中国经济转型中的政府担保与财政成本问题研究

【作者】 卢文鹏；

【导师】 陆德明；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 中国渐进转型的逻辑决定了政府的根本利益在于以较小的社会代价平稳推进经济转型的进程，“时间赎买”策略由此成为政府的必然选择。“时间赎买”策略的本质是一种财政机会主义的行为，政府在转型初期财政能力弱化的约束下，以大最积累隐性、或有负债的形式来尽量推延财政支付的时限。从表面上看，“时间赎买”策略减轻了短期内政府的财政支出压力，使得中国保持了较低的显性负债和赤字水平；但其代价却是政府隐性、或有债务的过度积累以及长期条件下财政成本的增加。 在转型期内，中国政府主要是通过担保的形式来载负大量隐性、或有债务的。在政府构建的担保体系中，隐性担保占据了主体地位。中国政府强大的权威和信用资源是隐性担保机制能够始终在转型期内有效运转的根源。政府的隐性担保在节约了财政补贴的情况下保障了转型条件下国有经济部门的顺畅融资，但隐性担保合约的不完备性也必然导致激励结构的扭曲。在隐性担保的庇护下，受保经济主体的风险倾向增加，道德风险和逆向选择问题蔓延。政府和受保经济主体之间的风险收益呈严重不对称分布状态，政府在免费提供隐性担保的背景下承担了受保主体转移出来的外部成本，这就必然表现为长期条件下财政成本的增加。 在市场经济的条件下，政府担保是一把“双刃剑”。只有通过制度和技术两个层面上的财政创新，才能做到提高政府担保的杠杆效率，控制财政成本。更多还原

【Abstract】 The logic of China’s incremental transition decided that government’s fundamental interests lay in promoting the economic transition smoothly with the least social cost. Time-buying strategy became the government’s inexorable selection. The nature of time buying strategy is a kind of fiscal opportunism behavior. Under the constraint of fiscal strength weakening, the government inclined to accumulate excessive implicit and contingent liabilities in order to put off the timing of fiscal payment. Time-buying tactics mitigated government’s pressure of fiscal expenditure and maintained moderate explicit liability burden and deficit rate, but in the short time, but in the long run, this kind of maverick will inevitably increase government’s fiscal cost.By means of all kinds of guarantees, China’s government has burdened large amount of implicit and contingent liabilities and implicit guarantees occupies main body of the government’s guarantee system. The government’s strong authoritative and credible resources were the pledges for the implicit guarantee mechanism to operate effectively. Implicit guarantee mechanism guaranteed state-owned sectors convenient financing with decreasing fiscal subsidies, but the incompleteness of implicit guarantee contract also caused distortion of incentive structure. Under the shelter of government implicit guarantee, guaranteed economic agencies’ risk preference was increased, which caused serious moral hazard and adverse selection. Guaranteed economic agencies tried to transfer their external cost to the government, and this will surely increase government’s future fiscal cost.In the market economy environments, government guarantee is a two-edged sword. In order to promote the efficiency of fiscal leverage and control fiscal cost, China’s government must innovate its fiscal institution and policy method.更多还原