【作者】 刘平青；

【导师】 陈文科；

【作者基本信息】 华中农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 为什么在转轨期间中国新兴的民营企业大都是家族企业，而且，在世界范围内家族企业也普遍存在、持久不衰?当经济学从亚当·斯密那里开始独立门户后，追随者便把道德、家庭等留给了其他社会科学，故而主流经济学中似乎没有家族企业的地位。现代企业理论也未能给出令人满意的解释。虽然现代经济学不断吸收其它学科营养，拓宽新的研究领域，但至今对家族企业进行系统全面分析的文献并不多见。论文尝试突破传统学科分工的藩篱，从经济学、社会学和生物学结合的视野，对这个具有强烈现实意义和重大学术价值的课题进行较为系统的专门研究。 论文导言基于“经济人”是来自于家庭的“生物人”、信息不对称、制度多样性三个基本假设，在评述市场“看不见的手”和政府“看得见的手”的基础上，明确地提出了“又一只看不见的手”——家庭或家族制度，并梳理出自己的理论体系。 论文上篇(第一章至第四章)阐述了家族企业是由“家族基因”内生性决定且由企业环境选择的组织形态。第一章分析了家族企业内生性因素——“家族基因”。构成“家族基因”的四个碱基分别为利己人性、心智模式、利他人性和文化因子。“家族基因”决定了家族企业具有适者生存性、形态差异性和生命周期性三大“生命”特征。所谓家族企业，也就是指由“家族基因”决定资源要素配置，且企业控制权以及全部或部分所有权为某一家族所拥有的企业组织形态。第二章从分工与专业化及由此引发的信息问题角度，构建出一个以企业家式企业为逻辑起点的企业理论分析框架，即分工—专业化—信息租金、激励—约束机制—信息成本双链信息分析框架。据此，家族企业可理解为遵守“分工原则”，有效选择契约型、身份型两类激励—约束机制的一种企业制度安排。第三章，家族企业家作为家族企业人格化，其成长是基于人力资本、物质资本和社会资本三维机制的一个动态过程。第四章，转轨期企业融资环境诱导了家族企业超强的内源融资“偏好”，进而锁定着家族式企业治理结构。家族企业克服了“所有者缺位”造成的困惑，成为真正意义上“所有者到位”的企业。因此，对转轨期信息环境、企业家环境和融资环境的分析表明，转轨期中国家族企业是一种适应性制度安排。 论文中篇(第五章和第六章)揭示家庭或家族制度如何通过“家族基因”向公有经济领域渗透并推动公有企业变迁。传统计划经济中，行政命令取代了家庭、市场等基础性资源配置方式，“家族基因”缺乏发挥作用的经济空间，形式单一的国有企业是计划经济体制的基层单位。始于20世纪70年代末80年代初恢复家庭作为基本经济单元后的市场化改革，为民有资本和家族成员向国有经济领域渗透提供了契机，使国有企业“准家族化”得以萌生。如果说企业“国有家营”只是“家族基因”决定的市场化企业的“雏形”，那么在计划经济体制边缘成长起来的乡镇企业，从异军突起到全面改制，则是“家族基因”历经了扭曲、变形之后，逐渐趋向正常表达的结果。 论文下篇(第七章至第十章)在逐一分析转轨期中国家族企业(FBsTC)、早期中国家族企业(FBsEC)、海外华商家族企业(FBsCO)和发达市场经济中家族企业 (FBsDC)各自的成长与特色之后，将前者与后三者进行了实证比较，其基本结论是:四类家族企业的“家族基因”，分别表现为隐性、次隐性、杂交显性和显性。受不同企业环境的制约，FBsTC表现为诱致适应型，即在不完善市场环境的诱导下，从计划经济体制边缘自发成长以适应向市场经济转轨的企业组织;FBsEC表现为濒临破产型，即在家族政权、外国入侵和“苏联模式”时期，家族企业受尽摧残与低毁，发展举步维艰;FBsCO表现为自发适应型，即身处异国他乡的海外华商，将家庭或家族制度与市场制度有机融合，企业自发成长并适应所处经济文化法制环境;FBsDC表现为自发协同型，即家族企业在几百年的演变过程中与市场经济协同进化，成为发达市场经济中“现代企业生态群体”的“母体”，而且是现代企业组织的基本形态之一。 根据以上分析，笔者认为:中国由传统计划经济向市场经济转轨，家庭或家族制度作为“又一只看不见的手”，通过“家族基因”发挥资源要素配置的作用，并反过来促进中国经济全面转轨。转轨期中国家族企业将沿着继承优秀“家族基因”的现代公司制企业方向变迁。在尊重市场经济与家族企业协同进化之客观规律的基础上，保护和优化“企业生态环境”，是培育中国市场经济和促使转轨期中国家族企业向现代公司制企业转化的关键所在。更多还原

【Abstract】 Why have most of the newly emerging enterprises during the economic transition in China been family businesses (FBs)? Why are FBs still the dominant form of economic organization in the world? In contrast to Adam Smith, the father of economics, his followers separated the issues of morality and family from economics and left these issues to other areas in social sciences. It seems that FBs have no room in mainstream economics, and that modern theories of the firm cannot explain their existence satisfactorily. Although modern economics has absorbed nutrients from other branches of social sciences and developed many new research areas, there are fewer literatures for analyzing the phenomena of FBs more comprehensively. This dissertation is trying to break through the boundaries of the traditional division by systematically investigating FBs, an issue of great practical and academic significance, from the angles of economics, sociology and biology.The thesis begins an introduction that outlines the relevant theories. Three fundamental hypotheses are included in this part. (1) Every "economic person" is a "biological person" that comes from a certain family. (2) Information is asymmetrical from person to person. (3) Institutional forms vary. Based on the analysis of the "invisible hand" of the market and the "visible hand" of the state, a theory that the family institution may act as another "invisible hand" is presented.Part Ⅰ(from chapters 1 to 4) proposes that the FB is a type of economic organization determined by family genes (FGs), and is affected by the macro environment for economic development. Chapter 1 analyses FGs, the endogenous factors of FBs, which are composed of four bases: selfishness, mental models, altruism, and culture. Due to FGs, FBs show three vital characteristics: the adaptability, the diversity, and the lifecycle. Therefore, a FB can be defined as a type of business organization whereby FGs determine the resources collocation of firms, and certain families own the firms’ rights control as well as all or parts of property. From the angles of labor division and specialization, and of that information is asymmetry between any two participants, a new theoretic framework for enterprises is established based on enterpriser-enterprises (chapter 2). The framework consists of two chains-one is the chain of division-specialization-info rent, and the other is the chain of motivation-restriction-info cost. Accordingly, the FB can be considered as an institutional arrangement in which the motivation-restriction strategy of both contract types and status types are chosen effectively based on the principle ol the division of labor. Chapter 3 discusses entrepreneurs in FBs as the personal representatives. They progress in developing their human capital, physical capital, and social capital, which this thesis calls the three-dimensional development mechanisms of entrepreneurs. During this period of economic transition, FB owners tend to choose internal finance to dominate the administration of their own enterprises, which solves puzzle of truncated property in state-owned enterprises (chapter 4). An analysis of the information status, entrepreneurs’ circumstances, and financial conditions in the economic transition indicates that the FB is a suitable institutional arrangement in China.Part Ⅱ (from chapters 5 to 6) focuses on how the family institution penetrates publicly owned enterprises by FGs and consequently, speeds up the economictransformation of this sector. In the period of the planned economy in China, administrative orders, instead of families and markets, allocated resources. Thus the function of FGs was inhibited and state-owned enterprises acted as the basic economic units. Since the early 1980s, China has adopted economic reform policies that are market-oriented and reinstated the family as the basic economic unit. These policies have provided the opportunity for the infiltration of household deposits and human capital into state-owned businesses and the emergence of qu更多还原