分工、契约与股票市场效率

【作者】 王峰虎；

【导师】 贾明德；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 政治经济学， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 本文运用契约经济学、信息经济学的分析方法，从分工的契约协调角度分析我国股票市场的效率问题，指出我国股票市场低效率的制度成因在于政府干预造成的内部人剩余控制权的垄断配置，并从投资者保护的角度提出提高我国股票市场效率的对策建议。 本文指出经济效率是一种动态效率，微观主体分工与专业化的技术效率是经济效率的物质基础，通过制度的协调来实现。制度的作用在于界定经济主体初始要素投入和分工盈余的产权。制度对分工的协调作用可概括为产权机制、竞争机制和第三方治理机制。由于分工的“干中学”效应和存在信息成本，产权界定始终是不完全的，剩余控制权的配置是制度协调的核心。分工生产的内生优势决定潜在剩余控制权，制度因素决定形式剩余控制权，短期内通过制度协调使二者相适应形成制度配置效率，长期内通过制度变迁使二者相适应形成制度变迁效率。经济效率是分工的技术效率和制度协调效率的综合反映。 本文认为股票市场效率的物质基础是上市公司的业绩，来源于企业分工生产。为促进企业分工生产的实现，需要在企业契约中形成动态的剩余控制权配置。在企业正常经营的情况下，企业契约可简化为股东与经理人的契约，通过股票契约来完成。在纳什谈判理论的基础上，本文建立了股东与经理人的谈判模型，用双方缔约区间的变化分析缔约的难度，用缔约难度分析股票市场的效率，重点分析股票市场制度因素对股东和经理人缔约行为的影响。股票发行是股东与经理人的缔约过程，也是产权机制发挥作用的过程，形成公司的内部治理结构。股票交易是股东与经理人的再谈判过程，也是竞争机制发挥作用的过程，形成公司外部治理结构。股票市场监管制度是一种第三方治理机制，解决的是市场机制失灵的问题。成熟股票市场内生的制度体系可以形成企业契约中剩余控制权的动态配置。 结合我国转轨经济的制度背景，从制度关联的角度出发，本文指出我国股票市场的制度是由政府干预外生形成的。我国的股票发行由政府控制，形成国有股“一股独大”的股权结构，在国有股所有者缺位的情况下，内部人控制与大股东控制二者合一，形成了内部人垄断的剩余控制权，从而使股票市场的产权机制失效。我国股票发行制度中的政府干预导致流通股供求失衡，股票交易制度中的国有股不流通以及市场分割、股权分割进一步加大了流通股的供求矛盾，导致股票交易市场过度投机的形成。机构投资者的股价操纵使股票市场定价机制、竞争机制、报酬机制和退市机制失效，强化了上市公司内部人控制。在发行制度和交易制度的综合作用下，为创造国有企业良好的融资环境，监管机构往往用行政干预取代市场监管，使我国股票市场第三方治理机制失效，进一步强化了股票市场的内部人控制。 由于缺乏产权明晰的制度基础，行政干预使我国股票市场的产权机制、竞争机制和监管机制失效，形成了我国股票市场中广泛的内部人控制。内部人控制形成垄断的剩余控制权，导致内部人对中小股东的利益侵害，使中小股东的缔约区间缩小，股票市场效率降低。短期内政府的干预可以扩大股东的缔约区间，吸引投资者入市，但由于没有实体业绩的支撑，投资者因政府干预而扩大的缔约区间是一种泡沫区间，长期内难以持续，引发政府的进一步干预，导致政府在干预股票市场的同时被股票市场“套牢”。 从分工的契约协调出发，本文认为破解目前股票市场困境的思路是加强投资者保护，创造可竞争的缔约环境，形成剩余控制权的动态配置。据此提出了完善法律机制、减持国有股、推动市场化改革以及加快对外开放等对策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Using the contracting theory and the information economics to analyze the efficiency of China’ s stock market from the aspect of the contractual coordination of the division of labor, the paper points out that the cause of the present inefficiency lies in the monopoly distribution of residual rights to the insider, which is resulted from the government interference. The paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures to protect the investors.Economic efficiency is dynamic efficiency, based materially on the efficiency of division of labor and specialization of the individual. It is realized through the coordination of institutions that plays the role of defining the property of the initial investment of the individual as well as the surplus of division of labor. And, Ihe coordinative effect of institutions to the division of labor can be summarized into three categories: property mechanism, competition mechanism and the third party regulating mechanism. Thanks to the "Learning by Doing" effect on division of labor and the cost of information seeking, the definition of property is always incomplete. As a result, the distribution of residual rights becomes the nucleus of institutional coordination.The potential residual rights are determined by the inner superiority of production founded on division of labor, while form residual rights by institutional factors. So the two kinds of control should be made adaptable to each other so as to gain the distribution efficiency of institutions through institutional coordination in short term, and the efficiency of institutional change in the long run. On the whole, the economic efficiency is the synthetic representation of technology efficiency based on division of labor, and coordinative efficiency of institutions.The paper advocates that the material base of the efficiency of the stock market is the performance of the listed company, which is the result of the production based on division of labor. Therefore the realization of labor-dividing production in a firm needs the dynamic distribution of residual rights in the firm contract. Under normal operation, the firm contract can be simply referred to as the contract between the shareholder and the manager that is reached by stock contract. And in the light of the Nash’s negotiation theory, the paper sets up the negotiation model of the shareholder and the manager, which analyze the difficulty of contracting in the changes of thecontracting domain as well as the efficiency of stock market according to the difficulty of contracting, and focuses the analysis on the influence of the institutional factors of the stock market to the contracting behavior between the shareholder and the manager. On one hand, the issuing of the stocks indicates the contracting process between the shareholders and the manager as well as the course in which property mechanism is given full play. In consequence, the interior company governance structure is formed. On the other hand, stock trading also points to the renegotiation between the shareholders and the manager besides the course in which the competition mechanism plays. In this way, the exterior company governance structure is laid down. As for the supervision institution of the stock market, it is the third party regulating mechanism that is expected to tackle the malfunction of the market mechanism. Consequently, the mature stock market built upon private ownership can realize the dynamic distribution of residual rights in the firm contract.Against the institutional background of our transition economies, from the aspect of institution linkage, the paper presents that the institution of the stock market of our country is born through the intervention of the government. In China, the government manipulates the stock issuing and listing of a company so that the state-owned share becomes the largest shareholder in the stock equity structure of listed company. Then in the absence of the state-owned shareholder, the insider control and the leading shareholder control mix toge更多还原