经理人股票期权会计问题研究

【作者】 李维友；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 2001， 博士

【摘要】 经理人股票期权作为对公司管理者实行的一种长期激励机制，起源于70年代的美国。几年前，这种激励机制引入我国，并受到许多上市公司的青睐。目前，国内已经有一些公司在进行经理人股票期权制度的试验。鉴于国内实行经理人股票期权激励机制尚无章法可寻，以致许多公司的操作很不规范。为此，中国证监会正在着手制定与经理人股票期权相关的监管制度，财政部会计司也在着手制定相关的会计处理和信息披露制度，以规范经理人股票期权计划的施行。 本文以西方已有的研究成果为借鉴，研究经理人股票期权的会计处理及其信息披露问题，并从我国的实际情况出发提出若干政策建议。 本文共六章。具体内容安排如下： 第一章绪论，提出本文将要研究的问题，讨论本文的研究方法及其运用，并说明本文的章节安排。 第二章，经理人股票期权的确认。该章从确认的基本理论入手，结合经理人股票期权的性质特征，论述了经理人股票期权的确认问题。笔者研究发现：按照现行会计模式，经理人股票期权既不是负债，也不是权益，而兼有负债和权益的特征。所以，现行会计模式难以处理这种既有权益性质又有负债性质的经理人股票期权。由此，笔者提出改革现行会计模式的两点设想：(1)不改变会计要素的基本结构，增加权益的独立性；或(2)改变会计要素的基本结构，通过增加第三个“资本”要素或消除现行负债和权益的区别，来满足这种既有负债特征又有权益特征的经理人股票期权的处理。但是，在现行会计模式下，把经理人股票期权作为一种特殊的权益来处理是较为恰当的。 尽管赠予经理人股票期权是一项资本交易，并不会导致负债的发生，更不会减少企业的所有者权益，但笔者仍认为应确认由此而引起的报酬费用。这是因为：(1)经理人股票期权有价值；(2)赠予的经理人股票期权具有激励和报 经理人股票期权会计问题研究酬性质；（3）确认由经理人股票期权引起的报酬成本具有经济后果。所以确认经理人股票期权的同时要确认由此而引起的报酬费用。 第三章，经理人股票期权的计量。该章从计量属性入手，结合作为衍生金融工具的股票期权的计量来论还经理人股票期权的计量问题。笔者的结论为：对经理人股票期权应采用公允价值的计量属性，具体而言，就是采用期权定价模型来计量经理人股票期权。但是，在采用期权定价模型进行计量时，又要结合经理人股票期权的性质做一些修订。至于计量时间的选择，笔者的结论为：经理人股票期权及由此而引起的报酬成本应在赠予日予以计量。 第四章，经理人股票期权的信息披露。由于披露的范围很广，而本文千要研究会计问题，所以木文所讨论的披露范围主要限制在实行经理人股票期权的上市公司年报中经理人股票期权的信息披露。这一披露又包括表内确认和表外披露。表内确认主要指经理人股票期权信息在资产负债表、损益表和现金流量表中的确认。而表外披露则指经理人股票期权信息在财务报表附注中的披露。在损益表中涉及到每股收益的披露问题。由于经理人股票期权的赠予势必会对每股收益起着一定的稀释作用，所以本章同时说明了在赠予经理人股票期权的情况下每股收益的计算。 第五章，我国实行经理人股票期权的现状及可行性研究。本章对我国实行经理人股票期权的现状和存在的问题进行了归纳总结。从理论和现实两方面论述了我国实行经理人股票期权制度的必要性和可行性，从宏观政策层面提出了我国实行经理人股票期权制度的一些建议。笔者的建议为：门）在高科技的上市公司进行经理人股票期权计划的试点；（2）进一步完善企业治理结构；（3）加强法律、法规等制度建设。第一，尽快修订蚣司法》；第二，对经理人股票期权的税收优惠作出规定；第三，尽快制定经理人股票期权的监管制度和会计制度。 第六章，我国经理人股票期权的会计处理、信息披露现状及政策建议。本章以深圳万科企业股份有限公司为例，分析了我国实行经理人股票期权计划的上市公司对经理人股票期权的会计处理、信息披露现状。就我国当前的现实环境而言，笔者认为应当运用美国会计原则委员会的第25号意见书的内在价值 一二二一 内 客 摘 要法，而不适宜采用公允价值法来对经理人股票期权进行会计处理。 本文理论上的创新之处在于： 1．指出了现行会计模式存在的问题，并提出了相应的完善措施：（）不改变会计要素的基本结构，通过修改权益的定义以增加权益的独立性；或（2）改变会计要素的基本结构，在负债和权益之间增加第三个“资本”要素或消除现行负债和权益之间的严格区分。 2．指出了通过现行的期权定价模型，如布莱克一斯科尔斯模型或二叉树模型计算经理人股票期权公允价值的不足之处，提出了修订上述模型需要增加考虑的因素。 由于笔者数学知识的限制，没能给出一个适合的经理人股票期权定价模型，这也是笔者以后继续探讨的方向。此外，?更多还原

【Abstract】 As a long-term incentive system to manager, executive stock option (ESO) invented in America in 1970’s was introduced into China several years ago, and many listed companies have showed great interest in the system. At present, some listed companies have been making some experiments on implementing ESO in mainland of china. Being lack of regulation to comply with, the operation of the system is not normative. So, Chinese Security Regulation Committee is drawing up the supervision regulation of ESO, and the Administration of Accounting Affairs of the Ministry of Finance is drawing up the standard of accounting for SEO.The objective of this dissertation is to salve China’s practical problems based on China’s specific circumstance and the lessons drawn from the studies on accounting and information disclosure for ESO.This dissertation consists of six chapters.Chapter I , Introduction. In this chapter, the author puts forward the main issues of this dissertation and discusses the methodology and the main contents of the paper.Chapter II, The recognition of ESO. In this chapter, the researcher dissertates the recognition of ESO. The researcher finds out that ESO isn’t liability, nor equity according to the current accounting theory. It has the characteristics of both liability and equity. It’s very difficult or impossible to solve the problem if we still depend on the current accounting theory. The researcher addresses two tentative plans to reform the current accounting theory: (1) not changing the fundamental structure of accounting elements, making the equity more independence; or (2) changing the fundamental?structure of accounting elements, adding another "capital" element or eliminating the difference between liability and equity. According to the current accounting theory, however, we should treat ESO as a special kind of equity.Although the issue of ESO is a kind of capital transaction, it doesn’t cause liability, neither reduces equity. But the researcher believes that compensation cost of ESO should be recognized. The reasons are: (1) ESO has value; (2) ESO has some incentive to the manager and it can compensate the manager; (3) the recognition of ESO has some economic consequences.Chapter HI, the measurement of ESO. In this chapter, the researcher demonstrates the attribute of measurement at first, then narrates the measurement of stock option as a derivative instrument, at last explores the measurement of ESO. The conclusion is that ESO should be measured by fair value. To be specific, ESO should be measured by stock option pricing model. At the same time, we should do some modification on the stock option pricing model according to the nature of ESO. As to the choice of measurement date, the researcher’s conclusion is that ESO and compensation cost should be measured at the grant date.Chapter IV, the disclosure of ESO. In this chapter, the researcher limits the research range of the disclosure of ESO in the annual report of listed companies which use ESO to inspire the manager. Disclosure includes the recognition of ESO in financial statements which consist of balance sheet, income statement and the statement of cash flow and disclosure note. Since the issue of ESO dilutes earnings per share (EPS), the researcher explains the calculation of EPS.Chapter V, the present status and feasibility of ESO in China. In this chapter, the research summarizes the present status and feasibility of ESO in China, dissertates the necessity and feasibility of ESO in China from theoretical and practical points of view, addresses some suggestions of ESO from themacro-policy perspective. The suggestions include: (1) making experiments on ESO in some listed high-tech companies; (2)further consummating corporate governance; (3) improving laws, rules and regulations which include company law, tax law and accounting regulation for ESO.Chapter VI, the present status of accounting for ESO and its information disclosure in China, and some suggestions. In this chapter, the researcher anal更多还原