经济体制、信息结构与企业破产

【作者】 虞慧晖；

【导师】 金祥荣；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 经济学的一个中心命题是竞争可以使市场趋向长期均衡状态，在这个过程中，效率低下的企业被淘汰，规定这些企业退出市场的法律机制就是破产制度。经营失败是竞争性市场中的普遍现象，因而有效的破产和债权人权利制度是经济持续发展的重要组成部分。本论文研究了经济体制、信息结构与企业破产之问的关系。 全文共分为八章，第一章为绪论，文章的第二章简单介绍破产制度的历史沿革以及现有的主要破产程序，其中重点介绍了中国企业破产制度的演进。第三章对现有的关于企业破产的各种文献进行了系统的梳理，其中包括对一般市场经济条件下和转型经济条件下企业破产研究的述评。在第四章中，我们建立了一个完善市场经济条件下的简单模型来分析最优破产机制的设计并以此作为以后各章节分析的一个基准。在第五章中，我们简单地界定了企业经理人与债权人之间的一维不对称信息，并在这一基础上分析了不对称信息下的最优破产制度设计。在不完全信息条件下最优破产制度设计的基础上，我们研究了法官的自由裁量权对破产制度和社会经济效率的影响。在第五章的基础上，第六章里我们进一步深化和细化了企业经理人与投资者之间的信息不对称，建立了一个二维的信息结构。并根据这一信息结构将社会经济体制分为三种不同的类型：发达的市场主导型经济体制、发达的银行主导型经济体制和欠发达的转型经济体制。在此基础上，我们分析了发达经济体制下最优破产机制的设计。考虑到转型经济的特殊性，在第七章中，我们专门分析了在欠发达的转型经济体制下最优的破产机制，并进一步分析了转型经济的某些特殊环境、因素对破产机制和社会经济效率的影响。在理论分析的基础上，我们以一定的篇幅对中国这一转型国家近20年来的破产历程进行了实证研究。在最后一章中，我们对整篇论文中主要结论进行了简单的总结并提出了今后进一步研究的方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 An important proposition in economics is that competition can make the market run to long-term equilibrium. In this process, the inefficient firms are eliminated and the laws that regulate the exit of these firms are bankruptcy laws. Management failure is a common phenomenon in competitive markets, so effective bankruptcy law and creditors’ protection systems are important to the continual development of economy. My thesis studies the interaction of judiciary discretion, information structure and bankruptcy law.My thesis is composed of eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction. In the second chapter, I introduce briefly the historical evolution of bankruptcy and the main bankruptcy procedures in present. In the following chapter, I systematically hackle various literatures on corporate bankruptcy, including the summary on corporate bankruptcy under the market economy and the transition economy. In chapter four, I build a basic model under the condition of perfect market economy and analyze the design of first-best bankruptcy law. This is a benchmark for the following analyses. I firstly define the one-dimensional asymmetric information between the manager and the investors in chapter five. Then I study the optimal bankruptcy law under this asymmetric information and the effect of judiciary discretion on bankruptcy law and the economic efficiency. Based on the analyses in chapter five, I deepen the asymmetric information between managers and the investors and build a two-dimensional information structure in chapter six. According to this information structure, I divide the social economic system into three different types: developed market-oriented economic system, developed bank-oriented economic system and undeveloped transitional economic system. Then I study the optimal bankruptcy law under developed economic systems including the market-oriented and bank -oriented economic system. Considering the particularity of transitional economy, I investigate specially the optimal bankruptcy law in the undeveloped transitional economic systems in chapter seven. I also research the effect of certain unusual environment and factors on bankruptcy law andeconomic efficiency. After these theoretical analyses, I empirically test the bankruptcy course in China during the last twenty years in the next section. In the last chapter, I briefly summarize the main conclusions in my thesis and advance the direction for further research.更多还原