【作者】 戴岱；

【导师】 李胜；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 企业管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 由于激烈的市场竞争,为了吸引消费者,零售商不得不采用打折促销的手段来增加产品的销售量。面对不断的降价促销,消费者变得越来越“聪明”,即使商品当前的零售价格已经低于消费者对于商品的评价,他们也不会急于购买,而是以自身效用最大化为目标决策最佳的购买时机。这种由于预期到商品未来将会降价而产生的等待行为,在市场营销理论中被称为消费者的策略行为。随着现代信息技术的飞速发展,特别是互联网的出现,消费者越来越容易获取商品的相关信息,同时由于消费者文化水平的提高,他们越来越善于分析和思考,所以消费者群体中具有策略行为的消费者所占比例将会不断提高。目前的研究已经发现：消费者的策略行为会给供应链成员的决策以及供应链的绩效产生很大的影响,忽略消费者的策略行为将会给决策者带来巨大的损失。因此,研究当消费者具有策略行为时,供应链成员应该如何决策以及应该采用怎样的措施来应对消费者的策略行为,具有重要的理论意义和实际应用价值。本文在追踪国内外最新研究成果的基础上,针对目前研究中的某些不足,借助供应链管理、消费者行为学和博弈论等理论,从理论研究和数值验证分析等两个方面探讨了在考虑消费者策略行为的条件下,引入柔性补货机制以及对于废旧产品的回收再制造后,供应链成员的定价与订购策略的制定问题。在此基础上,分析了供应链成员应对消费者策略行为时所能采取的措施,即初始订货量承诺和零售价格承诺机制,并以此为目标研究了供应链的协调问题。最后,通过设定模型参数,使用matlab软件编程进行数值算例计算,对理论研究成果进行了检验。主要的研究内容如下：(1)在假设商品市场需求随机的情况下,引入消费者的策略行为以及柔性补货机制展开研究。首先,在集中型供应链设定条件下,基于理性预期理论,给出了零售商与消费者博弈时的均衡初始订货量和零售价格。与经典报童模型的结果进行比较后发现,消费者策略行为的存在对供应链的绩效会产生很大的负面影响,柔性补货机制可以有效的减轻影响的程度。然后分析了初始订货量承诺条件下的定价与订货决策,证明存在唯一的初始订货量承诺,使得零售商获得最大利润；同时研究了零售价格承诺机制对于零售商的决策以及利润的影响。研究结果表明：零售商通过在销售季节开始前对初始订货量或者零售价格进行承诺,可以进一步降低消费者策略行为的不利影响,提高自身的利润水平。接下来,本文把研究的对象拓展到由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链系统,在假设制造商与零售商之间进行制造商领导的Stacklberg博弈条件下,证明了子博弈精炼纳什均衡解的存在唯一性。由于消费者具有策略行为,在分散型供应链系统中,供应链的总利润水平有可能大于集中的情况,即“双重边际化”有时候是有利的。在此基础上,以初始订货量承诺情况下的利润水平为目标,讨论了利用收益共享契约对于供应链的协调问题。在契约参数的合理设定下,可以实现供应链的渠道协调,并且通过改变收益共享契约参数的取值,可以实现在供应链成员之间进行利润的分配。最后讨论了零售商向消费者提供最终价格匹配政策的效果。收益共享契约以及PM契约的引入可以有效解决零售商单纯自身承诺的不可信问题,使得供应链的绩效水平达到初始订货量承诺或者零售价格承诺时的水平。(2)在考虑制造商、零售商以及消费者具有风险偏好的情况下,研究了供应链定价、订购和供应链的协调问题。重点分析了风险偏好系数的变化对于供应链成员决策以及供应链绩效的影响。(3)在零售商面临两阶段随机需求的条件下,基于消费者的策略行为和柔性补货机制,研究了两阶段报童模型中供应链成员的最优决策以及供应链的协调问题。基于理性预期假设,给出了集中型供应链中零售商的均衡零售价格和初始订货量。由于零售价格承诺机制下两阶段报童模型将退化为经典的报童模型,所以重点探讨了初始订货量承诺机制下,零售商的决策以及对于零售商利润的影响。在基础上,以初始订货量承诺机制下的利润水平为目标,分别利用两部定价契约和收益共享契约对供应链进行协调。证明了在合理的契约参数设定下,两部定价契约和收益共享契约都可以实现供应链的渠道协调,同时两部定价契约可以实现利润在供应链成员之间进行任意的分配,收益共享契约使得制造商和零售商分担风险。最后,本文从消费者对于商品的估值与时间相关、考虑再制造柔性补货和两阶段零售价格都为决策变量等三个方向,对于模型进了拓展,使其更加具有理论和应用价值。(4)在假设消费者对于商品估值不同的条件下,研究了由制造商和再制造商组成的供应链系统中的两阶段定价问题。在集中型供应链的设定下,研究了新产品和再制造产品的最优定价与订购策略；在分散型供应链的设定下,根据制造商和再制造商不同的市场地位,分别讨论了Bertrand价格博弈和Stacklberg博弈情况下制造商与再制造商的定价与订购问题。论文重点分析了消费者对于两种产品估值的差异以及因为等待而产生的折扣因子对于供应链成员决策以及利润的影响。通过对于目前研究的收集、归纳和整理,本文的主要创新点可以归纳为以下的几个方面：(1)现有研究在讨论应对消费者策略行为措施时,都只单独讨论了一种机制的作用,本文结合柔性补货机制与初始订货量承诺或者零售价格承诺进行了研究,研究发现综合使用多种应对措施可以进一步降低消费者策略行为的负面影响,提高供应链的整体绩效水平。(2)考虑消费者策略行为的大部分研究都是假设供应链成员以及消费者是风险中性的,考虑风险偏好的文献相对较少,并且其中绝大部分都只考虑了消费者的风险偏好,同时考虑制造商、零售商以及消费者都具有风险偏好的研究目前还没有查询到。本文在假设供应链成员和消费者都具有风险偏好的情况下,研究了供应链的定价与协调问题,分析了风险偏好程度所产生的影响。(3)两阶段报童模型作为经典报童模型的一种推广,目前还没有文献在考虑消费者策略行为和柔性补货机制下,研究两阶段报童模型中供应链的定价与协调问题。基于此,本文尝试在这方面进行了探讨。(4)闭环供应链、再制造以及绿色供应链管理近年来一直都是供应链管理中研究的热点,但是再制造结合消费者策略行为的研究还很少。本文在制造商与再制造商竞争的情况下,考虑消费者的策略行为,讨论了两阶段定价策略的制定问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the more and more competitive market, retailers have to develop discount strategies to attract more consumers and increase their sales. However, consumers become smarter and they don’t rush to order even the current price is below their valuation of commodities. They put their own utility maximization as the goal and decide the optimal buy time. In anticipation of depreciate in the future, consumers will choose to wait, this behavior called consumers’strategy behavior in marketing. As the development of modern information technology, consumers can obtain relevant information of commodities easily, due to the improvement of consumers’ culture level, they are good at analyzing and considering, so the proportion of strategic consumer improve continually. Current studies show that consumers’ strategic behavior will influence supply chain members’decision and its performance. Therefore, the research on supply chain members’decision and how to cope with consumers have important value of the theory and practice.Based on the new achievements at home and abroad, the paper uses supply chain management, consumer behavior and game theory to discuss supply chain with flexible replenishment mechanism and recycling of waste products. This study focuses on supply chain members’pricing and order policy and is conducted from two respects:theoretical research and numerical analysis. On this basis, it analyzes supply chain members’strategies about initial order quantity and retail price and their coordination when cope with consumers’strategic behaviors. finally, numerical examples are studied by using MATLAB programming. The main researches are as follows:(1) First, based on rational expectations theory, the initial order quantity and price when a retailer and consumers gaming under a centralized supply chain are given. Assumes that the market demand is stochastic, uses consumers’strategic behavior and flexible replenishment to conduct the study. Compared the results with newsvendor model, consumers’strategic behavior have a negative effect on supply chain performance. At the same time, the flexible replenishment mechanism will alleviate the impact. Then we analyze price and order decision under the initial order quantity commitment conditions and it proves that there exists a unique order quantity commitment to maximize the retailer’s profit. We also research the retailer’s decision and profit impact of the initial order quantity commitment. The study shows that if the retailer makes a commitment about initial order or price before the selling season, he will reduce strategic consumers’ negative effect and improve his profit. Then we study a two level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. We prove the uniqueness of sub-gambling refining Nash equilibrium under the assumption that supplier as leader of the game. Since consumers are strategic, the total profit in decentralized supply chain may higher than centralized supply chain, that is double marginalization is beneficial. On this basis, we set profit with initial order commitment as the goal and discuss the influence of revenue sharing contract on supply chain coordination. By setting up the contract parameters reasonably, the supply chain will be coordinated and the profit will be allocated among supply chain members by changing the parameters. Revenue sharing contract and PM contract will solve the problem brought by dishonest retailer and make supply chain’s performance achieve initial level under the initial order commitment or price commitment.(2) Considering the risk preference of manufacture, retailer and consumers and studying the supply chain price, order and coordination problems. Analyze the influence on supply chain decision and performance brought by the metabolic risk preference coefficient.(3) In a two stage supply chain with random demand, the paper considers consumers’strategic behavior and flexible replenishment mechanism and studies the supply chain members’optimal decision and coordination problem. Beside, the equilibrium retail price and order are given base on the rational expectation hypothesis. Since the two stage newsboy model with retailer’s price commitment will degrade to the classical newsboy model. The paper focuses on the retailer’s decision and its profit under initial quantity commitment mechanism. We set profit under the initial quantity commitment as the research objective, use two-part tariff and revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain and prove that with reasonable parameters, the two contracts will coordinate the supply chain. Beside, the two-part tariff can allocate profit among supply chain members and the revenue sharing contract can make manufacturer and retailer share the risk. Finally, the paper expands the model from three aspects (goods’value are related to time; flexible replenishment of remanufacture; prices of two stages are decision variable) and makes it more theoretical and applicable.(4) Suppose that consumer’s valuation for goods are different, the paper studies pricing problem in two-stage supply chain. In the centralized supply chain, we study the optimal pricing and order strategy of new product and remanufactured product. In the decentralized supply chain, we discuss the optimal pricing and order strategy under Bertrand game and Stacklberg game according to different market position of manufacturers and remanufactures. The paper focuses on different valuation and discount factor’s influence on supply chain members’ decision and profit.The paper’s main innovation points can be summarized as following:(1) The current research on consumers’strategic behaviors is based on single mechanism. The paper combines the flexible replenishment mechanism and the initial order commitment or retailer price commitment and proves that multiple measures will reduce the negative impact and improve the supply chain’s performance.(2) Lots of researches suppose that supply chain members are risk neutral and most of them only consider consumer’s risk preference. The paper supposes that supply chain members and consumers have risk appetite and analyzes the impact of their risk preferences.(3) The paper discusses supply chain’s pricing and coordination under the condition of consumers’strategic behavior and flexible replenishment mechanism to promote the two-stage newsboy model.(4) The close-loop supply chain, remanufacturing and green supply chain management are research hotspot of supply chain management. But there have been relatively little study on remanufacturing combing consumers’strategic behavior. The paper considers consumer’s strategic behavior in the case of competition between manufacturer and remanufacture and discusses the pricing problem in the two-stage supply chain.更多还原