【作者】 张万成；

【导师】 徐传谌；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 政治经济学， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 自莫迪格利安尼和米勒的MM理论诞生以来，企业资本结构理论引起了理论界的广泛关注，资本结构的研究一直是热点话题之一，形成了比较清晰的理论演进路径，出现了多个理论假说：如信号传递、融资优序等等。这一理论的前提是：成熟的资本市场使得企业可以相对自由地选择融资方式；有效的市场监督与治理机制又使得企业必须谨慎地选择融资方式。但是我国企业融资方式与这一定理，尤其是融资顺序偏好理论存在很大的差别甚至相左，融资制度的成本与不确定性都很高。国有企业在“拨改贷”之后，资本金来源由财政直接投入转向主要依靠国有商业银行贷款的方式，形成了国有企业对国有银行的高负债。这种高负债的实质在于软预算约束和行政干预下的内部人控制。由于预算软约束，经营状况不佳的国有企业不是在竞争中被淘汰，而是继续获得来自银行的支持，因此，从表面上看，国有企业的经营困难是由于国有企业债务负担过重，深层次的原因在于盈利能力下降导致还贷能力下降以及软预算约束造成的“投资饥渴症”。高额负债累积的本息提高了国有企业的固定成本，削弱了国有企业的盈利能力。上市公司的情况却正好相反，负债率要低于非上市的国有企业，其偏好于股权融资、增发配股等方式。以非国有经济为主的中小企业资本结构的选择受到很多限制：一方面由于所有制不同，客观存在所有制上的歧视、加上信息的不对称，使其难以从国有商业银行获得所需要的贷款，而适合中小企业贷款的中小银行等民间金融机构还不发达和完善，难以进行债权融资；另一方面，上市的资格和条件的门槛比较高，使得中小企业的股权融资也很困难，少数能够海外上市的也需要花费较多的成本，所以中小企业的资本来源主要是自有资金和民间借贷等形式。由于上述原因，我国企业资本结构选择呈现出了多元化的特征。在本文中笔者从一个新的视角进行研究：在微观和宏观两个方面把资<WP=199>本结构领域已有的研究成果与中国企业改革实践相结合，把国有经济的战略调整以及非国有经济的发展等宏观问题与资本结构的选择相联系。本文的研究对象是我国资本结构选择的历史变迁和制度创新。全文的写作思路是首先综述了西方国家资本结构的理论演进，然后对我国转轨时期的资本结构选择的制度变迁进行研究，分析了我国国有企业和中小企业的资本结构选择现状，并在此基础上提出了资本结构优化调整的思路。总体来说，是沿着理论综述——制度变迁——现状分析——优化调整的思路展开论述的。第一部分是理论准备部分，主要是第一章。这是研究资本结构的理论综述部分。对资本结构理论在西方国家演进进行了归纳总结并对其新的发展趋势进行了论述，即现代公司资本结构研究出现了和产业组织理论、行为金融理论、公司治理理论相互交叉融合的特征，衍生出战略公司财务、行为公司财务和财务治理结构理论，呈现了新的繁荣局面。第二部分是资本结构的比较部分，主要是第二章和第三章。第二章是国际比较部分，分别对发达资本主义国家、发展中国家的资本结构进行了国际的横向比较，认为不同的国家出现资本结构差异的根源在于宏观制度背景的差异。第三章是我国资本结构选择制度变迁的纵向比较。通过国际和国内比较，笔者认为：在发达市场经济国家，由于宏观制度环境比较确定，资本结构主要由微观的因素来决定；而包括我国在内的发展中国家，资本结构的选择受外部宏观因素的影响巨大，是我国资本结构的现实与发达国家资本结构理论出现差异甚至相左的根本原因。我国国有企业资本结构的制度变迁，从根本上来说是计划经济条件下内生交易费用逐渐缩小，市场经济条件下外生交易费用逐渐增加，总的交易费用在收益一定的前提下逐渐下降的过程。第三部分探讨企业资本结构多元化的现状与公司治理，主要是第四章和第五章。第四章对我国企业资本结构现状进行了分析，认为国有企业、非国有中小企业的资本结构呈现出了多元化的特征。第五章则主要针对国有企业中的上市公司进行分析，对股权结构、债权结构与公司治理和企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究。第四部分对策分析部分，主要是第六章。把资本结构优化与国有经济的战略调整相联系，把资本结构领域已有的研究成果与我国企业改革实践<WP=200>相结合，从“目标——行为——绩效”的角度对我国企业资本结构选择的优化进行了初步的探索，国有企业改革的进程也可以看作是资本结构的调整过程，在这一转轨过程中，债转股问题、国有股减持等问题都应该纳入到资本结构的研究范围，特别是要把人力资本纳入到资本结构当中，承认人力资本产权，深化国有企业改革。更多还原

【Abstract】 Ever since the birth of the MM theory (by Modigliani and Miller), the Corporate Capital Structure Theory has drawn great attention from and remained as a hot topic of the theoretical circle. Fairly clear-cut theoretical evolutionary paths have come into being and various theoretical hypotheses have since emerged, such as the Signal Model Theory and the Pecking Order Model Theory. One of the most important presuppositions of the theories is that: a mature capital market allows the enterprises the freedom of choosing its concrete financing mix while an effective market supervision mechanism imposes the necessity of making that choice a wise and scrupulous one. However, a great gap has been shown between the practices of the majority of Chinese enterprises, including the listed ones, and what has been indicated as the correct action to take in the western theories. The gap has resulted in high costs and great uncertainties in the financing practices of domestic enterprises. Seemingly, a key transformation in the financing mechanism, on the behalf of the enterprises, from relying mainly on government allocation to getting loans from state banks as the major fund-raising source has led to the high DAR of businesses to state banks. However, the real problem still lies in the soft budget constraint and contrived manipulation under a climate of governmental intervention. The effects of such a soft budget constraint model, as we can see, are manifested in two interrelated facts: firstly, in the initial stages of the investment, enterprises receive extravagant financial support from the government, who often intentionally ignores the concrete size of the enterprises’ own capital. Secondly, even when businesses are losing money, government still asks the banks to <WP=202>provide loans to those enterprises instead of seeing to a normal bankrupt. Therefore, enterprises who should have been eliminated after failing to win the market competition survived not through improving its management nor means like that, but through getting undue and sustained financial support from those state-owned banks. From the first sight, the difficulties faced by the businesses in their development should be attributed to the tremendous debts they own to the banks, but in the final analysis, those difficulties actually comes from the increasingly heavy burden of repaying the principal and interest of bank loans which has been accumulated under a soft budget control model and a subsequent undermined ability of making profits. That is to say, those accumulated principle and interests of banks loans has raised the operational cost of the state-owned enterprises and thus further undermined the profiting capability of these businesses. Then we can find a sharp contrast in those listed corporations in terms of financing structure. In most circumstances, they enjoy lower DAR than those of state enterprises and rely on the stock market for a much bigger part. The financing landscape for the middle-and-small-size non-state-owned enterprises is still much different. For one hand, they usually have much difficulties getting financial support from the state banks due to the so-called “ownership discrimination” and “asymmetric information” while the nongovernmental financing institutions (who are widely supposed as appropriate lenders for those privately-owned enterprises) are still much underdeveloped; for the other hand, the qualifications for an entry into the stock market are typically too strict for these privately-owned enterprises (plus the fact that the favor is often granted to those state-owned ones) , so for those middle-and-small-size enterprises, there is still a long way to go to have a stock market that can meet their specific financing needs. Even for the minority of these enterprises who are lucky enough to get listed in an overseas stock market, the actual costs of raising funds from the stock market is still relatively higher than that of obtaining loans from state banks on behalf of the state-owned enterprises. Basically, the middle更多还原