【作者】 李文峰；

【导师】 阎庆民；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 金融学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 2013年党的十八届三中全会的提出了：“经济体制改革是全面深化改革的重点,核心问题是处理好政府和市场的关系,使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用和更好发挥政府作用。”这一发展观念不仅契合了新中国建立之后尤其是改革开放后我国政治制度与经济体制自我变迁的客观规律,更是反映出我国制度结构下的当今及未来社会经济发展的需要。从新制度经济学和制度金融学视角看,一国的制度安排对该国的经济增长和金融发展具有奠基性的影响。金融作为经济体中经营和创造信用的特殊行业受到不同金融制度的规制。在此意义上分析,一国基本制度的变迁必会影响到金融制度的变迁,因此基本经济制度乃至金融制度的变迁及其形成的具体制度安排对一国金融行业具体运行存在至关重要的影响。而基于基础制度安排及经济运行机制产生的存在于我国银行业内部的非正式制度安排：政治关联对我国商业银行运行的影响性态是当前理论界面临迫切问题。历次金融风险所呈现出来的巨大破坏性及对实体经济侵染性凸显了银行风险承担诱因及其渠道效应研究的必要性。而作为基础性因素的制度及银行风险承担的政治关联渠道在既有以上问题的研究中并没有得到系统全面的体现。鉴于此,本文基于新制度经济学和制度金融学的研究视角,围绕“我国制度结构及变迁特征”——>“政治关联路径形成动机、形式及效能”——>“银行风险承担”——>“银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态”四个问题梯次推进,从经验论证和理论均衡分析两个维度研究了我国制度结构及其动态变迁背景下银行风险承担的政治关联渠道存在性及其效应,并得出一些有益结论。具体而言,文章紧紧围绕着政治关联产生的基础制度因素、政治关联形式及银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态进行分析。重点解决的基本问题有：第一,我国基础制度因素对银行风险承担的影响性态；第二,以高管政治背景、政府实际控制和银行国有股权性质为主要形式的银行风险承担的显性政治关联渠道的影响性态；第三,基于政府、银行两方博弈所形成的银行风险承担的隐性政治关联渠道的影响性态；第四,基于政府、国有企业、银行三方博弈所形成的银行风险承担的隐性政治关联渠道影响性态。结合研究思路和思想,本文融合了新制度经济学、制度金融学、经济学及金融学等学科知识,采用理论研究和经验论证相结合的研究方法。理论研究的方法主要体现在三个方面：一是基本理论推理与演绎归纳；二是构建理论均衡模型进行比较静态分析；三是在均衡分析过程中,采用逐步放松约束条件进而提高研究结论普适性的论证逻辑。经验论证方法主要体现在三个方面：一是基于我国经济金融运行现状,收集并整理有关数据进行基本统计单变量分析；二是在单变量统计分析基础上构建银行风险承担组合模型和银行风险承担的政治关联渠道检验组合模型,在严格按照经典计量经济学原理和相关模型构建原理基础上,利用收集数据组成非平衡面板数据进行多元拟合回归；三是在具体经验分析中采用递进研究逻辑和对比分析的思想对相关问题进行研究。尽可能的完善研究逻辑并提高研究结论的可信性。文章紧紧围绕着基本问题和研究核心,依据理论演绎归纳、经验论证及均衡分析得出如下基本结论：(1)基本经济制度因素推动了银行三种风险承担水平；产权保护制度因素和社会基本意识性态因素对银行风险承担影响呈现微弱且基本不显著性态；表征基本金融制度因素的信贷资金分配市场化程度因素在计量意义上较为显著的提升银行系统风险和非系统风险的承担水平,而对总风险承担水平影响并不显著,金融市场竞争因素显著加剧了银行风险系统风险承担。(2)在控制基本制度因素的背景下,外部宏观经济层面的房地产市场景气因素对银行的风险承担影响微弱并且不显著；经济增长因素符合降低银行风险承担水平的预期。同时,样本商业银行层面的净利润增长率因素和规模因素对银行不同类型风险承担存在一定影响并且显著,银行规模反而会积极推动银行三种类型的风险承担水平,而净利润增长因素显著降低系统风险承担却整体提升非系统风险和总风险承担水平。(3)以高管的政治背景为主要特征的显性政治关联路径并没有显著改变基础制度因素和其余控制变量对银行风险承担的影响性态,但其本身对银行三类风险承担行为存在影响且显著,即使这种影响程度并不高。其中,高管的政治背景对银行系统风险承担的积极影响程度高于其对总风险和非系统风险承担的影响程度。同时,在其他控制条件不变的情况下,基于高管政治背景而形成的政治关联所引致的银行风险承担水平越高,银行就越注重调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。具体而言,银行总风险承担、系统风险承担与非系统风险承担在计量意义上均有效的降低银行杠杆水平并且显著,尤其是总风险承担水平的上升对银行杠杆水平抑制效应更为显著,也即是说有效引致银行调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。(4)政府实际控制因素对银行的三种风险承担的影响微弱并且不显著；银行国有股权性质因素对银行各类风险承担存在一定影响并且显著。整体而言,国有股权因素提升了银行总风险承担程度,但降低了银行系统和非系统风险承担水平。同时,在其他控制条件不变的情况下,基于政府股权和政府实际控制因素而形成的政治关联所引致的银行风险承担水平越高,银行就越注重调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。具体而言,银行总风险承担、系统风险承担与非系统风险承担在计量意义上均有效的降低银行杠杆水平并且显著,具体而言,三类风险承担效应均有效抑制银行杠杆水平,而总风险承担的政治关联渠道而引致的银行资产组合调整进而抑制银行过高的杠杆水平的程度更为积极显著,也即是说有效引致银行调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。(5)高管政治背景与政府实际控制共同作用因素显著降低银行系统风险承担水平和非系统风险承担水平,但对银行总风险承担水平影响并不显著,并且二者的共同作用显著的放大了两种因素所形成的政治关联路径对银行系统和非系统风险承担的影响程度,尤其是显著加剧了银行系统风险承担水平。同时,在其他控制条件不变的情况下,基于二者交叉因素而形成的政治关联所引致的银行风险承担水平越高,银行就越注重调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健,尤其是所引起的银行系统风险承担水平越高,银行也就越倾向于调整其资产组合借以抑制银行杠杆水平。具体而言,银行总风险承担、系统风险承担与非系统风险承担在计量意义上均有效的降低银行杠杆水平并且显著,三类风险承担均有效抑制银行杠杆水平,而系统风险承担的政治关联渠道而引致的银行资产组合调整进而抑制银行过高的杠杆水平的程度更为显著。(6)存在政府干预和外部制度约束条件既定的情形下,基于政府控制而形成的隐性契约和银行经理人个体利益诉求的共同作用塑造银行经理人两种策略：合作策略与非合作策略。政府代理人和银行经理人合作框架下的均衡收益揭示二者合作是其占优策略选择,这种合作收益提供了银行经理人积极构建隐性政治关联路径内在激励。但这种基于合作而形成的隐性政治关联路径所引致的银行经理人的寻租行为和政府补贴行为会加剧银行风险承担。同时,从银行风险承担的政治关联渠道层面来看,理性的银行代理人倾向于选择合作框架下的行为并获得其均衡收益,这一合作框架潜在关键条件就是银行代理人积极构建并维持政治关联渠道的存在,这种政治关联渠道会诱发银行经理人道德风险进而引致银行风险承担,同时银行风险承担改变就会通过银行信贷资金的配给行为于银行资产组合的变动。(7)政府、银行与国有企业三方博弈的均衡结论揭示,存在于商业银行、国有企业与政府之间的隐性政治关联路径直接或间接形成以政府和政府项目为中心的银行、国有企业和政府之问的紧密关联。现行制度约束条件下,基于隐性政治关联路径之上的银行经理人、国有企业经理人及政府代理人的均衡策略选择不仅共同激化了银行信贷扩张,更是加剧了风险承担水平。同时,从银行风险承担的政治关联渠道层面来看,政府、银行与国有企业三方博弈框架下各自均衡收益表明,三方合作是其占优合作策略。而这种合作策略就形成了围绕政府及政府项目为中心并以隐性契约为核心的政治关联纽带的运作机制,但预期存在的隐性政府信用担保就会诱发银行道德风险并加剧银行风险承担,进而会通过这种隐性政治关联渠道作用于银行以信贷配给为主要诱因的资产组合波动。结合本文的研究内容和既有的相关研究,本文的创新主要体现在如下方面：(1)文章结合Coase创立的新古典关于制度变迁的比较静态分析和Hayek等关于制度变迁的动态演化分析范式,在制度变迁动态演进理论框架内探索中国银行业内政治关联产生的制度基础及形式,并重点分析银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态,最终通过理论研究和合理的经验论证得出银行风险承担的政治关联渠道的影响性态和适应率评价。(2)在文章理论均衡分析部分,突破既有相关研究中先验性的制度外生假定,通过合理的假设将基础制度安排和政治关联为代表的非正式制度内生到均衡模型中,最终围绕政治关联形式与银行风险承担的政治关联渠道之间动态均衡分析得出银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态。(3)系统分析基本制度结构对一国制度变迁的影响、制度变迁与具体制度安排(经济体制和金融制度)之间关联,为本文的政治关联产生、路径及对银行风险承担的影响提供研究的理论基础。并从理论上演绎政治关联作为一种非正式制度与正式制度之间的“反馈循环(Feedbeck Loop)"动态作用机制。(4)文章突破了传统基于货币政策、利率、银行公司治理、市场约束等层面对银行风险承担影响的研究,从政治关联的层面全面系统地论证银行风险承担的政治关联渠道存在性及其影响性态。更多还原

【Abstract】 In2013, the third plenary session of the18th put forward:"the focus of the economic system reform is comprehensively deepen reform, the core problem is to correctly handle the relationship between government and market, the market plays a decisive role in the allocation of resources and would better give play to the role of the government." This development concept not only fit the after the founding of new China, especially in the political system of our country after reform and opening-up,and the objective laws of economic system change myself, but also reflects our country institution endowment structure of today and future social and economic development needs. In Perspective from the new institutional economics and the system of finance, the system of a country’s institutional endowment of the country’s has the founding influence of economic growth and development, and the financial embedded in the economic development also is restricted by institution endowment. But the financial as special industry in the economy operation with creating credit not only is restricted by system of basic endowment, but also by different financial institution endowment of regulation. Macro level, a country’s financial institution endowment is part of the system of the country’s basic endowment, but the current financial development in the important position in the economic growth and financial institution endowment in a country’s basic system of the endowment special status. In this sense, the changes of the basic system of a country will affect the changes of the financial system, and also the changes of the financial system not only reflect the country’s basic system vicissitude important characteristics, but also affect the country’s basic system of the endowment change characteristics. This institutional change path is the most prominent characteristics for China. In addition, the previous financial crisis triggered by the financial risks presented by the enormous destructive and infection on the real economy to highlight the importance of financial institutional change, because the scientific and reasonable system formed by the institutional change of endowment for promoting financial development and reduce financial risk and improve the financial efficiency has an irreplaceable role.In view of this, this article based on the perspective of new institutional economics and the system of finance, and around the "institution endowment structure and the characteristics "->"features and the formation of the basic system of institutional changes"->"political association path formation motivation, form and performance"->"bank risk-taking" four questions arrangement in advance, and arguments from two dimensions of the empirical experience and theory of equilibrium analysis, studing the associated path effect on bank risk-taking under the background of the political system of our country endowment structure.Specifically, the analyzed in the article closely around the political relevance of institutional factors and the formation of the political form of associated impact on bank risk-taking behavior. The key to solve the basic proposition of are:First, how does the based system in China impact on bank risk-taking; Second, how does bank executives political background as the main form of dominant political association path impact on bank risk-taking behavior; Third, how does the actual control of government and state-owned bank equity nature as the main form of dominant political association impact on bank risk-taking behavior; Fourth, how does the crossover factor formed by the dominant political association impact on bank risk-taking behavior; Fifth, how does based on the government, the bank of recessive political association which is formed by the two sides game impact on bank risk-taking behavior; Sixth, how does based on the government, state-owned enterprises, Banks recessive political association which is formed by the tripartite game impact on bank risk-taking behavior. Combined with the research ideas and propositions, this paper combines the new institutional economics, the system of finance, economics and finance discipline knowledge, and adopting the combination of theoretical research and experience demonstrates the research methods.This paper closely around the basic proposition and research core, on the basis of theoretical deduction experience induction, comparison and equilibrium analysis and reasoning to get basic conclusions as follows:(1).The basic economic system factors promoted the bank three risk bearing level; Property rights protection system and social awareness of factors impact on bank risk bearing appears weak and basic state is not significant; Basic financial system market-based degree of credit capital allocation factors in measuring sense more significantly improve the banking system risk and non-system risk levels, and, there is no significant impact on the overall risk bearing level, financial market competition factors significantly increased the risk of bank risk.(2). External macroeconomic level of the real estate market booming factor influence on bank’s risk-taking is weak and not significant; Growth factor conforms to reduce the bank risk bearing level of expectations. Sample level of commercial bank’s net profit growth rate and scale factors impact on the Banks of different types there is a certain risk and significantly, bank size will actively promote bank three types of risk bearing level, while net profit growth factors significantly reduce the risk of system for overall ascension unsystematic risk and overall risk level.(3). Executives political background as the main characteristics of the dominant political association path based institutional factors did not significantly change and the rest of the control variables influence on bank risk-taking behavior, but its three kinds of risk-taking behavior exists for Banks and significantly. Executives of the political background of risk in the banking system positively influence degree is higher than its impact on overall risk and unsystematic risk.(4). Government control factors on the Banks of the influence of three kinds of risk bearing small and not significant; Bank of state-owned equity properties have a certain influence factors on the Banks of various kinds of risk bearing and significant. State-owned equity factors increase the risk of bank’s total degree but reduce the banking system and non-system risk bearing level(5). Senior political background and the actual control interaction factors significantly reduce the risk of bank system and non-system risk bearing level, government control factors significantly increase bank system risk and non-system risk level. Senior political background significantly increased bank system and non-system risk exposure levels.(6). External institutional constraints and the government intervention established, the government agent and cooperation within the framework of balanced benefit bank managers about cooperation is its dominant strategy choice, this kind of cooperation benefits provided the bank managers actively build recessive political association path intrinsic motivation. But this is based on the cooperation and the formation of a recessive political association path caused bank managers of rent-seeking behavior and government subsidies behavior will increase bank risk-taking.(7). Governments, Banks and state-owned enterprise tripartite game balanced conclusion reveals that exists between commercial Banks and state-owned enterprises and the government’s recessive political path associated directly or indirectly around the government and the government project as the center, this is closely related between state-owned enterprises and government. Current institution endowment constraints, based on the recessive political connection path of bank managers, the state-owned enterprise managers and the government agent of choice of equilibrium strategies not only intensified the bank credit expansion, but also contributed to the risk level.According to the research contents of this paper and the existing related research, the innovation of this paper is mainly manifested in the following aspects:First, based on Coase, founded the new classical comparative static analysis on institutional change and Hayek on the dynamic evolution of institutional change analysis paradigm, the system of institutional change within the framework of dynamic evolution theory to explore China’s endowment and the reform of the political system of the economic system structure of banking channels of political association, and ultimately through the theoretical research and the experience of the reasonable argument political associated channels of influence on bank risk-taking and adaptation rate evaluation.Second, on equilibrium analysis section, the article theory breaks through the existing related study exogenous assumption of apriority system, through the reasonable assumption to institutional arrangements and political association of informal institution endogenous to the equilibrium model, finally it is concluded that based on institutional constraints, the path of political relation and bank risk-taking based on dynamic equilibrium between political connection path influence on bank risk-taking.Third, system analysis system endowment structure influence on a country’s institutional change, and systems analysis of institutional change and concrete system arrangement (economic system and financial system) link between, for the political correlation, path and influence on bank risk-taking provide the institutional basis of the system. And theoretically deduce political association as one of the unofficial system and formal system between the "feedback Loop (Feedbeck Loop)" dynamic mechanism.更多还原