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中国式财政分权对城乡收入差距的影响研究

Study on the Impact of the Chinese-style Fiscal Decentralization on the Income Gap between Urban and Rural Residents

【作者】 马万里

【导师】 李齐云;

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 , 财政学, 2014, 博士

【副题名】以政府教育支出为例

【摘要】 中国的城乡收入差距世界最高,由于中国大量的贫困人口集中在农村地区,因此研究城乡收入差距与经济政策之间的关系,对缩小城乡收入差距和缓解中国的贫困问题具有重大的意义。党的十八大报告提出到2020年要实现城乡居民人均收入翻一番的目标,从而引发社会各界对收入分配问题的讨论,也使我国贫富差距这个当前的焦点问题更受关注。要实现城乡居民收入倍增的目标必须找到引致居民收入下降的原因才能对症下药。对此,学术界存在以下几种解释。第一种是收入差距的人力资本说,该观点认为政府教育、医疗等人力资本支出不足和不平等导致城乡收入差距扩大,政府应加大人力资本支出规模并实现结构均衡。第二种是收入差距的产权说,认为产权制度的不完善是引起我国收入分配不公平和贫富差距的重要根源,完善农村土地产权制度、国有资本经营收益分配制度与矿产资源产权制度能从制度上解决收入分配不公平问题。第三种是收入差距的税收说,该种观点认为增值税、营业税和消费税等间接税负担在不同收入群体之间的分配是不同的,从而导致中低收入群体的税收负担过重,造成收入差距的进一步扩大。第四种是收入差距的社会保障说,认为社会保障制度的不完善不健全导致了收入分配差距。上述文献为中国现存的城乡收入差距问题提供了丰富的经验证据,并加深了我们对该问题的认识,为解决城乡收入差距过大的问题提供了更宽的思路与更开阔的视野。但是,税制改革的长期性与缩小收入差距的现实迫切性使我们不能完全指望通过改变税收制度来实现收入分配的合理化,更进一步,如果将中国的收入分配问题纳入整个中国的经济增长过程中的话,那么,城乡收入差距的形成与地方政府就有着密切的联系,上述各种观点会很好地融入一个分析框架内。换言之,中国的城乡收入差距问题必须纳入财政分权的框架内进行深度透视。贾康(2010)、李稻葵(2011)认为,现行财政分权体制是引致我国收入分配问题的根源所在,但遗憾的是两位学者并没有进一步分析财政分权对收入分配的影响机理与传导机制。本文逻辑结构:文章认为随着中国经济的快速发展和收入水平的不断提高,全面认识和把握城乡收入差距问题尤为重要。因此,本文在充分认识和分析中国城乡收入差距现状的基础上,基于中国式财政分权的背景,重点围绕理论研究和实证检验两个方面展开相关研究。首先,结合当前中国式财政分权的基本事实,勾勒和总结中国式财政分权下地方政府的激励机制,并分析地方政府在财政体制不完善、监督制约机制缺位情况下的行为选择与公共品供给偏好及其对城乡收入差距的影响,并基于上述分析框架构建中国式财政分权对城乡收入差距的影响机理与传导机制。其次,对当前我国城乡居民收入主要来源结构和城乡收入差距形成的原因进行系统的统计分解,并基于《第六次全国人口普查》有关数据检验受教育程度差异是导致城乡工资性收入及城乡收入差距最重要的因素。之后,选取中国式财政分权的有关指标作为解释变量来检验教育支出偏向城市对城乡收入差距的影响。既是对理论预设的实证支持,亦为后文的政策建议提供实证依据。本文研究结论:1.工资性收入差异是城乡收入差距最主要影响因素对于城镇居民而言,工资性收入是其收入的主要来源,2000年-2011年间,工资性收入占城镇居民人均可支配收入的平均比重为68.4%;而对于农村居民而言,工资性收入是农村居民纯收入的第二大收入来源,其占农村居民人均收入的比重逐年增加,由2000年的31.2%上升至2011年的46.2%,与家庭经营收入基本持平。2000-2011年12年间工资性收入对城乡收入差距基尼系数的贡献度平均为85.44%。2.教育人力资本差异是城乡工资性收入差距的主要原因城乡受教育程度的巨大差异导致城乡居民巨大的就业和工资差别。根据第六次全国人口普查数据检验了因受教育程度的差异而造成的城乡就业和工资水平的差距。从城乡就业情况来看,农村就业人员主要从事低学历要求的农林牧副渔行业。而城镇就业人员主要从事学历要求较高的行业,且随着学历层次的提高,城镇就业人员所占比重也逐步增加。从行业工资总额来看,除农林牧副渔行业之外,城镇就业人员工资总额均高于农村就业人员。3.中国式财政分权是城乡教育人力资本差异的体制原因中国式财政分权及其异化的增长型激励机制是造成地方政府城市偏向制度的重要原因。在缺少有效的监督制约机制的情况下,这种增长型激励机制导致地方政府对经济增长的过度偏爱,而忽视收入分配差距问题的解决。特别是中央政府的政治激励导致地方政府横向和纵向博弈竞争,竞争的结果是地方政府竞相追逐经济增长,由于城市是财富、资本、要素等的集中地,加之完善的基础设施使城市具有天然的经济发展优势,致使地方政府实施城市偏向型的政策,教育支出过度偏向城市而忽视农村,导致农村人力资本和经济发展水平远远落后于城市,使城乡收入差距不断扩大。本文创新之处:1.研究视角的新颖性关于城乡收入差距问题的研究早已有之,而研究财政分权对城乡收入差距的影响是一个较新的视角。由于研究起步较晚,加之理论界对财政分权影响城乡收入差距的研究大多集中于实证计量检验方面,而对于财政分权影响城乡收入分配的理论传导机制的研究却并不多见。因此,本文重点建立了财政分权对城乡收入差距影响的理论基础,包括财政分权影响城乡收入分配的分析框架和数理模型,并特别考察了地方政府教育支出偏向城市对城乡收入差距的影响。2.系统构建中国式财政分权下地方政府的激励机制以钱颖一、温格斯特(Weingast)等人为代表注重研究中国式财政分权下财政激励对地方政府行为和中国经济增长的影响,而已Blanchard和Schleifer (2000)、Li and Zhou (2005)、周黎安(2007)为代表着重研究政治晋升激励对地方政府行为和中国经济增长的影响。但如何晓星(2005)所指出,对于那些自认缺少与其他地区竞争条件而自愿放弃政治晋升竞争的地方官员而言,“晋升锦标赛”理论则缺少解释力,但这些官员依然在努力促进辖区经济增长,显然,政治晋升的解释力并不全面。因此,本文在讨论中国式财政分权下地方官员激励机制时,扩展了政治激励的内涵,并借鉴Schleifer和Vishny(1993)等人有关财政分权增加地方官员腐败的理论,构建了包含财政激励、政治激励和个人收益激励在内的增长型激励机制框架。3.以博弈论为基础分析地方政府的行为选择在中国式财政分权“增长型激励机制”下,地方政府到底会有什么样的行为选择?这些行为对政府公共品供给和城乡收入差距产生了哪些影响?为回答上述问题,本文借鉴博弈论和标尺竞争(yardstick competition)的有关思想,基于纵向和横向博弈视角建立了地方政府的行为选择分析模型,并指出增长型激励机制导致地方政府博弈竞争加剧、公共品供给城市偏向和城乡收入差距的扩大。4.建立了中国式财政分权对城乡收入差距的影响机理与传导机制文章构建了中国式财政分权对城乡收入差距的影响机理与传导机制,包括分析框架与理论模型两部分。分析框架部分具体分析中国式财政分权下地方官员的增长型激励机制及地方官员的行为选择对城乡收入差距的影响。而数理模型部分,借鉴劳动经济学关于人力资本与收入分配的关系,以内生经济增长模型为基础,建立了中国式财政分权影响城乡收入差距的基本模型,并以政府教育支出为例,推演地方政府教育支出偏向城市对城乡收入差距的影响。

【Abstract】 China’s urban-rural income gap is highest in the world,due to the large number of China’s poor population is concentrated in rural areas,urban-rural income gap and study the relationship between economic policy,to narrow the income gap and to alleviate poverty in China is of great significance.The party’s18th report to the2020per capita income of urban and rural residents to achieve the goal of doubling, causing the community to discuss issues of income distribution, and also the gap draws more attention.To achieve the goal of doubling the urban and rural residents’ income must find the causes of the decline of income in order to remedy.In this regard,there are various academic explanations, but there still are deficiencies.There has been the idea that current financial system is the root cause of China’s income distribution,unfortunately,no further analysis of the financial impact of decentralization on income distribution and lack in the impact and transmission mechanism.Based on the full understanding and analysis of China’s urban-rural income gap on the basis of the status quo,based on the background of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization, the focus on theoretical and empirical research launched two aspects.Firstly,sum up incentives of local government’s under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization. And analyze the behavior of local governments to select and supply of public goods preferences and their impact on urban-rural income gap,and build the framework of the financial impact of decentralization on income distribution and lack in the impact and transmission mechanism.Then,put forward the statistical decomposition on causes of the current main source of income of urban-rural income gap,and select Chinese-style fiscal decentralization indicators as explanatory variables to test the impact of urban bias education spending on urban-rural income gap.The study conclusions are as follows:Firstly,Wage income is the primary factor of urban-rural income gap.For urban residents, the wage income is the main source of their income.During2000-2011,wage income accounted for68.4%per capita disposable income of urban residents on average.For rural residents, the wage income is second source of family income.During2000-2011,wage income increased from31.2%to46.2%.Wage income differences contributed to urban-rural income Gini coefficient by85.44%on average.Secondly,human capital is the main reason for differences in educational wage income gap between urban and rural areas.The huge difference in educational attainment lead to huge differences between urban and rural residents in employment and wages.Judging from the urban and rural employment,rural employment is mainly engaged in low academic requirements industry.However,urban areas are mainly engaged in employment in higher education requirements industry,and as education levels increase,the proportion of urban employment has gradually increased.In addition,The total wages in urban areas are higher than rural areas.Finally,Chinese-style fiscal decentralization is the institutional reasons for differences in education human capital between urban and rural areas.As the city is the concentration place of wealth,capital,and other productive elements and sound infrastructure make the city’s economic development has a natural advantage,which drove local governments to implement urban-biased policies,caused rural human capital and the level of economic development fall behind the city,so that the income gap between urban and rural areas expanded.The innovations of this dissertation are as follows:Firstly,novel research perspective.Research on the impact of fiscal decentralization for rural income distribution are rare,so we built the framework of the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on income distribution and constructed the impact and transmission mechanism.Secondly,building incentive mechanism for local governments under Chinese-style fiscal decentralization.This mechanism includes fiscal incentives, political motivation and personal income incentives,and we name it as growth-oriented incentive uniformly. Thirdly,analyzing the behavior choices for local governments based on game theory.In this dissertation,we built a model which shows the local governments’ vertical and horizontal game competition by absorbing ideas from game theory and yardstick competition,and pointed out that growth-oriented incentive mechanism increased game competition in the local government,city-biased supply of public goods and widen the urban-rural income gap.Fourthly,built the impact and transmission mechanism that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization impact on urban-rural income gap.We analyzed the impact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on local officials and city-rural income distribution.Then, by learning about the relationship between human capital and income distribution,we built a basic model that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization impact on the urban-rural income distribution. Finally,by taking government education spending for instance,we analyzed the effect that city-biased education pending impact on urban-rural income distribution.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 山东大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2014年 10期
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