【作者】 司林杰；

【导师】 赵曦；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 区域经济学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 城市群区域的全面、协调、可持续发展对优化国土空间开发结构、完善城镇体系建设、促进区域经济协调发展乃至全面推进中国新型城镇化战略进程具有重大的战略意义。《国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》明确指出,未来我国城镇建设必须遵循城市发展客观规律,以大城市为依托,以中、小城市为重点,逐步形成福射带动作用大的城市群,促进大、中、小城市和小城镇协调发展。依托主体功能区规划完善城市布局、促进城市群发展、加强城镇化科学管理,已成为有效推进中国城镇化进程的重大战略选择。数据表明,城市群在国民经济和社会发展中的关键作用日益突出,已成为我国区域经济发展的基本承载平台和主体空间格局,随着大量的经济资源逐步聚集到城市群区域,其内部各地区如何有效配置资源、化解经济冲突、实现协调发展显得尤为重要。我国现行的管理体制机制,如官员绩效考核以及财政分权等,在促进地区经济增长的同时,也加剧了地区间竞争,特别是一定空间范围内存在多个城市的城市群区域,竞争更加激烈,产业结构趋同、恶性竞争加剧、区域合作减少、资源配置效率降低的发展态势已成为城市群发展理论研究面临的严峻挑战,城市群内部次区域间竞合无序问题及如何进行有效的机制设计已成为城市群发展实践中的重大课题。论文从梳理世界五大城市群发展历程入手,分析了世界主要城市群的发展特点,着重探讨了不同发达国家的城市群治理模式,归纳出对我国城市群治理具有一定指导意义的经验做法。在本文提到的五大城市群中,作者同样发现地区间存在着大量邻近区域间竞合问题,比如美国各城市间的税率策略互动问题、欧洲城市间竞争不平衡问题、英国伦敦自治市恶性竞争问题、日本国土空间开发问题等等。通过深入研究这些城市群发展与治理模式,发现这些城市群在处理城市间竞合问题时,采取的一些措施和方法对我国具有一定的借鉴和启示意义：一是充分发挥市场的作用,让市场成为资源配置的主导力量；二是加强区域发展规划；三是强调区域错位发展；四是设立特殊机构,协调区域利益；五是适度调整行政区划等。本文同样对我国几个主要城市群的发展历程与竞合行为现状进行了梳理。总体来看,我国地区间竞争可划分为四个阶段：改革开放前的“兄弟竞争”、80年代的“地方保护主义”、90年代后期的“政策竞争”以及现阶段的“全方位、多层次”竞争。文章还归纳总结了现阶段一些较为常见的城市群内部竞争行为,包括外商投资竞争、劳动力资源竞争、发展定位竞争、税收竞争、地方保护主义等。在城市群区域内合作方面,改革开放后,我国原有的经济体制被打破,区域合作机制需要重新确立。开始于80年代的“区域经济技术合作组织”对促进地区间横向经济联合起到了重要作用。经过多年发展,我国区域间合作水平也在不断提高。本文也对目前我国城市群内部地区间的典型合作行为进行了归纳总结,其主要表现形式有：区域间基础设施建设、区域产业分工协作、经济合作区建设等。总体看,我国城市群内部地区间既存在大量的竞争行为,也存在一些合作,但由于我国存在的,诸如官员考核选拔、财政分权等体制机制,使得城市群内部次区域间的恶性竞争数不胜数,合作却少之又少。为此,我国部分城市群相继建立了区域协调组织,对地区间竞合行为加以协调,如“环渤海区域合作市长联席会”、“长三角城市经济协调会”、“泛珠三角9+2”区域合作组织等。但不容乐观的是,现阶段城市群内部邻近地区“以邻为壑”、市场分割、地方保护主义等问题仍然严重,这些区域协调组织并未实现其成立初衷。为研究我国城市群内部次区域间的竞合无序问题,本文构建了城市群内部两中心晋升博弈模型,通过求解对称性纳什均衡,并进行比较静态分析,提出了城市群内部次区域间的“积极竞争,消极合作”行为推论,即：随着地区间竞争行为对本城市经济增长影响程度的提高,政府竞争趋于激烈；而随着地区间合作行为对其他城市经济增长影响程度的提高,政府合作更趋消极。为验证该推论,本文使用2000--2011年北京等10个城市的面板数据,并选取区域专业化水平、城市间交通便捷程度等变量代表合作行为；选取区域劳动力增长、外商直接投资等变量代表竞争行为,验证这4个变量对本城市经济增长的促进作用是否显著,同时,还选取这4个变量的空间滞后项进入模型,检验这些变量对城市群其他城市经济增长的作用,并用以匹配政府行为表现,以此来验证本文提出的推论。结果显示,政府在资本竞争、劳动力竞争以及城市间交通设施建设等方面的行为能够与本文三种不同设定的模型估计结果进行很好地匹配,而政府在区域分工方面的行为也能够与时点固定效应模型实证结果相匹配。总体而言,实证结果和现有的数据分析能够较好的支撑本文提出的“积极竞争,消极合作”的行为推论。我国城市群内部次区域间普遍存在的“积极竞争,消极合作”行为会产生何种后果呢?本文在第六章以城市群内部两城市争夺外商投资为案例基础,对“积极竞争,消极合作”行为所产生的后果,进行了福利经济学分析。通过构建由两个地方政府和一个外商投资企业参与的多阶段动态博弈模型,发现在产业转移过程中,地方政府的这种“积极竞争,消极合作”的行为产生了“租金耗散”的后果。本文认为,产生“租金耗散”后果的直接原因在于,城市群内各地方政府并没有从区域分工和比较优势角度进行产业承接,而是从自身利益最大化出发,参与竞争,进而使得外商投资企业掌握主导权,并利用这种同质化竞争,迫使两个地方政府不断提高优惠条件,最终导致“产业转移租金”全部被外商投资企业获得。同时本文也认为产生“租金耗散”的根本原因在于,地方政府目标选择与地区发展利益并不完全一致。“租金耗散”的形式一般表现为地方政府对外商投资企业的各种税收、土地优惠条件、财政转移支付或财政补贴,其缺口只能由地方财政承担,所以城市群内部“积极竞争,消极合作”行为的最终利益受损者是参与竞争的城市的普通居民。为避免由“积极竞争,消极合作”行为所造成的社会福利损失,促使城市群内部形成“积极合作,良性竞争”的态势,本文认为应从以下几个方面构建城市群内部竞合机制：一是建设法律基础机制：推进城市群发展公约制订和出台、鼓励城市群内部地方政府合作协议签订、推动城市群发展规划编制和实施等；二是建立内部协调机制：未来城市群区域的管理应在不同层面设置不同管理机构,在国家层面应设置中央城市群统筹协调小组、在跨地区层面应设置城市群综合协调管理委员会和专业性协调委员会,同时还应该进一步完善补充性协调管理组织；三是形成财政保障机制：理顺中央与地方财权事权关系、建立纵向与横向转移支付体系、确立“税收法定”等原则、改革财政预算体制等；四是完善激励约束机制：应从激励约束的的实施主体、参与客体、环境条件、预期目标、实施途径等方面入手,尽快建立激励相容的激励约束体制。本文以现有官员考核选拔体制为依据,构建晋升博弈模型,研究我国城市群内部次区域间竞合问题,提出了城市群内部“积极竞争,消极合作”的行为推论,并加以实证研究。随后,建立了多阶段动态博弈模型,探讨城市群内部“积极竞争,消极合作”行为的社会福利影响,得出了“租金耗散”结论。为促使我国城市群内部次区域形成“积极合作,良性竞争”的新秩序,以上述分析结果为依据,本文从法律基础、内部协调、财政保障、激励约束等几方面构建城市群内部竞合行为机制。根据本文对我国城市群内部次区域间竞合行为的研究,结合世界城市群治理实践经验,提出了促进我国城市群内部各区域协调发展的政策建议,主要包括：理顺政府与市场的关系,以市场为主导,更好发挥政府宏观调控作用；加强城市群区域内基础设施网络建设,深化内部一体化进程；构建现代产业体系,加强区域产业分工；制定城市群发展规划,实现区域错位发展；引入绿色GDP,加强经济成本核算,完善官员考核体系；打破条块分割,设置具有权威性的区域协调管理机构等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of urban agglomeration has great strategic importance for the optimization of national spatial development structure, the construction of urban system, coordinated development of regional economy and strategic process of China’s new urbanization.The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China pointed out clearly that the future urban construction of our country must follow the objective law of urban devellopment, which means that urban construction is based on big cities and focusing on small and medium-sized cities. The urban constructions aims to form a big cities group so that it could promote a coordinated development among big cities, medium-size cities and small cities.Relying on main functional region planning, the government should improve urbanization layout, promote the development of urban agglomeration and strengthen the scientific management of urbanization. It is a great strategic choice for the promotion of China’s urbanization.Some statistic Data show that the urban agglomeration in the national economy has become an increasingly key role in the development of society, and it also has become basic platform of China’s regional economic development. As a large amount of economic resources gradually gathered in urban areas, how to distribute resource efficiently in various areas, dissolve the economic conflict, realize the coordinated development among the cities group is particularly important.The existing management systems and mechanisms in China, such as official performance appraisal and fiscal decentralization, has promoted regional economic growth as well as intensified competition between different regions, especially in the regions containing several cities groups. The trend of fierce competition, similar industrial structure, vicious competition, few cooperation between neighbor areas and low efficiency of resource allocation has become severe challenges for the theory research on urban agglomeration development. The competition disorder problem among the sub-region of the urban agglomeration and how to design an effective mechanism have become a major topic in the study of the urban agglomeration development.Papers combine the development process of the world’s five urban agglomerations, analyzes the development characteristics of the world’s major urban agglomerations, focused on the different modes of urban agglomerations governance in developed countries, summed up the experience with a certain guiding significance for the practice of urban agglomerations governance to our country. In the five urban agglomerations mentioned in this article, the authors also found numerous competing issues exists between the neighbor regions, such as tax policy interaction issues between the United States cities, imbalance competition between European cities, vicious competition issues of London Borough, national spatial development issues of Japan and so on. Through in-depth study of these urban agglomerations development and governance model, found that some of the measures and the method which taken by these urban agglomerations dealing with inter-city competition and cooperation problem has certain reference and enlightenment to China:First, give full play to the role of the market, let the market become the dominant force in the allocation of resources; second, strengthen regional development plan; Third, emphasis misplaced on regional development; Fourth, the establishment of special agency to coordinate regional interests; Five, moderate adjustment of administrative divisions and so on.Also in this paper,the development process and current co-opetition behavior of China’s several major urban agglomerations are presented.Overall,China’s regional competition can be divided into four stages——the brother competition before reform and opening,the local protectionism in the80s,the policy competition in the late90s and the omnibearing and multi-level competition at present stage.Also the paper summarizes some common urban agglomeration internal competition at present stage,including foreign investment competition, labor resource competition, development orientation competition, tax competition, local protectionism and so on.In the aspect of the cooperation in the city group region,original economic system has been broken after reform and opening in China,so regional cooperation mechanism needs to be reestablished.The Regional Economic and Technology Cooperation Organization,which was set up in the 80s,plays an important role in promoting interlocal horizontal economic union.With many years of development,the level of China’s regional cooperation are improving constantly.This paper summarizes the typical cooperative behavior in the present internal area of city group in China as well,including regional infrastructure construction,regional industrial division and cooperation, economic cooperation zone construction.In general,there are not only a large number of competition behavior but also some cooperation in China’s urban agglomeration internal.However because there exist some institutional mechanisms,like official assessment of selection and fiscal decentralization,there is countless malignant competition but little cooperation among sub regions in the urban agglomeration internal.To this end,China’s a part of urban agglomeration have established regional coordinating organization in succession to coordinate regional competition and cooperation behavior,such as Circum-Bohai-Sea Region Cooperation Mayor Joint Committee,Yangtze River Delta City Economic Coordination Committee,Pan Pearl River Delta9+2Regional Cooperation Organization.But the troubling fact is that some serious problems,like benefiting themselves at others’ expense,market segmentation and local protectionism,remain between nabes in the urban agglomeration internal at this present,and these regional coordinating organizations cannot achieve their original intention.To study the problem of competing disordered among internal sub-regional areas of urban agglomeration, this paper constructed the promoted game model of two centers in urban agglomeration. by solving the symmetry of the Nash equilibrium, and make comparative static analysis, this paper raises behavior inference inside the subregion "positive competition" and " passive cooperation",namely:With the improvement that the regional competition affects the local cities’s economic growth, the competition among the governments tends intensely; whereas inter-regional cooperation improves influence of economic growth in of other cities, the government cooperation become more negative.To verify that the inference, we use panel data2000-2011Beijing and other9cities and select regional specialization level, convenience of inter-city transportation as variables to represent the cooperative behavior; and select growth of regional labor force, foreign direct investment as variables represent competition behavior, verify the significance of the four variables that promote the economic growth of local city, meanwhile we bring these four variables space lags into the model, testing the role of these variables on economic growth of other cities in urban agglomerations, and to match the performance of government action. The results showed that the behavior of the government in the capital competition,labour competition and construction of transport facilities between the cities matches the results of three different models very well, and behavior of the government in terms of regional division can also match with the one Empirical results of time-fixed settings. Overall, the empirical results and analysis of existing data can better support the proposed inference that "positive competition and negative cooperative".What are the consequences while "positive competition" and "passive cooperation" behavior generally exist China’s cities? The sixth chapter researches the problems of competition about industry transfer between cities by building a dynamic game model which has two cities and a large enterprise. Through comparative static analysis, the article finds that increase of timeliness of transfer enterprises will reduce the rounds of government and enterprise bargaining while the governments simply improve the concession will not reduce rounds of bargaining. When transferring enterprise timeliness is low and the government concessions range is larger, the rounds of bargaining approach infinity, which caused the rent dissipation. This study shows that competition among cities causes rent dissipation directly, but the root reason is that the government target selection and city development interests are not completely coincident."Rent dissipation" includes tax cuts and financial transfer payments or subsidies to enterprise. The consequences of "positive competition" and "passive cooperation" among cities are borne by residents.To avoid the loss of social welfare by the "positive competition" and "passive cooperation" behavior and promote "healthy competition" and "active cooperation" posture formed in the inner city group, This paper considers that the following aspects should be thought in building urban agglomeration of competing mechanisms:Firstly the legal basis for the construction of the mechanism:promote the development of the Convention on the development and introduction of urban agglomerations, encourage urban agglomeration internal local government cooperation agreement, promote the development of urban agglomerations planning and implementation. Secondly, establish internal coordination mechanisms, future management of urban agglomeration areas should be set at different levels by various regulatory agencies, at the national level should be set to the central city group coordinated team, the regional level urban agglomeration integrated and coordinated management committee and the Coordination Committee professionalism should be set, should also improve the coordination and management of complementary organizations. Thirdly, financial security mechanisms, rationalize the relationship between central and local financial powers, establish vertical and horizontal transfer payment system, establish "tax legal" principles, such as the reform of the budget system.Last, improve the incentive and restraint mechanisms, should encourage the implementation of the main constraints to participate object, environmental conditions, targets, implementation and ways to start and establish an incentive-compatible incentive system as soon as possible.In this paper, based on existing assessment of official selection system, constructing a dynamic game model of promotion, researching problems among the sub-region of the urban agglomeration of competition in China, putting forward the urban agglomeration "positive competition, negative cooperation" internal behavior inference, and empirical research. Multi-stage dynamic game model is established, then explore the urban agglomeration "positive competition, negative cooperation" internal behavior of the impact of social welfare, the "rent dissipation" conclusion. To promote the urban agglomeration of China internal sub-regions to form new order of the "positive, cooperative, benign competition", based on the above analysis results, this article from the legal basis, internal coordination, several aspects, such as financial security, incentive and constraint to build urban agglomeration mechanism of internal competition behavior. According to this article research on the urban agglomerations of China internal competition behavior between sub-regional, combining the experience of the world urban agglomeration governance practices, putting forward to promote the urban agglomeration of China internal coordinated development of regional policy recommendations, mainly includes:straighten out the relationship between the government and the market; Deepening the internal integration of urban agglomeration; Building a modern industrial system, strengthening the regional industry division of labor; Formulating plans for the development of urban agglomeration and realize regional dislocation development; The introduction of green GDP, strengthen economic cost accounting, improving the official examination system; Breaking the regional segmentation, establishment of regional coordination management of authoritative institution, etc.更多还原