【作者】 马喆；

【导师】 任际；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 经济法学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 我国地方预算权的适度独立研究是在我国的具体国情下，调适中央与地方的预算权力关系，发挥中央与地方的合力，实现公共利益最大化的问题。这是我国预算管理体制研究中一个不可回避的重要问题。目前，有学者提出，我国的地方预算权应当走“自主”的道路。然而，这种提法缺乏对我国国情及其对地方预算权影响力的考查。与绝对集权和绝对分权相比，适度独立的地方预算权更有利于在当前的具体国情下实现地方公共利益最大化。地方预算权的适度独立可以从三个层面逐步深入地理解。首先，地方预算权的存在具有必要性。相对于中央集权，赋予辖区内的公民管理本地区公共事务的权利，更有利于实现地方公共利益最大化。在预算国家，公民管理本地区公共事务的权利离不开地方预算的支持，地方预算权是公民管理本地区公共事务的物质保障，因此，地方预算权具有存在的必要性。其次，地方预算权不是中央预算权的附属品，应当具有独立的法律地位。独立的地方预算权使地方政府能够发挥属地优势，根据辖区内的公民对公共产品的偏好安排预算收支，提高公共产品的供给效率和效益；独立的地方预算权提供了公民“用脚投票”的前提条件，促进了地方预算良性竞争，有利于提高社会福利水平。再次，地方预算权的独立不是割裂地方与中央的预算关系，地方预算权的独立应当是适度的。地方预算权的适度独立是指地方预算权客观存在的度与特定主体的主观需求相统一。从客观角度讲，因为绝对集权和地方割据都否定了地方预算权的存在，所以地方预算权的独立幅度应当在绝对集权和地方割据之间。从主观角度讲，只有在特定国家特定时期的具体国情下，有利于实现社会公共利益，地方预算权的独立才是适度的。在实践中，受到政治、经济、社会等国情因素的综合影响，不同国家的地方预算权必然呈现不同的独立状态。脱离各国的具体国情分析地方预算权，就无法理解地方预算权的适度独立。通过分析美国、法国、俄罗斯和印度等国的地方预算领域的权力配置，可以发现，这些国家在地方预算收入权和地方预算支出权的独立状态方面存在明显的差别。总体而言，政治体制、经济发展总体水平、区域发展平衡程度和多元化程度，以及社会民主程度是影响地方预算权独立状态的主要因素。我国是单一制的、区域发展不平衡的、社会民主制度不健全的发展中大国，鉴于我国的特殊国情，没有任何一个国家能够为我国提供地方预算权适度独立的范例。我国必须从现阶段的具体国情出发，走出一条具有中国特色的地方预算权适度独立的道路。建国后至1994年分税制改革前，我国的预算管理体制经历了多次改革，总体目标是实现各级财政自负其责，但是因为改革措施不能适应当时的具体国情，未能取得良好的效果，导致中央政府的宏观调控能力弱化，地方政府的预算主体地位虚化。1994年分税制改革也不是一次成功的预算管理体制改革。分税制改革后，在预算收入方面，地方的税收征管权和税收收入支配权被削弱，造成地方税收收入不足，不规范的地方债务导致财政风险扩大；在预算支出方面，地方预算支出责任不合理加重，地方预算支出结构失衡。造成这种局面的根本原因是缺乏地方预算权适度独立的定位。我国是单一制的发展中国家，区域发展失衡和区域多元化现象明显，社会民主制度尚不健全。这种特殊的国情决定了我国不能盲目借鉴其他国家的经验，应当立于我国国情探究地方预算权适度独立的定位。总体而言，我国地方预算权的适度独立，要在地方预算领域形成中央和地方的合力，既要发挥地方政府了解公民偏好的优势，又要发挥中央政府的宏观规范作用，最终有利于实现社会公共利益最大化。我国地方预算权的适度独立，表现在地方预算收入权适度独立和地方预算支出权适度独立两个方面。在地方预算收入权适度独立方面，我国立法已经赋予地方较低层次的税收立法权；根据我国当前的经济发展水平和区域多元性，地方税收立法权无须进一步扩大，规范地方事权、培育地方主体税种、完善转移支付制度才是充实我国地方政府财力的着力点；受到我国单一制政治体制、区域发展失衡、民主机制不健全的影响，地方税收立法权不宜进一步扩大；而且，区域发展失衡和民主机制不健全还导致地方政府不宜享有举债权。在地方预算支出权适度独立方面，首先应当明确划分中央与地方的预算支出责任。其次，为了保障基本公共产品的均等化，在我国区域发展失衡且多元化、民主机制不健全的情况下，中央政府应当享有制定基本公共产品全国最低供给标准的权力，并且履行相应的预算支出责任，使中央能够适度干预地方预算支出。针对中央政府的此项权力，预算法应当规范基本公共产品全国最低供给标准的制定原则、表现形式、参照指标、制定程序和法律效力；预算法还应当规范转移支付制度，使中央政府对基本公共产品的预算支出责任落实到位。再次，在我国区域发展失衡的情况下，为了保障基本公共产品的结构符合不同地区公民的偏好，地方政府应当享有基本公共产品供给结构的预算支出决策权；为了适应区域多元化的发展定位，对于仅涉及地方利益的地方性公共产品的供给，地方政府应当享有自主决策权。针对地方政府的此项权力，预算法应当规范公民直接参与地方预算制度，包括组织机构和服务机构法定化、参与人数法定化、参与方式和程序法定化、参与时机法定化，以及排除公民直接参与地方预算的障碍。公民直接参与地方预算制度使地方政府能够通过法定的方式和程序了解公民对公共产品的偏好，提高预算支出决策的准确性。预算法还应当明确地方政府在地方预算支出决策方面的主导地位，不使公民直接参与权利取代地方政府决策权力。为了保障地方政府运用适度独立的地方预算权服务于社会公共利益，预算法应当完善预算激励机制和预算监督制度。预算激励机制旨在促使地方政府自觉地以公共利益最大化为目标行使地方预算权。这种激励机制的着力点在于形成政府本位利益与社会公共利益的依存关系，关键点在于抑制地方政府机会主义动机和使政府本位利益潜在化。在制度安排方面，首先，预算法应当将社会公共利益作为衡量地方政府预算权实施效果（预算绩效）的法定标准。其次，贯彻绩效预算制度，建立地方预算绩效与预算资金分配之间的法定联系。再次，预算法应当保障地方政府的预算绩效可以进行量化考查。具体的作法是围绕社会公共利益标准，规定地方预算绩效的评价原则；根据评价原则，规定地方预算绩效指标体系；围绕绩效指标体系，要求预算部门和预算单位制定预算绩效目标，并且要求绩效目标具有量化、形象的特点，为考查地方预算绩效提供依据，进而为分配预算资金提供依据。除激励机制以外，预算法还应当完善预算监督制度，包括赋予人大对预算草案的减额修正权，建立立法型预算审计制度等。我国地方预算权的适度独立，赋予中央对基本公共产品全国最低供给标准的直接干预权，同时赋予地方对基本公共产品供给结构和地方性公共产品供给结构及规模的决策权。因为我国地方预算权的适度独立，是立足我国当前具体国情的、具有中国特色和创新性的地方预算权定位，所以少有可资借鉴的文献资料。可以这样认为，我国地方预算权的适度独立，探索了研究我国地方预算权的合理定位的新路径，希望具有抛砖引玉的作用。另外，因为地方预算权适度独立的定位应当随着具体国情的变化而调整，所以应当不断地接受实践检验，并且在实践中不断地深化。更多还原

【Abstract】 The moderate independence of local budget power is the cooperation between thecentral government and local governments in the field of local budget in China, in orderto maximize the public interests. It is an inevitable problem in budget managementsystem. At present, the view of local budget autonomy is popular. But, from the point ofthat view, the research on influences of conditions in China on the local budget power isignored. Compared with the absolute centralization and absolute decentralization, themoderate independence of local budget power is more advantageous to maximize thepublic interests.The moderate independence of local budget power can be explained from thefollowing three respects step by step. First, the local budget power should exist. In orderto maximize the public interests in a certain territorial unit, citizens in the territorial unitshould have the right to manage local public affairs, for which the local budget powerprovides material guarantee. Second, the local budget power should be legallyindependent. The independent local budget power is the prerequisite of localgovernments’ territorial advantage and citizens’“voting with feet” in the field ofsupplying public goods. Third, the independence of local budget power should bemoderate, but not be absolute. The moderate state is the unity of subjective demand andobjective degree. From the objective point of view, the independent degree of localbudget power is in the great range from absolute centralization to local separatism. Fromthe subjective point of view, the moderate independence of local budget power shouldserve to the public interests in a specific country under specific conditions.In practice, under the influence of politics, economy and society, the states ofindependence of local budget power in different countries are different. Divorced fromspecific conditions in a specific country, the moderate independence of local budgetpower can not be analyzed. USA, France, Russia and India do not share the same state ofindependence of local budget power. Generally speaking, the political system, the levelof economic development, the degree of equilibrium and diversification between regions,and the social democracy are the main influencing factors to local budget system. Chinais a developing country with the unitary political system, the imbalance and diversification between regions, and the inadequate democratic system. There is nosample for us to deal with the relationship between local governments and the centralgovernment in the field of budget. Thus, the moderate independence of local budgetpower in China is to be explored under the specific conditions.Before the tax sharing system reform in1994, good results were not achieved fromthe several reforms of budget system. The tax sharing system reform in1994is notprofound. After the reform, in the respect of budget income, the tax collective power oflocal governments is weakened, so the number of local tax income declines apparently.In the respect of budget expenditure, the local budget expenditure responsibilities areincreased apparently, and the expenditure structure is imbalance. China is a developingcountry with the unitary political system, the imbalance and diversification betweenregions, and the inadequate democratic system, which requires the moderateindependence of local budget power with Chinese characteristics. Briefly speaking, themoderate independence of local budget power should serve to the public interests, so itrequires the cooperation between the central government and local governments.The moderate independence of local budget power should be analyzed in therespects of the local budget revenue and the local budget expenditure.In the part of local budget revenue power, the local legislative authority of localtaxation already exists on the lower level. Under the specific conditions in China, thisauthority should not be improved, and is not necessary to improve. Further more, thepower of debt should not be authorized to local governments. To enrich local financialresources, the focus should be put on cultivation of local mail tax categories andimprovement of payment transfer system.In the part of local budget expenditure power, first, the powers of central and localgovernments must be divided moderately. Second, in order to supply the primary publicgoods equally, the central government should have the power to set the nationalminimum standard of primary public goods and performance budget expenditureresponsibility. Such a power of the central government should be regulated in the budgetlaw, including principles, forms, references, and procedures of setting the nationalminimum standard of primary public goods. Besides, the payment transfer system shouldbe improved, in order to implement the central government’s budget expenditure responsibility to supply primary public goods. Third, in order to satisfy the differentrequirements of different regions, the power to decide the structure of primary publicgoods should be authorized to local governments, and in order to supply local publicgoods which only relate to the interests of citizens in a certain territorial unit, the powerto decide the structure of local public goods should also be authorized to localgovernments. To regulate the decision-making power of local governments,specifications for citizens to participate directly in local budget affairs should be clarifiedin the budget law, including organizers and service agencies, methods, procedures,timing, and removing obstacles to direct participation. The dominant position of localgovernments in the field of local budget expenditure should also be clarified to preventthe citizens’ participation right to replace the local governments’ decision-making power.In order to guarantee local governments to use the moderately independent local budgetpower serving to public interests, the incentive system and the supervision system in thebudget law should be further improved. The incentive system aims at promoting localgovernments to maximize public interests consciously by budget. The focus should beput on forming the interdependence of governments’ interests and public interests. Thekey points should be inhibiting local governments’ opportunism motivation and makinggovernments’ interests uncertain. In terms of legal institution, the budget law should beimproved in the following respects. First, public interests are the statutory standard tomeasure the effect of local budget power. Second, there must be a statutory relationshipbetween local budget performance and budget allocation. Third, public interests shouldbe quantitatively assessed. Concretely speaking, evaluation principles and the evaluationindex system of local budget performance should be regulated in accordance with publicinterests. At the same time, budget departments and budget units must externalize theindex system into a series of concrete, visible, and quantitative targets, to provide thebasis for the study of local budget performance and for budget allocation. Besides, thesupervision system should be improved in the respects of the power of the people’sCongress to reduce budget expenditures and the audit system of legislative model.The moderate independence of local budget power in China is the combination of theintervention power of the central government and the decision-making power of localgovernments in the field of local budget. The moderate independence of local budget power in China is an innovative view with Chinese characteristics, which should beexamined in practice step by step. Thus, the further research on it should be continuous inpractice.更多还原