公司内部治理机制研究

【作者】 谢军；

【导师】 曲晓辉；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 会计学， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 公司治理被广泛地定义为一套控制体系，这套体系的目的在于帮助公司和其他组织有效地实施管理、管治和引导经济资源。公司治理结构包括企业内的治理机制，如董事会、管理报酬和大股东控制等，还包括企业外的强制性的治理机制，如法律管制制度和市场规训等。外部治理机制是公司控制的间接工具，内部治理机制则是公司控制的直接工具。管理失败通常源于有问题的内部治理机制，因此，公司绩效的改善最终有赖于内部治理机制的改进。 本文共分七章，主要内容如下： 第一章，引论。本章提出了本文所要研究的问题，讨论了本文的写作背景和动机，并介绍了各章节的内容安排。 第二章，公司内部治理机制的概述。本章在介绍公司治理基本理念的基础上，考察了外部治理机制的功能及其局限性，梳理了外部治理机制和内部治理机制的理论关系。作者强调了内部治理机制对于企业战略管理的重要现实意义，并主张公司治理的改革应侧重内部治理机制的优化， 第三章，董事会。本章探究了董事会的概念框架和组织设计，剖析了董事会的制度结构。作者从理论上解释了董事会的存在性原因及其主要功能，探讨了董事会特征(组成、规模、激励和委员会结构)与公司治理绩效的理论关系，分析了董事会在构建内部经理市场中所发挥的主导作用以及董事会的内生性问题(董事与经理的博弈过程和结果)。文章还从董事会对公司绩效的影响、董事会的功能执行效率和董事会结构的动态因素等三个方面综述了有关董事会的经验研究成果，并在理论和经验意义上讨论了董事会制度的演进和改进。 第四章，管理报酬。本章分析了管理报酬的激励功能，讨论了激励性支付结构的设计和管理业绩的评估问题(尤其是对业绩计量指标的选取)。作者专门评价了股票基础的报酬计划及其激励效应，分别考察了经理持股和股票期权的管理激励功能。文章阐述了股票报酬与管理业绩(管理行为)的理论关系，并做出了相应的理论预测。 第五章，股权结构。本章阐述了大股东对股东集团“搭便车”问题的克服作用及其在公司治理中的监督和控制功能。作者论述了股权结构的差异性及其演进动因，分析了大股东控制的代理成本。文章在考察大股东治理的积极作用和消极影响的基础上，指出了大股东治理机制的优化举措并提出了相应的改进意见。 第六章，公司治理范式的比较制度分析。本章从制度层面对发达经济下的两种最具代表性的公司治理范式进行了分析比较，具体探讨了外部人制度和内部人制度这两种治理体系的控制机制结构、特征和制度背景及其对我国国有企业治理改革的有益借鉴和启示。 第七章，我国公司内部治理机制的分析、评价和改进。本章以我国国有企业改革为背景，并结合东欧国家经济转轨的经验教训，探讨了我国国有企业治理改革的路径选择。在回顾我国国有企业治理改革的制度背景的基础上，作者分析了我国上市公司的内部治理机制现状，并结合己有的实证研究成果考察了我国上市公司内部治理机制的运作绩效，最后尝试性地提出了相应的改进建议。 本论文的主要理论贡献如下: 1.文章剖析了内部治理机制的制度结构，强调和解释了董事会在组织设计中的核心角色。作者较全面系统并有创新地阐释了董事会的概念体系和组织结构，这些成果有助于对董事会制度和内部治理机制的理解和改进。 2.文章比较了发达经济下的两种代表性的公司治理范式。通过对这两种存在根本差异的公司治理体系的比较制度分析，作者发掘了它们的机制结构和系统特征。在深入考察和评价这两种极端治理模式的制度背景和相对价值的基础上，作者指出了我国国有企业治理改革所应借鉴和学习的方向。另外，在总结东欧转型国家企业治理改革历程中的成败得失的基础上，作者进一步探讨了我国国有企业治理改革的路径选择问题。这一系列的探讨对于我国国有企业内部治理机制的改进和现代企业制度的建立都具有建设性的积极意义。 由于本文是规范分析的研究成果，文中的理论预测都有待于实证检验，甚至有一些结论只能依托经验结果。没有进行相关的经验研究是本文的主要局限，这也是今后作者所要努力的方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 Corporate governance is broadly defined as a control system that is helpful for corporations and other organizations to conduct effective and efficient management, governance and resource allocation. Corporate governance system includes internal governance mechanisms, such as board of directors, management compensation and ownership structure. It also includes external mandatory governance mechanisms, such as legal systems, regulatory infrastructure and market discipline. External governance mechanisms are indirect tools of corporate control, while internal governance mechanisms are direct. Corporate performance ultimately depends on the improvement on internal governance mechanisms, because management failure always results from problematic internal governance mechanismsThis dissertation consists of seven chapters:Chapterl, Introduction. This chapter puts forward the main issues of this dissertation and discuses the background, motivations and the arrangements of this paper.Chapter2, Introduction of internal corporate governance mechanisms. After explaining the basic conceptions of corporate governance, this chapter investigates the function and limitation of external governance mechanisms. The author argues that, because of the large institutional costs, external governance mechanisms are difficult to function on a regular basis and the reform of internal governance mechanisms should be particularly emphasized.Chapters (board of directors), chapter4 (management compensation), and chapters (ownership structure) are the main body of the dissertation. Focused on the three important aspects, the institutional arrangement and organizational structure of the internal governance mechanisms are explored.Chapter 3, Board of directors. Conceptual framework, organizational design and institutional structure of board of directors are discussed in this chapter. Empirical researches on board of directors are also surveyed. Based on the analysis, the author made great efforts to trace the evolution of the board and explore the methods to improve it.Chapter4, Management compensation. After the investigation of the incentive role of management compensation, this chapter discusses the design of incentive-based payment and performance evaluation. Particularly, the incentive effects of stock-based compensation are reviewed.Chapter 5, Ownership structure. The author analyses the governance function of large shareholder. He shows the global differences of corporate ownership, and explains theevolutional drive of ownership structure. In addition, based on the investigation of agency costs of large shareholder, this chapter discusses the optimizations of ownership structure.Chapter6, Comparative institutional analysis of corporate governance paradigms. In this chapter, two typical corporate governance models in developed economies are compared and analyzed on an institutional basis. The two extreme corporate governance structures (outsider system and insider system) and their respective economic contexts provide valuable implications for China SOEs governance reform.Chapter 7, Discussion on internal corporate governance mechanisms in China. Based on the discussion of the unique background of the state-owned enterprise reform in China and the economic transition in East Europe Bloc, path selection of China SOEs governance reform are discussed. Combined with the related empirical results, the current situations of the SOEs reform, especially the internal governance reforms are evaluated. Finally, some suggestions are given to improve the performance of internal governance mechanisms.In this dissertation, two main academic contributions are provided as follows:1. Internal governance mechanisms, specially the core role of the director board are systematically analyzed. The conceptual framework and organizational arrangement of board discussed in the paper will be helpful to understand and improve the structure of board of directors.2. Based on the analysis of institutional structure of the two typic更多还原