【作者】 黄圣；

【导师】 叶振鹏；

【作者基本信息】 财政部财政科学研究所 ， 财政学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 中国地方政府性债务的产生和管理模式有其历史的、客观的、体制的原因,它为转轨时期地方政府履行公共服务职能提供了财力基础,对地方的经济社会发展也发挥了积极作用。但是,客观而言,中国地方政府债务存在规模过大,负债形式不规范等诸多的问题,成为了中国经济发展的一个巨大隐患。在新型城镇化的大背景下,地方政府自主发债又一次成为财政学界的一个焦点问题。但是,流行的研究思路局限于从城镇化的角度、从地方资本市场的角度去研究市政债券的模式选择,忽视了从财政分权这样一个更为根本的角度去分析市政债券的必要性、市政举债的模式选择、市政债券的风险控制等问题。本文从财政分权这样一个视角去分析上述的这些问题,不仅具有政策实践意义,也具有基础理论意义。本文强调了财政分权和市政债券模式选择之间的关系,财政分权不仅影响了市政举债的目的、市政债券的类型,也影响了市政债券市场的结构、发债的方式、风险的管理等各个方面。在此基础上,笔者比较了日本、美国、法国的财政分权制度及其对地方政府举债模式的影响。在理论基础分析和国际经验比较的基础上,笔者进一步回顾了我国财政分权改革的历史和地方举债形式的发展变迁,并从财政分权的角度总结了我国地方政府举债形式变化的趋势。最后,文章分析了中国式财政分权特点对市政债券模式选择的影响,界定了中国市政债券模式的基本取向、制度框架和风险控制对策。在沿着上述逻辑进行分析的过程中,笔者得到了以下几个主要的结论：(1)财政分权是发行市政债券的基础；(2)随着我国财政分权制度的进一步推进,我国的地方政府发债将从短期的权宜之策变为长久的制度安排。(3)我国的市政债券的模式和运行制度必须与现有的财政分权制度相适应,并随着我国财政分权制度的变化而稳步推进；(4)当前,我国可以采用的市政债券模式和运行制度可以归纳为以下几个特点：首先,应当由中央政府制定全国的公债规划并审批地方公债发行；其次,我国横向的府际关系是一种竞争关系,缺少横向转移支付制度,所以联合发债不适合中国；再有,在目前的财政分权现状下,地方政府中只有省级政府有条件发行一般责任债券,其余的地方政府层级应当以发行收益类债券为主;最后,在中国的财政分权模式和政府建构制度下,只有市政项目公司可以破产,地方政府不能破产,因此一般责任债券的风险应当以事前的风险预警机制为主；另外,高度的经济分权决定了收益类债券的风险控制应当以事后的破产约束为主。更多还原

【Abstract】 Local government debts in China, accompanied by historical, objective and institutional management features, has provided financial support for public service during the economic transition period and played a vital role in economic and social development. However, issues on oversized debt level and nonstandard forms of indebtedness have become a tremendous hidden potential peril to economic development of China. Under the background of new-type urbanization, discretionary bond issuing by local government has once more become a focus issue in financial academics. Nonetheless, current research approach is confined to study on patterns selection of municipal bond only based on point of view from urbanization and local capital market, but not from fiscal decentralization, which is a more fundamental point of view to analyze the necessity, pattern selection and risk management of municipal bond. This article has studied above issues attributed to fiscal decentralization, which is a remarkable innovation in both policy practice and basic theory. This article emphasizes the correlation between fiscal decentralization and patterns selection of municipal bond. Fiscal decentralization has a positive impact not only on the purpose of municipal financing, but also on many aspects of market structures, issuance way and risk management and so on. This article has made a comparison among Japan, America and France from institutions of fiscal decentralization and influence on financing patterns of local government. On the basis of above analysis, this article reviews the reform of fiscal decentralization in China and changes in financing patterns of local government debt issuance, drawing a conclusion on the trend of changes in financing patterns of local government debt issuance. Finally, this article analyzed the influence of China’s fiscal decentralization features on municipal bond patterns selection, and has defined basic orientation, institutional framework and risk control measures of these patterns. Under the logical analysis, this article draws following main conclusions:(1) Fiscal decentralization is the foundation of municipal bond issuance.(2) Following the improvement in fiscal decentralization institution, local government bond issuance will move from a short term interim step to long term arrangement.(3) Municipal bond issuance patterns and operation mechanism are required to adapt to current fiscal decentralization institutions and steadily develops based on changes in the institutions.(4) The features of municipal bond issuance patterns and operation mechanism are as follows. At first, the central government should formulate the national municipal bond issuance plan and approve local government bond issuance. Next, there is a competitive relation, without transfer payment institution, among local governments, thus resulting in inadequacy of joint bond issuance in China. What is more, under the current condition of fiscal decentralization, only provincial governments in local governments have the rights to issue general obligation bonds, while other levels of local governments give priority to income bonds issuance. Finally, the projects of municipal administration can go bankrupt, but the government cannot, thus risk management of general obligation bonds should focus mainly on ex-ante risk warning. In addition, high degree of economic decentralization suggests that risk management of income bonds should rely mainly on ex-post bankruptcy constraint.更多还原