【作者】 宛玲羽；

【导师】 罗宏；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,国有企业的收入分配和上市公司的高管薪酬问题一直是社会各方面高度关注的热点话题。从国资委成立来,国企高管的薪酬机制虽逐步规范,但薪酬水平增长较快,与普通员工薪酬差距在不断拉大。如招商证券董事长宫少林2011年薪酬总计483万,是职工平均工资的60倍；中国建筑总公司党组成员孔庆平2011年领取薪酬910万,与职工平均工资相差180倍。这些信息混合在公众对我国收入分配差距持续扩大的关注中,国家也将薪酬改革作为国有企业改革的重要方面,试图制定出合理的薪酬契约。但频频见诸报端的国企高额薪酬、薪酬与业绩背离等现象似乎违背了薪酬契约设计的初衷,这些现象背后体现更多的是高管运用权力操纵薪酬的痕迹。那么,高管如何利用权力操纵薪酬?其操纵背后存在着怎样的原因呢?学者们一直在传统公司治理理论下,用追求利益最大化来解释高管的薪酬操纵行为,但对高管操纵行为的多样性却无法给予充分的解释。因为在传统的公司治理下,人是完全理性的,这种完全的实质理性,也即单单追求利益最大化并不能解释人行为方式的多样性。将心理学纳入公司治理的研究,行为公司治理打开了传统公司治理所忽视的决策黑箱,从人类真实的心理和行为模式入手,研究在实际决策中,参与者心理对决策的影响。在此框架下,我们探讨高管的薪酬操纵行为,以期达到以下目的：第一,找到国有企业高管薪酬操纵的不同证据,为更好的理解薪酬契约提供一定的支持；第二,在理论分析和实证分析的基础上,将高管心理与高管行为结合,从源头上探讨薪酬操纵行为背后的原因,为解释薪酬操纵方式的多样性提供依据。第三,通过薪酬操纵的现实基础、薪酬激励存在的问题以及薪酬操纵行为的心理分析,从约束高管权力、制度设计等角度为国有企业薪酬改革提供政策建议。为达到本文的研究目的,全文共分为八章,分步阐述本文的研究思想：第一章是对本文的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路等要素做一个必要交代,界定相关的研究边界,明确全文的研究逻辑和主要内容。第二章是文献综述,本章基于最优契约论、管理层权力论的研究以及管理者心理的研究分别进行综述,既是回顾和总结前人的研究成果,也是为了在此基础上尽可能地提炼可借鉴的成果并找出其中的不足,进一步确定研究重点及研究空间。第三章是国企高管薪酬操纵的背景分析。本章首先探讨了国有企业的体制性障碍；其次,从薪酬操纵的现实基础出发,探讨国有企业高管权力的形成以及业绩考核困难性下具体操纵方式的可行性；再次,通过高管薪酬现状的分析探讨薪酬激励中可能存在的问题,为薪酬操纵的研究提供现实依据。本章背景的分析为后续理论和实证研究提供了相应的制度铺垫。第四章是心理诱因下薪酬操纵的理论分析。本章首先阐述了薪酬操纵的理论基础,为薪酬操纵的研究提供理论支持。接着运用行为公司治理理论作为高管心理与行为研究的理论依据。在此理论下,我们将高管的心理与其操纵行为相结合,并通过具体的心理学理论来解释高管不同心理的产生及与薪酬操纵行为的关系。第五章从实证的角度验证了基于攀比心理的事前薪酬操纵。研究发现,在上一年度高管薪酬低于行业均值的公司中,高管利用盈余管理操纵薪酬的动机会加强,初步说明了高管攀比心理的存在；而在这些公司中,若高管团队内的薪酬差距较大,则会抑制薪酬操纵的强度,说明了消极投入并不必然是高管消除负面情绪的唯一方式,改变参照物也能缓解攀比所带来的负面情绪。进一步的,基于控制层级和外部环境的考虑,发现攀比心理对央企高管的解释力较弱,薪酬操纵显著的存在于偏好货币性收益的地方国企中；此外,环境的竞争性越强,攀比心理越发凸显,也更容易诱发薪酬操纵。最后,由于薪酬操纵是高管通过极端方式消除其心理紧张的手段,因而对企业未来的业绩和价值都会产生负面影响。第六章从实证的角度验证了基于辩护心理的薪酬契约操纵。首先我们利用企业内部业绩指标间的高低进行验证,研究发现,高管事后会提高薪酬与较高业绩指标之间的相关性为其高薪辩护,且权力越大,这种操纵行为越明显；由于央企存在着薪酬规制等原因,操纵行为显著的存在于地方国企中；进一步的,当相对薪酬越高时,操纵强度越大,说明了薪酬越高,高管的辩护心理越强烈。其次我们利用与行业平均水平比较下的相对业绩进行验证,研究发现,若相对业绩越好,薪酬与业绩的敏感性越强,进一步的说明了薪酬业绩敏感度的提高可能是基于辩护心理下的薪酬操纵手段。最后,由于高管的操纵行为扭曲了薪酬契约,会带来未来业绩的下滑和企业价值的下降。第七章从实证角度验证了基于自我归因偏差的薪酬粘性。由于个体存在将成功归功于自身努力,而将失败归因于外部环境的自我归因偏差,且会随任务的稳定性和可控性发生变化。据此,在验证薪酬粘性存在性的基础上,我们将公司业绩按照可控程度分为营业利润与营业外收支,按照风险程度分为修正的营业利润与投资收益,研究发现高管薪酬与可控性较强的营业利润和风险度较低的修正的营业利润的粘性特征较弱,而与可控性较弱的营业外收支和风险度较高的投资收益的粘性较强,进一步证明了高管自我归因偏差的存在性。我们还发现,金融危机冲击下环境的不可预测性使得业绩的可控性降低,进而使高管的自我归因偏差在危机前后存在着显著差别,表现为金融危机之后高管薪酬的粘性特征显著高于危机前。第八章是结论部分,在此章中我们回顾和总结了本文的主要研究结论；从抑制管理者权力角度和政策制定角度提出了具体相应的政策建议。此外,指出了研究的局限和不足,同时展望了未来的研究空间和继续努力的方向。本文的研究在以下几个方面做出了创新：第一,本文从影响高管行为的核心因素——心理特征出发,进行跨学科的研究,探讨不同心理特征下薪酬操纵行为的形成机理,拓宽了薪酬操纵形成机理的理论视野。具体的,本文通过心理因素来解释国有企业高管薪酬操纵方式的多样性,对于此类的文章,目前学者仍缺乏相关的实证检验,而这种研究思路可以为未来的研究提供启示。第二,本文研究了基于业绩评价指标选择的操纵,推进了事后薪酬操纵方式的研究,丰富了现有薪酬操纵的研究视角。对于辩护心理下薪酬操纵,我们的研究不同于主流的理论预期,我们认为高管会基于薪酬辩护的心理提高薪酬业绩敏感性。对此,我们将业绩按照企业内部业绩指标间的高低首先进行区分,研究高管是否会提高薪酬与较高业绩指标的相关性来操纵薪酬,并探讨相对薪酬高低下操纵的程度；此外,我们将业绩按照与行业相比的高低程度进行区分,探讨高管是否会选择具有行业优势的指标为其高薪辩护。第三,本文从事前的盈余管理操纵到事后的薪酬契约操纵、薪酬粘性,系统的研究了薪酬操纵的全过程,对高管心理效应的揭示以及高管薪酬契约有效性的理解做了更立体、更深刻的解释。本文检验心理诱因的讨论思路可以为未来的研究提供方向。此外,本文探索从业绩考核角度来分析操纵的现实基础,加入国企高管薪酬的现状分析,进而使得薪酬操纵的研究前提有据可循,这有利于高管薪酬操纵的研究形成一个完整的体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, the income distribution and executive compensation of state-owned enterprises (SOE) have been hot topics of great concern in all quarters of society. From the establishment of the SASAC, although chief executives’incentive mechanism gradually standardized, the pay level grows rapidly and the gap between chief executive and general staff widens. For example, chairman of China Merchants Securities, Gong Shaolin, gets the compensation of4.83million in2011, which is60times the average wage of worker. Kong Qingping, party member of China State Construction Engineering Corporation, receives remuneration9.1million, which is180times the average wage of worker. These information mixes with public awareness of the widening income distribution gap. The country makes compensation reform as one of the most important aspects of state-owned enterprises reform, trying to formulate a reasonable compensation contract. However, the phenomenon of high salaries, the deviating of compensation and performance hit the newspapers frequently, which are contrary to the original intention of compensation contract design. These phenomena reflect chief executives using their power to rig compensation. In that way, which are the ways of chief executives’ rigging and what are the reasons behind them.Under the traditional corporate governance theory, the scholars use benefit maximization to explain chief executive’ remuneration rigging, which cannot give full explanation to the rigging diversity. Because under the traditional corporate governance, people are perfectly rational, which means they take benefit maximization as their only goal. However, seeking to maximize interests alone cannot explain the diversity of people behavior. Combining psychology with corporate governance research, behavioral corporate governance opens the black box that traditional corporate governance neglect and starts from the human psychology and behavior patterns. In the actual decision-making, behavioral corporate governance researches participants’psychological impact on the decisions-making. Under this framework, we discuss chief executives’ compensation rigging and hope to achieve the following objectives. Firstly, the dissertation wants to find different evidence of rigging, in order to provide support for the better understanding of compensation contract. Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, combining executive psychology with their behavior, the dissertation wants to find the reason behind rigging and provide evidence for explaining diversified behavior. Thirdly, through the analysis of realistic basis of the rigging, problems existing in the compensation incentive and psychoanalysis, the dissertation want to provides policy advice to the reform of state-owned enterprises pay, which are from the perspective of constraint of executive power, system design, etc.To achieve the study purpose, this dissertation is divided into eight parts. The basic structure is as follows:The first chapter:Introduction. This part describes the background of the research, at the same time elaborates the practical significance and theoretical significance of this article, and then defines the concepts involved in this paper. It defines the boundary of dissertation, and clears the study logic and main content.The second chapter:Literature Review. This part sorts out the existing literature from the following perspectives:the study under optimal contract theory, under managerial power theory, the executives’psychological research under corporate governance. This chapter reviews and summarizes results of previous studies, in order to refine reference results as much as possible and find out the further positioning of this field, to identify research focus and to expand research space.The third chapter:Background analysis of SOE chief executives’ compensation rigging. Firstly, this chapter discusses the systematic obstacles of the state-owned enterprises. Secondly, starting from the realistic foundation of compensation rigging, this chapter discusses the formation of SOE executive power and the difficulty of performance evaluation, in order to find the feasibility of manipulation. Thirdly, this chapter explores the possible problems of incentive by analyzing the status quo of SOE executive compensation, providing a realistic basis for the study of manipulation. The background analysis provides institutional bedding for the subsequent theoretical and empirical studies.The fourth chapter:Theoretical analysis of compensation rigging based on psychological incentive. This chapter first describes the theoretical basis of manipulation, providing theoretical support for our research. Then we uses the behavioral corporate governance as the theoretical basis for the psychological and behavioral research. Under this theory, we combine rigging behavior with executives’ psychology. Besides, we explain the generation of executives’different psychology and the relationship between the manipulating behavior and psychology through specific psychological theory.The fifth chapter:The first part of this dissertation’s empirical study, which tests the ex ante rigging of compensation based on comparing mentality. The study finds that chief executives use earning rigging to entrench performance compensation. When executive pay below the industry average last year, the rigging motivation will be intensified, which indicates the fair tension coming out of external comparison leads to the rigging behavior. However, even if executive pay below the industry average last year, the widening gap among executives alleviates the adverse mood and restrains the compensation rigging, which illustrate negative input is not necessarily the only way to eliminate negative emotions. By further study, we find that comparing mentality is more applicable to the chief executives of SOEs controlled by local governments, for the chief executive of SOEs controlled by the central government prefer to hidden non-monetary private benefits while the top managers controlled by local governments prefer to explicit monetary private benefits. Besides, the more competitive environment is, the stronger comparing mentality is, which easily leads to the compensation rigging. Since rigging is an extreme way to eliminate psychological stress, it brings negative impact on the firm’s future performance and future value.The sixth chapter:The second part of this dissertation’s empirical study, which tests the rigging of compensation contract based on defending mentality. Firstly use internal performance measures, we find the chief executives shift compensation weight toward better performing measures in order to defend their high compensation. The greater power executives possess, the more rigging they conduct. Because of the compensation regulation of SOEs controlled by the central government, the rigging behavior is significantly strong in local government controlling SOEs. By specific study, the higher of relative compensation is, the more intense psychological defense is and then the stronger of rigging behavior appears. Secondly use relative performance measures that compared to the industry average, we find the better relative performance is, the stronger of pay and performance sensitivity is, which suggests the improvement of compensation performance sensitivity may be a rigging way based on the defending mentality. Since rigging distorts compensation contract, it brings negative impact on the firm’s future performance and future value.The seventh chapter:The third part of this dissertation’s empirical study, which tests compensation stickiness based on self-attribution bias. Individual inclines to attributing success to their effort, failure to external environment, calling self-attribution bias, which varies with the stability and controllability of the task.Accordingly, based on the existence of compensation stickiness, we divide the performance into operating performance and non-operating performance according to the controllability, and into revised operating profits and investment returns according to risk level. We find the stickiness between executive compensation and operating performance of high controllability is low, while the the stickiness between executive compensation and non-operating performance of low controllability is high. Besides, the stickiness between executive compensation and revised operating profits of low risk is less obvious than that of investment returns. These evidences suggest the existence of self-attribution bias. We further find the unpredictability of the financial crisis lowers performance controllability, which makes a significant difference of self-attribution bias, appearing that the stickiness characteristic after the financial crisis is significantly higher than before the crisis.The eighth chapter:The summary of the full paper. In this chapter we review and summarize the main conclusions of this paper, at the same time put forward specific policy recommendations from the perspective of restraining power and policy setting. At last, points out the shortcomings of this research and the direction of follow-up study.This research makes innovations in the following aspects: Firstly, the dissertation conducts interdisciplinary research by incorporating psychological factors into the behavior of chief executives, exploring the reasons behind certain behavior from the source. This way of research contribute new perspectives and evidence for the study of executives behavior. To be specific, the dissertation explains the diversity of SOE executive rigging way by analyzing psychological factors. There is still lack of relevant empirical test for such kind of research, and then the research idea can provide inspiration for future study.Secondly, the dissertation conducts explorative study for the rigging way, which enriches the research methods and perspectives related with compensation rigging. For the rigging based on defending mentality, our deduction is different from the anticipation of the agents theory of the mainstream. We deem the increase in executives’ degree of performance compensation sensitivity is because of executive’s demand for justifying compensation. Accordingly, we firstly use internal performance measures to test whether the chief executives would shift compensation weight toward better performing measures and what the rigging behaves if relative compensation is high. Secondly we use relative performance measures that compared to the industry average, in order to find whether the executives would use relatively better performance to justify compensation.Thirdly, the dissertation incorporates multiple rigging ways into the same research framework for the first time and conducts a in-depth study by analyzing the different manifestation of rigging under different control levels and circumstances. By this way, the dissertation provides a more comprehensive and profound analysis for the revelation of mentality and the comprehension of the effectiveness of compensation contract. The way of discussion can provide direction for future research. Besides, the dissertation analyzes realistic foundation of rigging from the perspective of performance evaluation, at the same time elaborating status quo of SOE executives’ compensation, which comprise a reasonable study prerequisite and avails for a complete system of rigging study.更多还原