【作者】 陈太明；

【导师】 傅永军；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 外国哲学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 本研究论文旨在探析法兰克福学派重要代表人物尤尔根·哈贝马斯的商谈伦理学之道德论证逻辑,阐释其在现代道德危机语境下突破危机困局所采用的论证策略在何种意义上具有合理性,又在何种意义上存在尚需进一步澄清之处。商谈伦理学自诞生之日起,研究者对其的讨论所形成的一个基本共识是,商谈伦理学是现代多元主义价值理念之下依然追求道德普遍性与知识性的一种乌托邦理论。对于哈贝马斯商谈伦理学在何种意义具有乌托邦倾向,研究者大都模糊断论,明察不足。这种研究取向直接导致大部分研究者没能注意到哈贝马斯商谈伦理学真正关心的问题,即商谈伦理学如何能够证成自己的核心诉求。商谈伦理学自其构建伊始便明确地赋予自身以揭明日常生活中基本道德实践之论证任务(至于商谈伦理学诉求什么则是证成之后自然而然显示出来的一种学术关怀,它在商谈伦理学中并不占据核心和根本的位置),并以此诠证潜藏在我们日常生活中时刻发挥作用的那些基本道德直觉,从而最终达至颂扬启蒙精神、超克现代道德危机的基本目标。在这一问题意识规制下,哈贝马斯采用了语言学转向论域下的元伦理学进路,籍由这种路径并结合欧陆哲学的论证方式来揭示道德规范推理过程之基本逻辑结构。因此,对商谈伦理学的研究不能大而化之地将其贬损为没有现实可能性的理想性构思,而应该在还原其综合性视野诸论据前提下批判分析商谈伦理学的核心问题意识及其论证逻辑,并进而理解商谈伦理学理想性诉求的题中之义以通达哈贝马斯道德哲学的核心意涵。本研究论文的基本观点是,商谈伦理学是一种以阐明规范命题之“证立”过程为核心,以道德的普遍性与知识性为诉求,并以此应对启蒙之后出现的道德危机为基本问题意识的伦理学理论建构。这种建构策略有其纵向的承继因素与横向的批判因素,因而我们不能简单地从谈论商谈伦理学建基于何种基础、引用了哪些论据、得出了什么样的结论此种流行模式中对之加以探讨,而必须赋予其一个一以贯之的核心并在对诸多道德论证策略的分析与批判中透显其论证合理性。这种论证合理性本身而不是其诉求才是我们谈论商谈伦理学乌托邦理念之具体所指。本研究所认为的“一以贯之的核心”即对“道德证立”概念蕴含的推理模式之逻辑结构形式之剖析,其简单地体现在对如下基本道德命题进行论证所暗含的逻辑结构之形式分析中：待证立命题：“A的做法是错误的”(C)。证成这一规范性命题需要援引特定理由并分为两个步骤,分别是：步骤一：其理由是“A撒了谎”(D)；这一理由必须借助相应的规则,步骤二：“撒谎是错误的”(W)。基于这个基本观点,本研究的整体结构可以划分为四个论题相对独立的部分：第一章和第二章构成了本研究的第一部分。主要是在一种危机与证立的辩证关系中设定商谈伦理学面对并想要解决的基本问题。现代道德是一种继承了启蒙的断裂意识,并以启蒙所阐扬的自我抉择、自我发展与自我完善等以人类自主性诉求为核心的启蒙精神来进行自我论证的道德。在这种自我意识下,现代道德裂变出危机倾向,该危机我们可以通过分析康德的《回答这个问题——什么是启蒙?》对启蒙的阐释将之分离出两种基本危机形态：一种是证立危机,一种是现实危机。康德为人类进入启蒙状态规定的基本方法是自由地公开运用自己的理性,而与之相对的则是理性的私人运用。两种理性运用方式,被现代道德哲学家及普通大众进行了错误理解,自由的公开运用方式被理解为个体性的自由,非自由的私人运用方式则被理解为工具目的理性,并因此分别产生了证立危机与现实危机。商谈伦理学的证立核心,正是面对这样的危机背景而给出的论证策略,当然其所指向的主要是证立危机这个危机侧度。哈贝马斯的商谈伦理学基于对现实危机的反思转向对“道德证立”的逻辑分析,依据这种分析,现代道德要想克服其所陷入的危机必须首先从证立角度阐明道德规范的推理结构。这种推理基于后形而上学的语言性、程序性、以及可错性的认知,从而认定“道德证立”过程必须从元伦理的角度阐明其逻辑推理结构,这个结构也就是我们所说的“一以贯之的核心”中W、D、C之间的逻辑推衍关系。第三章到第五章构成了第二部分。主要是阐明“道德证立”的逻辑结构,并对之做一种重构性建构工作。这一部分主要而向三个逐次推进的基本问题：规则证立、内部证立与外部证立。规则证立主要从语言在日常应用中所暗含的基本规则出发来证成一种意向性的规则意识。这样,“道德证立”中规则W就会获得某种蕴含于语言应用中的必然性。在此证立过程中,通过对交往行动的语言学分析我们首先将交往行动看作是以意义理解为取向并遵守一定规则的社会交往模式,这一模式的理想化形态就是人类生活世界中的道德行动。同时,该道德行动指向了语言沟通过程中必然指向的有效性要求,这些有效性要求决定了现代道德的形式取向及其所要证成的正确性目标。就内部证立而言,其所要面向的问题是本研究最为核心的部分,通过内部证立这个步骤,“道德证立”的逻辑结构得到重构,即我们并不是简单地就可以籍由规则W而从D推论出C,它还需要接受普遍化原则(U)的调控与过滤,只有如此W才能获得正当性。U原则在“道德证立”推理逻辑中发挥的桥接作用成为一个重要问题,我们将表明其桥接的正是休谟难题中难以得到沟通的“是”与“应当”。最后,就外部证立而言,U原则虽然通过普遍语用学的交往规则分析,以及推理逻辑结构的重新建构工作已经获得了基于语言与逻辑的证立,但是就道德的社会属性而言,其面向的仍然还是社会化的行动者在社会世界中的人际关系。因此之故,我们必须从社会角度出发为其寻求合理性基础,这一点哈贝马斯借助的是社会心理学与认知发展心理学的相关理论,由此商谈伦理学的U原则获得了外在于逻辑内部的外部合理性。以上的三个步骤构成了一个逻辑圆满的关于“道德证立”逻辑结构的论证程序。第六章和第七章构成了第二部分。主要是说明证立与应用之间存在着一种张力关系。这种张力关系的表现是,证立性商谈说明的是道德规范如何具有逻辑上的有效性,它抽象掉了一切经验性以及语境性因素,回答的是“我应该做什么?这样一个道德知识问题。但是,道德作为行动系统的语境性特征证立性商谈却并未给于解答,我们用时需要回答“我应该做出什么样的行动?”。当行动者的道德行动被限定在一定的语境中时,其所要做的是认知到该语境中哪一个规范适用于该语境,也即是说哪一个规范具有适当性,而不是去回答哪一个规范具有普遍性。哈贝马斯接受了这种区分,但却未意识到其理论如何界定证立与应用之间的关系。通过分析我们可以认读出其坚持的是证立在逻辑上优先于应用,应用在本质上依然还是一种证立而不是平行关系。这就出现了一个进一步的问题,即应用向度的引入并未解决“我应该做出什么样的行动?”这个问题,因为即使通过应用性商谈确立了特定语境下的特定道德规范适用于该语境,但仍然不能保证行动者必然会按照这个规范去行动,即道德知识与道德行动之间是存在分离的。为了弥合证立与应用之间的张力关系,必须借助于建制化的现代法律之强制性力量,以此为道德作为知识系统的软弱性提供外部保障。法律之所以可以充任这个角色,是因为现代法律与现代道德具有一种基于商谈逻辑的同源互补关系。现代法律具有道德所不具有的可操作化、具体化以及强制性等特征,通过这些特征现代法律一方面保证由知识转换为行动的基于外在惩罚的推动力,一方面又为道德所无力涉及的领域提供了补充和援助。余论的内容构成了本研究的第四部分。主要是在批判性视域下对哈贝马斯的“道德证立”逻辑提出批评性意见,并由此质疑商谈伦理学将道德行动还原为论证活动之合理性。商谈伦理学的“道德证立”有一个基本论点,即事实性命题的真实性与规范性命题的正确性具有一种相似的逻辑结构。哈贝马斯论证这一结构是从两个命题处在相同的谓项形式出发判定其具有相似性的,但是“道德证立”却并未在这一简单命题视域下进行逻辑讨论,它面向的是由不同命题所组成的推理逻辑。如此便存在一个问题,即命题内部的主谓逻辑关系无法合法过渡到推理逻辑结构中。当我们为其设定特定的情境以研判道德命题的推理结构时,这种非对称性会变得更为明显。因为事实性命题可以小受情境因素限制,但规范性命题却必须受其限制,可以说情境性因素构成了规范命题的基本前件,这样事实性命题与规范性命题便不再具有相似性程序。另外,“道德证立”的逻辑图式并不包含D原则,而哈贝马斯马斯却将D原则勘定为一个高于U原则的根本原则。从其语用学作为整个理论之基础这个视角分析,D原则应该更接近于勾划一个交往的理想性商谈前提,因而应该具有普遍性并在逻辑上适用于所有人。但是从哈贝马斯对其内容的表述来看,D原则却是一个可以用条件句加以改造的原则,并且该原则并不是具体道德规范的充分必要条件,而只是一个充分条件。最后,哈贝马斯马斯从“道德证立”的元层而理解现代道德也造成了一个重要后果,即道德被还原为基于语言的语用论证过程,因为道德就其作用而言发挥的是调节人与人之间基本冲突关系之作用,而不是一个简单的理性论证过程。日常语言交往使用中潜含的有效性要求与道德的行动力之间并不能直接等同,一个长于用理性论证来获得相互间共识的人并不必然是一个在道德决断和道德践行上总是正确的人,反之亦是如此。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper is intended to analyze the relevant ideas about discourse ethics proposed by Jurgen Habermas, an important representative figure of Frankfurt School, and to further expound under what circumstances its argument strategy which is used to break through crisis and dilemma in the context of modern moral crisis exists rationality, as well as under what circumstances it still needs further clarification. Since the birth of discourse ethics, the discussion conducted by various researchers has already formed a basic consensus that discourse ethics is a utopian theory adhering to moral universality and intellectual in the modern pluralism value. However, it is not clear to tell under what circumstances Habermas believes his discourse ethics has a tendency to utopia. When it is dismissed as a utopian dream by the researchers unanimously, few people noticed such a more fundamental problem, namely, how can discourse ethics justify its core appeal, rather than what is its appeal. Since the beginning of its creation, discourse ethics has clearly endowed itself with argument task, which reveals the basic moral practice in daily life, then explained and justified the basic moral intuition which plays a role constantly in our daily life. And eventually achieve the basic goal of extolling the enlightenment spirit and conquering modern moral crisis. Under this issue of consciousness regulation, Habermas uses linguistics turning to the domain of meta-ethics approach, which combined with the way of continental philosophy to reveal the basic logical structure of ethical reasoning process. Therefore, the study of discourse ethics cannot be regarded as Utopia without realistic possibility. Instead, the core of the argument which is concealed should be recognized on the premise of restoring its comprehensive view of various arguments, in order to understand the meaning of its utopian orientation and the core implication of discourse ethics.The basic point of this research paper is that discourse ethics is a kind of ethics theoretical construction, setting the justification process of clarifying normative proposition as the core, moral universality and intellectual as appeals, and thus responding the moral crisis emerged after enlightenment as basic issue of consciousness. That construction strategy has longitudinal inherited factors and transverse critical factors, so we cannot simply talk about discourse ethics in the popular mode, such as what basis is on account of, what argument is cited, and what conclusions are drawn. Instead, we should endow it with a consistent core and reveal argument rationality from analysis and criticism of many moral argument strategies. This argument rationality itself rather than its appeal is the specific subject of discourse ethics utopia’s concept we are talking about.In the research, the author proposes "the core of consistent", which means the logical structure analysis of inferential model that "moral justification" concept contains. It simply reflects in the following implied logical structure of form analysis, and the basic moral propositions for argument are shown below.To be justified proposition:"A’s practice is wrong"(C).Justifying this normative propositions needs to be quoted by a specific reason and divided into two steps, namely:Step1:the reason is "A lied"(D);The reason must follow the corresponding rules.Step2:"lying is wrong"(W).Based on the basic idea, the overall structure of this study can be divided into four themes, which are relatively independent parts:The first part of the research consists of Chapter1and Chapter2, which mainly sets the basic problems that discourse ethics has to face and wants to solve in a dialectical relationship with crisis and justification. Modern morality is an inherited enlightenment discontinued consciousness, and a self-argument moral, with self-choice, self-development and self-improvement which espoused by enlightenment and other human autonomy appeals as the core spirit of enlightenment. With this self-consciousness, the modern moral disintegrates crisis tendency. By analysis of the interpretation of the enlightenment from Kant’s essay "Answering the Question:What is Enlightenment?", we can separate the crisis into two basic forms:justificatory crisis and factual crisis. The basic method of being a state of enlightenment set by Kant is to freely public use one’s own reason, however, in contrast is rational private use. Two ways of rational use are misunderstood by modern moral philosophers and the general public. Freely public use is seen as individual freedom, and non-freely private use is regarded as tool purpose reason, which results in justificatory crisis and factual crisis respectively. Faced with such crisis background, justification core of discourse ethics gives the argument strategy, which, of course, mainly refers to justificatory crisis. Habermas’ discourse ethics based on the reflection of reality crisis turns to "moral justification" logic analysis. According to this analysis, if the modern ethics wants to overcome its crisis, it must first expound inference structure of ethics from justification perspective. This reasoning bases on metaphysics of linguistic, procedural, as well as fallible cognition. Therefore, the logical inference structure has to be expounded from meta-ethics perspective, if you want to identify the process of "moral justification". The structure is the logical inferring relationships among W, D. and C in "the core of consistent" we are talking about.The second part of the research consists of Chapter3, Chapter4and Chapter5, which mainly expounds logical structure of "moral justification", and does reconstruction work towards it. This part is mainly for three successive advance basic issues:rule justification, internal justification and external justification. Rule justification is to justify the intentional rules of consciousness, which mainly from language implied basic rules in daily application. Thus, Rule W from the "moral justification" will get some inevitability which contained in language application. In the process of the justification, through a linguistic analysis of communicative action, first, we regard the communicative action as meaning-oriented and rule-following social communication model, and the idealized form of this model is moral action in the world of human life. In the meanwhile, the moral action refers to the validity requirement which necessarily refers to in the process of verbal communication, thus, the validity requirement determines the form and orientation of the modern moral, as well as its validity target to justify. In terms of internal justification, the problems it has to face are the core part of this study. Through the step of internal justification, the logic structure of "moral justification" has been reconstructed, that is, we cannot easily get C inferred from D, by using Rule W, because it also needs to accept regulation and filtration of the principle of universality (U). Only in this way can W get justification. The bridging role which played by Principle U in "moral justification" reasoning logic has become an important issue, and we will show that the bridging is "Be" and "ought to Be" of Hume’s problem which is hard to communicate. Finally, in terms of external justification, although Principle U has obtained the justification based on language and logic, by interaction rules analysis of universal pragmatics and reconstruction of reasoning logical structure, in terms of moral social attribute, its objects are still human relations of social actors in the social world. Therefore, we must seek rationality basis from the social perspective, which Habermas using some related theories of social psychology and cognitive development psychology, thus, the Principle U of discourse ethics gains outside internal logic external rationality. The above three steps constitute a successful logic of argumentation procedures which are about "moral justification" logical structure.The third part of the research consists of Chapter6and Chapter7, which mainly explains there is the tension relationship between justification and application. The expression of this tension relationship is that justificatory discourse expounds how dose ethics have validity logically, which abstracts away all the empirical and contextual factors, answering such a moral knowledge issue as "what should I do". However, justificatory discourse doesn’t explain morality, a contextual characteristic in action system, in the meanwhile, we need to answer "What action should I make" as well. When actors’moral action is limited to a certain situation, they have to recognize which specification is applicable to the context, that’s to say, which specification is appropriate, not to answer which specification is universal. Habermas accepts this distinction, but he fails to realize how to use the theory to define the relationship between justification and application. Through analysis we can recognize that, in terms of logic, justification which he insists is superior to application. In essence, it is still a kind of justification rather than parallel relation, which results in a further issue, namely, the introduction of the application dimension does not resolve the issue "What action should I make", because even if setting specific ethics which is appropriate for the specific context through applicable discourse, we still cannot guarantee the actors are bound to act in accordance with the specification, which means there is existence of separation between the moral knowledge and moral action. In order to bridge the tension relationship between justification and application, we must use the coercive power of the modern legal institution to provide external protection for moral weakness of knowledge systems. The reason why law can play this role is modern law and modern ethics is a kind of homologous complementary relation based on discourse logic. Modern law has characteristics of operational, concrete and mandatory which moral doesn’t have. Through these characteristics, on one hand, modern law ensures the impetus of transformation from knowledge to action based on extrinsic punishments, on the other hand, it provides complementary and assistance for areas which moral cannot involveThe fourth part of the research is the Conclusion, which mainly proposes criticism about Habermas’s "moral justification" logic in the sight of the critical, and questions reasonableness of argument activities restored from moral actions by discourse ethics. As for discourse ethics "moral justification", there is a basic argument that authenticity of factual proposition and validity of normative propositions own a similar logical structure. Habermas demonstrates the structure by determining the similarities from two propositions with the same predicates form. However, the "moral justification" is not a logical discussion at the sight of this simple proposition. Instead, it oriented reasoning logic composed by different propositions. Then there is another issue, namely, the internal subject-predicate logical relation of the proposition cannot be legally transited to reasoning logic structure. When we set a specific situation to study the reasoning structure of moral proposition, this kind of asymmetry will become more obvious, because the factual propositions can not be limited by situational factors, on the contrary, normative propositions have to be limited by them. Therefore, there is no similar procedure between factual propositions and normative propositions. In addition, the logical schema of "moral justification" does not contain Principle D, while, Habermas regards Principle D as a fundamental principle, which is superior to Principle U. From the perspective of pragmatics as the whole theoretical basis, Principle D should be closer to outline the premise of communicative idealism discourse, which should be universal and logically applied to all the people. But in terms of Habermas’ expression of the content, principle D is a principle which can be modified by conditional clauses, and the principle is not a necessary and sufficient condition for specific ethics, but only a sufficient condition. Finally, a significant consequence is caused by Habermas’ understanding of modern ethics from "moral justification" meta-level perspective, that is, ethics is restored to be a pragmatic argument process based on language. In terms of its role, ethics adjusts the basic conflicts among people. Therefore, it is not a simple rational argument process. Validity requirements contained in the use of daily language communication can’t be directly equaled with moral actions. The person who is good at using rational argument to get a consensus among people is not necessarily a moral person, and vice versa.更多还原