银行体系失效与公司债券市场研究

【作者】 王锐；

【导师】 王忠民；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 政治经济学， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 论文在总结国内外公司债券理论，包括公司资本结构理论、金融中介与金融市场比较理论的基础上，论证了银行体系失效的制度根源，提出了发展公司债券市场的政策建议，并对银行体系占垄断地位的亚洲金融危机国家在1997年金融危机期间银行体系的失效以及随后迅速发展的公司债券市场进行了实证分析，从而进一步从降低金融体系风险和形成稳定的国家融资结构的角度，阐述了公司债券市场作为银行体系竞争性替代的发展趋势。 传统金融中介理论认为，基于降低交易成本和信息成本的需要，金融中介尤其是银行中介在企业融资中发挥着比证券市场更大的作用。本文扩展了“人情式交易”概念，将其一般化为以交易者的相互了解为基础进行的自在交易。并在“人情式交易”一般范畴基础上，借鉴历史情境分析，构建了一个人情式交易拓展博弈模型，证明在唐森德不完全信息模型中，人情式交易将彻底失灵。也就是说，由于人情式交易是非市场非公开化交易，交易双方的交易内容完全是私人隐藏信息，而信息是一种公共产品、对私人隐藏信息的开发和披露存在外部性，因此人情式交易在信息机制上存在典型的囚徒困境缺陷。随着产权交易域不断扩展，交易形式和合约越来越复杂，潜在的交易者已经无法事先识别潜在的交易对手，因此必须用非人格化交易代替人情式交易。 而银行贷款的人情式交易，其资产通用性会沉淀为资产专用性，银行的重新谈判和讨价还价能力会受到削弱，从而产生“贷款人质”问题；此外，竞争性的银行同业之间也会对抵押、担保、债权保全采取先动战略。所以银行只具有有限理性，银行人情式交易存在制度性缺陷，而金融危机不可避免。温州地下金融的初级阶段与日韩主银行制的案例证明了这一结论。 相比贷款信息不能价格化、非公开交易的私人隐藏信息不能对外信号显示所导致的银行金融中介机制失灵，本文通过对充足统计量的证明，构建了公司债券市场锦标赛制，公司债券市场采取连续竞价方式、交易者人数众多且自由进出 (“用脚投票”)，因此接近完全竞争市场(“有效市场”);各公司债券同台竞技公开竞价(类似上市公司“登榜效应”)，所有历史信息、公开信息、内幕信息都将作用与反映在价格信号之中，所需治理信息维数最小。能够证明，公司债券市场治理机制相比银行人情式交易中介治理，是一种更为有效的治理机制. 本文并首次使用三方博弈模型对股票市场利益格局进行剖析，证明当前中国股票市场的失灵与偏股权融资的弊端，从而使排除法的逻辑得以完整。 此外，从实证角度对银行体系占垄断地位的亚洲金融危机国家在1997年金融危机期间银行体系的失效以及随后迅速发展的公司债券市场进行了深入分析，这一全景式的实证研究，对推进中国金融体制整体改革(包括银行改革和建立多层次资本市场)具有一定现实意义。 最后，论文对公司债券市场结构、现状、发展提出了看法和建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 On the basis of summarizing theories relating corporate bonds, including the corporate structure theory, the financial intermediary and financial market theories, the author has proved the institutional roots for the bank system failure, brought forward some policy suggestions on developing corporate bonds. The author has also analyzed the bank failure of the South-East Asian countries which are characterized by monopoly of bank system when the financial crisis broke out in 1997 and the fast development of corporate bond market after 1997. Moreover, in the view of lower financial systemized risk and formulating the steady state financing structure, the author has stated trend of substituting bank loans for corporate bonds.Traditional financial intermediary theory believes that financial intermediaries especially bank intermediary plays more important role in corporate financing than the equity market. In the thesis, the author broadens the concept of personalized exchange, generalizes it as a spontaneous transaction based on the mutual understanding between trades. On the basis of personalized exchange, the author constructs an broader personalized exchange games model to prove the thoroughly failure of personalized exchange in the Townsend’s incomplete information model by reference of context-specific model. Since personalized exchange is non-market non-publicly transaction, the transaction content between the traders and private conceal information, and there exists externality when exploiting and disclosing private information because information is one of public goods, so that personalized exchange has its defects as typical prisoners dilemma in information mechanism.Going with the width of property transaction territory, the transaction forms and contracts are more and more complex, potential traders can not identify his potential counterpart, as a result, it is necessary to substitute personalized exchange by impersonal exchange.However, the asset generalization of impersonal exchange such as bank loan may sunk to asset specialization, the re-negotiation and bargaining abilities of bank will be weakened, thus the problem of loan hostage rises. Furthermore, under the pressure of competence, banks may choose first move tragedy. Then, banks only have limited rationality, bank impersonal exchange has institutional defects, and financial crisis is inevitable. Case of WenZhou’s underground finance, Case of Japan and Korea’s master bank can all prove the conclusion.Comparing with bank financial intermediary mechanism failure which is characterized as loan information can not be priced and non-public transaction concealing private information can not be signaled, the author formulate a corporate bonds market rank-order tournaments by testifying sufficient statistics. Corporate bonds market can adopt continuous tournaments, traders increase and vote with feet. Corporate bonds market is similar as complete competing market, also can be called efficient market. Each corporate bond competes with each other, like listing on board, all history information, public information, inside information effect and reflect on price signaling, the information dimensions which the governance need is most small. It can be proved that corporate bonds governance mechanism is effective than bank’s personalized exchange intermediary mechanism governance.The author use 3-party games model to analyze the stock market interest pattern, testify the stock market failure and particular press on stock finance, then perfect thelogic of excluding means.Furthermore, the author’s whole scenery research on the bank failure of the South-East Asian countries which are characterized by monopoly of bank system when the financial crisis broke out in 1997 and the fast development of corporate bond market after 1997 has factual meaning to accelerate China’s financial regime reformation which includes bank reform and multi-layers capital market build.In the end, the author gives some suggestions and viewpoints to the structure, latest develop更多还原