【作者】 郭鹰；

【导师】 徐金发；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 小股东权益保护是建立资本市场的基本要求，对这一问题的研究具有深远的意义。如果控股股东与经营者相分离，公司治理结构是清晰的，那么经营者所创造的公司价值将为所有股东所共享，小股东的权益将会是有保障的。但是现实的情况却是小股东的权益屡屡受到侵害，其根源究竟在哪里?代理理论解释了小股东权益受侵害的内因，但没有对外部条件进行论证。本文从交易费用理论出发，认为控股股东与经营者之间的契约是不完备的并且是有交易费用的，控股股东在交易费用、控制权收益、攫取控制权收益的成本和职业化经营所带来的增量收益之间做出权衡，有可能会理性地选择与经营者一体化，从而破坏了现代企业制度所要求的所有者与经营者相分离的公司治理结构，而这恰恰是小股东权益受侵害的外部条件。因此，本文选择影响交易费用的重要因素——资产专用性(在本文研究的问题中对应于股权的流通性)和影响控制权收益的重要因素——获取控制权收益的成本这两个问题作为研究的重点。通过小股东权益受侵害内因的分析，发现充分发挥机构投资者的作用是解决小股东“搭便车”问题的相应对策；通过对股权流通性的研究，发现中国目前影响股权流通性的主要问题是国有股占大股的股权结构，因此提出了国有股减持的相应对策；通过对控制权收益的成本的研究，发现加强外部制衡的力度，能够增加控制权收益的成本，降低控制权收益，因此提出了加强法律环境建设、加强控股股东监管和加强关联交易监管这三方面的相应对策。 第一章引言，本章首先界定了小股东及小股东权益的概念，阐述了小股东权益保护的意义，并通过对中国上市公司小股东权益受侵害的现象的分析，指出了本文选题及研究的现实意义。文献综述，是对与本文研究的问题相关的国内外有关文献的综述，分三方面指出了本文选题及研究的理论意义，这三方面分别是：小股东权益保护研究路径、小股东权益保护的关键和现有理论对小股东权益受侵害的原因解释。通过论文研究的问题、逻辑路径、章节安排及创新特色这一节，确立了全文研究的问题及方向，并对研究路径、章节安排及模型逻辑关系进行了设计，同时归纳了本文的创新点及特色。通过本章的阐述，使全文的脉络更为清晰，逻辑思路一目了然。 第二章小股东权益受侵害的内因与外部条件——企业契约理论分析，这是本文的理论基础。本章通过对企业契约理论的综述、代理理论对小股东权益受侵害内因的解释和交易费用理论对小股东权益受侵害外部条件的解释这三方面，为全文奠定了理论基础，同时对内因的分析为发挥机构投资者的作用对策提供了理论启示。特别是运用交易费用理论对小股东权益受侵害外部条件的分析，是本文的创新之处，也是后续章节深入分析的基础。 第三章资产专用性——股权流通性分析，这章是根据交易费用理论中，对交易费用有重大影响的因素——资产专用性(在本文研究的问题中就是股权的流通性)问题的进一步研究，通过对中国上市公司股权结构的现状、成因、弊端、股权结构的国际比较问题的深入探讨，为寻找针对这一因素的对策——国有股减浙江大学博士学位论文持，提供了依据。 第四章控制权收益成本的模型分析，构架了研究控股股东在与经营者一体化情况下，攫取控制权收益的成本的基本模型，以及该模型在不存在外部制衡下的均衡，并将该基本模型拓展到存在外部制衡的状态。在模型的构建中，探讨了模型的基本假设、公司收益规模约束和控股股东与小股东的效用曲线。在无外部制衡状态下的均衡研究中，在一定的假设条件下，首先深入研究了当不存在公司外部债务及控股股东捐赠利润的情况下，目标函数为控股股东效用最优情况下的结果，并分别探讨了存在公司外部债务情况下的模型的解和控股股东捐赠利润的可能性。在存在外部制衡的状态下，对模型进行了拓展，进一步研究在引入外部制衡力量后，公司在控股股东的控制下追求其自身效用的最大化所达到的均衡结果，并与不存在外部制衡情况下的均衡结果相比较，最后分别讨论了公司存在外部债务的情况下的模型的解和控股股东对公司捐赠利润的可能性。本章的关键性结论是:外部制衡力量的提高，能够降低控制权收益。 第五章外部制衡对控制权收益影响的实证分析，运用双样本异方差t一检验，对中国上市公司发生在1999年至2002年控制权转让的样本数据进行分析，研究外部制衡水平的变化对控制权收益水平的影响，以实证第四章通过理论模型分析得出的关键结论。 第六章小股东权益保护对策分析，作为第二章相对应的对策，深入探讨了发挥机构投资者的作用问题;作为第三章相对应的对策，深入研究探讨了解决股权流通性问题的国有股减持的有关问题;作为第四章和第五章相对应的对策，深入研究探讨了加强法律环境建设、加强控股股东监管和加强关联交易监管三方面与外部制衡相关的政策措施的内容。 第七章结论与展望，是对全文的总结，并对进一步尚需深入研究的相关问题进行了展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 The study of minority shareholders’ protection is meaningful because the protection of minority shareholders is required by the capital market. If the block shareholder is separated from the manager and the corporate governance structure is perfect, the value created by the manager will be shared among all shareholders so that the minority shareholders’ rights and interests will be protected. But it is well known that the minority shareholders’ rights and interests are exploited in Chinese public listed companies. What is its root?The proxy theory explains the internal factor of why minority shareholders’ right and interests are exploited, but it doesn’ t explain the external condition.Based on the transaction cost theory,we consider that there are transaction cost in the incompletes contracts between the block shareholder and the manager. So the block shareholder will collude with the manager after he trades off the transaction cost, the private benefit from control, the diversion waste and the value created by the manager. Then the perfect corporate governance structure in which the shareholders are separated from the manager is damaged and the minority shareholders’ rights and interests are exploited.So we choose two main facts to study. One is the share liquidity(asset specificity) which will affect the thansaction cost.The other is the diversion waste which will affect the private benefit.The the internal factor tells us that we should improve the role of institutional investors. The theory of liquidity tells us that the state-owned shares affect the liquidity so that the state-owned shares should be reduced. And the diversion waste says that the external restriction can reduce the private benefit and hence we should improve the legal environment, the block shareholder monitoring and the associated dealing regulating.In chapter one, we define the concept of minority shareholder and his rights and interests firstly and then explain the meaning of minority shareholders’ protection. Then we analyse the minority shareholders’ rights and interests exploited by the block shareholder so as to indicate the practical meaning of our research. Then we summarize related foreign and Chinese literature so as to indicate the theoretical meaning of our research. It includes the main way of how to study the protection of the minority shareholders,the key of the minority shareholders’ protection and the general explanation of the internal factor of why the minority shareholders’ rights and interests will be exploited. Finally we discuss the methodology of our research, the chapter arrangement and the innovation in this dissertation.In chapter two, we explains the internal factor and external condition of minority shareholders’ rights and interests being exploited by the block shareholder based on the contractual theory . Especially, we analyse the external condition based on the transaction cost theory.In chapter three, we discuss the share liquidity (asset specificity) which affects the transaction cost.We study the shareholders structure in Chinese public listed companies, the cause of formation, the abuse, the comparison with other countries and the relation between the controlling power and the shareholders structure,so as to find policies.In chapter four we discuss the cost of the private benefit from control by model when the block shareholder colludes with the manager.The model shows that the external restriction will reduce the private benefit.In chapter five, we discuss the empirical analysis of the effect of the block shareholder change using the data from 1999 to 2002. The results show that the external restriction will reduce the private benefit.In chapter six, we discuss five policies according to the fact of currentChinese public listed companies: improving the role of institutionalinvestors, reducing state-owned shares, improving the legal environment,improving the block shareholder monitoring and improving the associateddealing regulating.The seventh chapter is the conclusi更多还原