【作者】 李瑾；

【导师】 高申春；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 科学技术哲学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 在心理学作为自然科学而发展的一百多年的历史中，其流派更迭频繁而新理论层出不穷，各流派对心理学的研究方法甚至研究对象都有不同的看法，而将心理学连结为一个整体的是其研究者所持有的一个共同的信念，即心理学是一门自然科学。但是，如果我们试图对心理学的这一科学观念进行进一步的考察，就会发现在作为心理学之主流形式的科学心理学内部，不曾有人对这一科学观念进行过系统而严肃的论证，这也就意味着，作为一门自然科学的心理学并非建立在一个具有充分合理性的基础之上。然而，由于科学主义心理学对自然科学地位的盲目追求，这一问题从未进入其理论视域之中，可以说，自然科学心理学自诞生之日起就始终与之相伴随的种种分裂与危机正是其科学观念的盲目性所导致的结果。与此同时，如果我们能够不把视野局限于作为心理学主流形式的科学心理学之中，那么就会发现，事实上在与塑造了科学心理学之主流形式的冯特的实验心理学诞生的同一个时代，就已经产生了一种在科学观念上与之相对立的心理学的研究方向，这就是现象学传统的心理学。这样一种心理学，在历史上曾由两位思想家，即詹姆斯和胡塞尔，通过其各自独特的方式得到实现，而这两项工作在思想态度和思想内容上都可以说是同质的。现象学心理学为我们提供了一种关于心理学作为科学的必然的、真理性的理解，从而为批判地理解主流心理学的科学概念提供了一个赖以确立的基点和一个更为广阔的思想空间。基于此，本文在科学主义传统的心理学和现象学传统的心理学相对峙的关系背景中，一方面在否定的意义上以现象学的视角对主流心理学之科学观念的诞生背景及其理论基础的合理性进行现象学的批判，另一方面在肯定的意义上通过对詹姆斯和胡塞尔通过各自的心理学思想所表达出的那种具有一致性的现象学的趋势的探讨和把握，为心理学之科学观念的重建提供一种思想上的方向和可能性。论文由以下5个部分构成。第1章对心理学作为自然科学的观念产生的历史背景、理论前提和动机的合理性问题进行了初步考察。心理学之科学观念所由以产生的一个总的历史背景就是实证自然科学的发展以及由此产生的科学主义，其主要观点在于，认为一切事物，包括意识本身原则上都可以用自然科学的方法得到说明。但是，在其二元论的理论前提中，自然科学是特别针对其中物质实体的一种研究方式，它与以心灵为研究对象的心理学即便不是相互对立的，也是相互无关的。这表明了自然科学的研究手段对心理学真正的研究目的来说，其“合理性”是未经论证的，而科学心理学将“工具合理性”本身当作目的，必然导致自身的异化。第2章从现象学的视角对心理学作为自然科学的观念进行了具体的批判性考察。一方面对其在心理学的研究对象上将意识自然化之做法的前提和具体路径进行了现象学的考察，另一方面对其在研究方法上的“方法中心论”及导致的后果进行了讨论，并通过这两方面的考察揭示了心理学作为自然科学这一观念的背谬性质。第3章具体考察了詹姆斯的心理学思想及其现象学蕴含。詹姆斯曾明确地以心理学的自然科学规定作为其思想的出发点，但这一出发点在其心理学思想的具体展开过程中却遭遇了种种困难，这些困难意味着对心理学的自然科学规定及其二元论前提的否定。因此，在对心理学这一出发点进行自觉论证的基础上，詹姆斯最终对突破了关于心理学作为自然科学的信念，而走向了以“彻底经验主义”命名的一元论的形而上学。许多研究表明，这种一元论的形而上学，无论在思想态度上还是在方法内容上，都与胡塞尔的现象学具有内在的一致性，它们为心理学的科学观念提供了一种全新的理解方式，并在其中孕育着使心理学实现为真正的科学的希望。本章对詹姆斯心理学思想的出发点及其转向的原因和线索进行了详细分析，最后论述了詹姆斯的彻底经验主义思想与胡塞尔现象学的同质性及其对心理学科学观念重建的意义。第4章主要论述了胡塞尔的现象学心理学思想，并将其作为心理学之科学观念的一种具体实现。本章从对胡塞尔科学观念的分析出发，在与自然科学的科学观念相对比的意义上阐述了胡塞尔科学观念的三个重要的特点，即严格性、明证性和彻底性。进而考察了胡塞尔以“严格的科学”的观念为基础对心理学作为自然科学的观念的批判，具体包括对其在目的上以心理学作为一切科学之基础的心理主义做法的批判和在前提上错误地模仿自然科学的自然主义做法的批判。最后对现象学心理学的研究方法和基本内容进行了探讨，并评价了其在胡塞尔思想中的地位和对心理学之科学观念重建所起到的作用。第5章作为论文整个工作的总结，从詹姆斯和胡塞尔对心理学的影响和对心理学科学观的启示两个方面，对全文进行了一个整体的评述。更多还原

【Abstract】 In more than a hundred years of the history of psychology as a natural science,the schools change frequently and new theories emerge continually. Each school hasdifferent opinions of its research methods and objects, and what makes them as anintegrated discipline is a common belief hold by its researchers that psychology is anatural science. However, if we try to further examine this idea, we will find that inthe scientific psychology which constitutes the mainstream of psychology, the ideahas never been systematically and seriously studied, which means that the idea ofpsychology as a natural science isn’t built on a basis of full rationality. But since theblind pursuit of its scientific status, psychology of the scientism tradition has nevertaken this question into their theoretical horizon, which has led to the division andcrisises that accompany with psychology since its natal day as a natural science.Meanwhile if we could expand our horizon beyond the mainstream of psychology, wewill find that in the same era of Wundt’s experimental psychology which forms themainstream of scientific psychology there has been another approach of psychologywhich holds an opposite idea of science to Wundt’s. This is the psychology of thephenomenological tradition. This psychology has been realized by two thinkers,James and Husserl, in their distinctive ways, and the works of them are identical bothin the attitudes and the contents. Phenomenological psychology provides us withprovides us with a necessery and truthful understanding of the idea of psychology as ascience, which serves as a reliable base and a wider space to critically understand theidea of science of the mainstream of psychology.Based on the above discussions, the thesis in the negative sense criticize therationality of the idea of science of the mainstream psychology both on its backgroundand its theoretical base from a phenomenological perspective on the one side, and inthe positive sense provides a direction and possibility of thinking to thereconstruction of the idea of psychology as a science by the grasp and discussion ofthe identical phenomenological trend of the psychological thoughts of James andHusserl on the other side in the background of the opposition of natural scientifictradition and phenomenological tradition of psychology. The thesis is consisted by the following five parts. Chapter onepreliminarily investigated the historical background, theoretical premise and therationality of its motivation of the idea of psychology as a natural science. A generalbackground of this idea is the development of positive science and the scientism ledby it, the general point of which is that everything including the consciousness as suchcan be illustrated by the method of natural science. But taking dualism as its premise,natural science is a research style aiming at material entity which is unrelated, if notopposite, to the psychology whose object is consciousness. That means for the realaim of psychology, the rationality of taking the method of natural science is unproved,while taking the instrumental rationality as its own aim, scientific psychology mustlead to the alienation of itself.Chapter two specifically and critically analyzes the idea of psychology as anatural science from a phenomenological perspective. We give a phenomenologicalstudy of the premise and specific paths of the naturalization of consciousness aspsychology’s research object on the one side, and a discussion of the methodcentralism and its results on the other side, to reveal the fallacy of the idea ofpsychology as a natural science.Chapter three specifically studies William James’ psychological thoughts andtheir phenomenological implication. James has definitely taken psychology as anatural science as the starting point of his thoughts, but it has met several difficultiesduring its concrete expansion, which means a negation of psychology as a naturalscience and its dualism premise. As a result, James finally went beyond the idea anddeveloped his metaphysics named radical empiricism. Many studies show that thismonism metaphysics is internally identical with Husserl’s phenomenology both in itsattitude and its contents, both of which provide a completely new way to understandpsychology as a science and a hope for psychology to become a real science. Thischapter study in detail the starting point of his psychological thought and the reasonand clues of its turnabout, and discuss its similarities to Husserl’s phenomenology andits meaning for the reconstruction of the idea of psychology as a science.Chapter four mainly discusses Husserl’s phenomenological psychology as arealization of the idea of psychology as a science. It starts from the analysis ofHusserl’s idea of science and illustrates its three characteristics, namely the strictness,the evidence and the radicalness. Then Husserl’s critique to the idea of psychology asa natural science based on his idea of “strict science” is discussed, including his critique to the psychologism of its aim which perceive psychology as the basis of anyother science and the naturalism in its premise which blindly imitates the naturalscience. At last the research methods and basic contents of phenomenologicalpsychology are studied and its status in Husserl’s thoughts and its role in thereconstruction of the idea of psychology as a science are evaluated.Chapter five gives concluding comments on the impact and enlightenment ofJames and Husserl to the modern psychology.更多还原