【作者】 黄玉龙；

【导师】 饶育蕾；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 薪酬激励作为一种重要的激励机制,是完善上市公司治理的重要环节,是解决现代公司中委托代理问题的核心,公平、合理、有效的薪酬激励制度不但能降低代理成本,规避道德风险,还能激励高管人员重视经营绩效,努力工作,提高公司的长远价值。但2008年的金融危机再次证明,高管薪酬契约设计的不合理,以及约束条件的缺失使得薪酬激励变相成了薪酬福利,一方面损害了上市公司的经营效率,另一方面造成了社会财富分配的不公平。薪酬激励真能有效解决代理问题吗?是否需要重新审视高管薪酬激励及其相关配套制度。长期以来,高管薪酬结构中基本薪酬过高,绩效薪酬不足,长期激励缺失。2005年开始的股权分置改革为股权激励的推行扫清了制度上的阻碍。但内部治理结构不完善、外部监管缺失、薪酬契约设计不合理等仍然制约着薪酬激励的发展。在此关键时期,本文从契约结构内生视角出发,引入股权结构这一重要调节变量。结合薪酬激励在中国的实践,研究股权结构对薪酬契约实施效率的影响。建立适合中国上市公司的薪酬激励机制,具有重要的理论和实践意义。本文以我国A股上市公司2006～2012年的数据作为样本,在对国内外相关研究进行分析的基础上,通过对契约理论、代理理论、人力资本理论等理论的归纳和概括,综合运用理论演绎、比较分析、经济计量等方法,从契约结构内生视角出发,重点研究了薪酬契约中薪酬业绩敏感度、薪酬内部公平、股权激励三个关键契约要素的影响因素,然后研究了它们对公司业绩的影响,以及股权结构、公司特征等变量在这一实现过程中的调节作用。主要研究结论如下：(1)高管薪酬的内部公平性是薪酬结构的重要内容,也是社会关注的焦点。本文用高管薪酬变异系数作为高管内部薪酬差距的代理变量,将样本按股权性质进行了分组,在此基础上,研究了决定高管团队薪酬差距的影响因素。研究结果表明,股权结构、董事会特征对高管团队内部的薪酬差距有着重要影响,但在不同股权性质的企业中,其影响的程度和方向有很大差异。高管薪酬内部公平程度对企业未来业绩的影响,实证结果表明,总体而言,企业高管内部薪酬的不公平会对企业未来业绩造成负面影响,这一研究结论支持行为理论。但这种负相关关系,在规模较大的企业会被削弱；在非国有企业则变成了正的关系,这意味着在非国有企业中,锦标赛理论所推断的激励作用大于行为理论所推断的消极作用。(2)绩效薪酬是短期激励的重要方式,而薪酬业绩敏感度是衡量绩效薪酬的最有效标尺。实证结果显示,股权集中度越高的公司薪酬业绩敏感度越大；相对于国有企业,非国有企业的薪酬业绩敏感度高些；董事长与总经理两职兼任的企业和股权制衡程度高的企业薪酬业绩敏感度有所降低；薪酬业绩敏感度对未来公司业绩有正的影响作用,但非国有企业的激励效果好过国有企业,股权结构在其中起到了调节作用。(3)股权激励是长期激励的重要方式,而股票期权是股权激励的重要形式,股权激励强度、期限是股票期权契约中的关键要素。股权集中度高、负债比例高、规模大的企业股权激励的期限较长,股权制衡程度高的企业股权激励的期限较短。股权激励的期限越长,激励的效果越好。股权制衡程度越高、风险水平越高、成长性越大的企业股权激励的强度有所增加,因为对高管的监督和激励存在相互替代效应,故股权集中度越高的企业股权激励强度越低。在非国有企业中,股权激励强度与公司绩效呈正相关关系,并且股权集中度越高,这种激励效果越好,股权制衡程度对股权激励的效果没有明显调节作用。在国有企业中,股权激励强度与公司绩效正相关关系虽然成立,但不显著,激励效果不好。股权集中度对这种关系没有调节作用,但在股权制衡程度越高的国有企业中,股权激励水平与企业未来业绩的正相关关系会有所削弱。根据以上的实证结论,本文在第七章中构建了高管薪酬契约模型,该模型以薪酬契约结构为中心、以内外约束为要点,系统阐述了影响薪酬契约设计的各层面因素,从股权结构视角提出了优化高管薪酬契约的措施,以及内外部约束制度设计。企业只有根据自身特征,不断优化高管薪酬契约,才能真正实现高管与企业的“利益趋同”,提升公司价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 Compensation incentive mechanism is the key to solve principal-agent problems as an important part in governance of listed companies. Fair, reasonable and effective compensation incentive mechanism can not only reduce the agency cost and evade moral hazard, but motivate executives to pay attention to business performance, work hard and improve the company’s lasting value. The global financial crisis happened in2008, which once again proved that it’s because of unreasonable design of executive’s remuneration contract and lack of restricted conditions that turn the compensation incentives into compensation benefits. On the one hand, it affects operating efficiency of listed company. On the other hand, it causes unfairness of social wealth distribution. Will compensation incentive really solve agency problems? Whether we need to rethink the executive compensation incentives and its supportive system?For quite some time, basic pay is too high, performance pay is not enough and lack of long-term incentive in the executive compensation structure. Non-tradable shares reform from2005removed system’s barrier for pushing equity incentives. But some factors like imperfect inner administration structure, lack of external supervision and unreasonable design of remuneration contract restrict the development of compensation incentive.In this critical period, this paper introduces equity structure, an important moderating variable, from contract structure endogenous perspective. Combine with the practice of compensation incentive in China to research equity structure’s impact on operational efficiency of remuneration contract. It has tremendous theoretical meaning and practical value to establish appropriate compensation incentives for Chinese listed company.Taking the data from A-share listed company in2006-2012as a sample, this paper, which is based on related domestic and international research, summarizes and generalizes contract theory, agency theory and human capital theory, uses normative analysis, comparative analysis and econometric analysis etc, focus on the three key contract factors----pay performance sensitivity, internal pay equity and equity incentive from contract structure endogenous perspective. And we also studied the impact of this three key contract factors on company performance. So does the regulating effect of equity structure and firm characteristics in implementation process.The main research achievements are as follows:The internal equity of executive compensation, which has gained people’s attention, is an important part of compensation structure. This paper studies the factors which determine compensation gap between executives. It regards coefficients of variation of executive compensation as a proxy for executive compensation gap and base on grouping according to the property of stock ownership. The results show that the equity structure and board characteristics play a significant role in the compensation gap between executives. However, the extent and the direction of their impacts are considerably various in different ownership property enterprises.How the internal equity of executives affects firm’s future performance? The results supports behavioral theory shows that the unfairness of internal executive compensation has negative effect on company’s future performance. But this negative correlation is weakened in large scale enterprise but becomes positive in the non-state-owned enterprises, which means that the positive effect tournament theory is greater than the negative effect of behavioral theory in the non-state-owned enterprises.Pay performance sensitivity is the most effective mean to measure pay performance which is a significant way for short-term incentive. The empirical result indicates that the company with higher stock concentration has stronger pay performance sensitivity; When compared with state-owned enterprise, non state-owned enterprise has stronger pay performance sensitivity; Enterprise with duality of chairman and general manager or high degree of equity restriction has weaker pay performance sensitivity which has positive effect on firm’s future performance. But motivation effect in state-owned enterprise is better than non-state owned. It means that equity structure acts as a moderator. However, there’s great discrepancy in various nature enterprise. Stock option is an important form of equity incentive which is a significant way for long-term incentive. The intensity of equity incentive and duration are key points for equity incentive contract.The enterprise with higher stock concentration, extremely indebtedness and large scale has long-duration equity incentive. Those who owned high degree of equity restriction has short-duration equity incentive. By the way, the longer, the better.Enterprise with higher degree of equity restriction, higher risk level and greater growth has increased the intensity of equity incentive because there’s a mutual substitution between executives’ supervision and incentive. As a result, enterprise with higher stock concentration has weaker equity incentive.Equity incentive intensity shows positive correlation to firm’s performance. In non state-owned enterprise, the higher stock concentration, the better incentive effect. And the extent of equity restriction doesn’t have obvious regulating effect on equity incentive. On the contrary, it doesn’t acts obviously positive in state-owned enterprise and even has no regulating effect. But in higher equity restriction enterprises, such incentive will damage firm’s performance.According to the empirical conclusion above, this paper establishes compensation incentive mechanism model which regard compensation contract as focus and take internal and external restriction as key points. Moreover, it explains systematically various factors for compensation contract, propose solution to improve contract structure from the ownership structure perspective, design internal and external restriction mechanism. Only enterprise keeps improving contract structure according to its own characteristic, can it be mutual benefit for executives and companies.更多还原