；构建了一个有中国特色的官僚与代理人模型并在此基础上进行监管制度设计；引入复杂的动力学非线性模型探讨监管的强度与区间选择；讨论了道德规范与文化环境对监管主体与对象的行为约束。更多还原

【Abstract】 The state-owned financial institution plays an important role in China’s financial and economic systems, but it possesses the defects of poor output efficiency, expensive operating cost, and serious infringement, so it is of academic and practical importance to study the behavioral characteristics of the state-owned financial institution and to regulate it.Firstly, this paper analyzes the reasons of institution behavioral distortion. The state-owned financial institutions in China are born from the planned economy and the overtaking strategies, and deeply influnced by the government. The government’s unfit regulations destroyed the sorting mechanism of the equilibrium, resulted in the low efficiency and declining social surplus, likewise caused the abnormal variation of the evolvement path and the maximum supervision cost. Moreover, the government prefers expanding the state-owned financial institution’s scale and realm too much, leading to the low efficiency, high cost, and ?serious infringement.Secondly, this paper explains the supervision dilemma and designs the supervision system. The poor effects of the current supervision come not only from the rule rip and incorrect implementations, but also from the actually unfulfilled responsibility of the person. The paper analyzes the economic role of the state-owned financial institution operator, sets up a principal-agency model about the bureaucracies with China’s characteristics in the financial institutions, trying to seek the rational equilibrium in the supervision procedure with the subgame perfect Nash model.Thirdly, this paper introduces the concept of the degree of the supervision from a qualified micro-ecomomic aspect to explain the supervision. The supervision is essentially a disturbance to the market, and may lead to the order or to the chaos because of the nonlinear transformation. With the complex dynamic model, the paper argues that the chaos could be controlled by the external factors and that the system would lead to the order, this paper also gives rational explanations to the supervision’s forecast, externality, prudence and time lag.Lastly, this paper emphasizes the importance of the moral and the cultural restrictions. It tries to use the traditional and the advanced cultural essence in the management of the state-owned financial institutions from the restricting oneself, restricting others, and restricting with laws, hoping to set up a suitable and comprehensive framework for the state-owned financial institution’s management, containing the formal and the informal institutions at the same time.The innovations of this paper contain that, analyzing the behavior distortion of the state-owned financial institutions, explaining why the supervision effect not good, setting up a principal-agency model about bureaucracies with China’s characteristics, designing the supervision institution, studying the degree and the realm of the supervision with the nonlinear dynamic model, emphasizing the importance of the moral and the cultural restrictions to the management of the state-owned financial institutions.更多还原