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我国义务教育资源配置差距的制度述源及变革研究

The Institutional Tracing and Reform of the Disparity of China’s Compulsory Education

【作者】 夏茂林

【导师】 张学敏;

【作者基本信息】 西南大学 , 领导教育学, 2014, 博士

【摘要】 我国义务教育各类学校之间资源配置差距的演化经历了建国以后不断缩小和改革开放以来不断扩大的不同阶段。通过对改革开放以来不同时期我国义务教育差距状况的梳理发现,“三级办学”期间(1978年至2001年)我国义务教育资源配置的区域差距、城乡差距和校际差距不断拉大并达到非常悬殊的水平;尽管政府自2001年实行了“以县为主”的制度调整,但这一问题并没有得到有效解决,甚至仍旧越来越严重;2006年以来实行的农村义务教育经费保障机制同样没有明显改善这一状况。义务教育差距的严峻局势仍在不断加剧,并对我国社会发展产生了诸多不良影响和危害:危及社会公平正义,影响社会和谐稳定;助推了应试教育和择校风气;降低了教育资源配置的整体效率;与经济差距形成了恶性循环;在一定程度上阻碍了我国国民经济快速增长与结构优化。为此,缩小并消除义务教育资源配置差距已成为我国义务教育发展和社会发展的当务之急。义务教育办学差距根源于义务教育制度。义务教育制度起源于其交易成本的节省,实质是一种为降低交易成本而演化形成的用以调节人们行为的交易契约和博弈规则。均衡发展作为降低义务教育交易成本的必然要求,已成为现代教育制度的重要契约目标和国际义务教育发展的共同趋势。因此,义务教育办学差距是一个典型的制度悖论,其实质是一个制度绩效问题。基于此提出了本问题的研究假设,并进而确定将义务教育投入和资源配置的正式制度、非正式制度和相关制度变迁问题等作为研究内容,同时选择新制度经济学相关理论作为分析工具。在正式制度方面,运用委托-代理理论并结合调查实际分析预算内义务教育投资体制发现,我国义务教育投资管理体制中的委托-代理结构不仅存在着信息不对称、目标函数不一致和契约不完全等一般委托-代理问题,而且还存在许多特殊问题:初始委托人虚拟、缺位、弱势;代理人市场缺乏;代理层级过多、链条长;身份矛盾重叠;权责不对等;等等。正是这些问题导致和加大了我国义务教育的办学差距,具体表现为:(1)对投资代理人的逆向选择不仅使得投资主体逐层下放而导致了教育资源配置的区域差距,也使得义务教育投资体制出现了“城乡二元”委托-代理关系而导致了巨大的城乡教育差距。同时,代理人如“面子工程”等逆向选择行为也导致了校际教育资源配置的悬殊差距;(2)主要表现为教育乱收费、克扣或拖欠教师福利、拖延支付教育经费等投资卸责行为导致了农村义务教育投入不足和城乡教育差距的不断拉大;不仅在经费获取上而且在师资配置上都存在的权力寻租问题也为义务教育差距推波助澜;(3)主要表现为挤占或挪用教育经费和项目经费提成等代理人合谋行为使得本该用于扶持和改善农村或薄弱学校办学条件的教育经费不能落到实处;(4)主要表现为一些学校通过数据等信息、造假等方式获取更多教育资源以及过度的在职消费行为等内部人控制问题使得薄弱学校办学条件难以改善,也加剧了教育资源配置差距的程度。在分析了义务教育预算内投入体制问题以后,有必要从产权的角度进一步分析预算外办学经费和师资配置等正式制度问题对于教育资源配置差距的影响。从理论上看,教育机构本质上是一种特殊的企业。因此,教育产权不仅包括各行为主体(包括组织和个人)对于其财产的所有权、占有权、收益权和处置权,还应包括剩余控制权和剩余索取权。义务教育的公共产品属性决定了义务教育只能实行政府购买的国有产权。义务教育资源包括现金经营收益(预算外经费)和教师等都应实行政府统筹配置而非市场配置。优化义务教育产权安排应实行非营利性剩余分享制,由各种产权主体共同并对称地分享剩余控制权和剩余索取权。产权制度决定了资源配置状况。通过理论分析并结合调查实际发现,我国义务教育在预算外经费和人力资源方面的产权制度对于义务教育差距的形成贡献巨大,主要表现在:(1)教育机构及其代理人剩余索取权缺失导致其均衡配置教育资源的动力缺失;(2)教育机构剩余控制权错位使得预算外教育经费缺乏政府统筹,从而导致校际教育资源配置差距拉大;(3)教师人力资本剩余索取权谬误导向师资配置失衡;(4)教师人力资本剩余控制权失谐导致师资配置失衡。作为支配和约束人们行为的规范,制度不仅包括正式制度,还包括各种非正式制度。非正式制度是指一切没有通过正式成文方式确认的或社会正式组织予以强制实施的各种社会规范,包括意识形态、价值观念、道德信仰、风俗习惯、文化传统等。它与正式制度相互依存、相互补充、相互影响,共同决定着社会资源的配置状况。非正式制度作为一种不同于市场和计划的力量,是调节资源配置的第三只手(不同于市场的另一只“看不见的手”),在义务教育资源这个非市场化配置领域仍然起着重要作用。访谈和问卷调查及其统计分析显示,一些不合理的非正式制度因素也导致了我国义务教育资源配置差距的不断拉大。这些因素按其对义务教育差距的贡献大小排列分别为:差异发展观、应试教育、重点学校惯例、集权文化、潜规则、人情关系、拜金主义、本位主义文化、职业信仰、职业道德,等等。它们分别对应的四个维度即意识形态、习俗惯例、道德信仰和文化传统等对于财物资源配置和教师资源配置差距的影响力差异显著。这四个维度对于财物资源和人力资源的影响跟其对教育总体资源配置差距的影响趋势基本一致,即意识形态>习俗惯例>文化传统>道德信仰。其中,潜规则、本位主义和差异发展观等因子对师资配置差距的影响显著高于其对财物资源配置差距的影响。依据制度变迁理论并运用新经济史学常用的分析法等研究方法进一步分析我国义务教育资源配置差距不断演化及其治理背后的制度变迁问题发现,改革开放以来,社会经济环境、政府决策、利益博弈和文化意识是决定和制约我国义务教育制度变迁的主要因素。目前,我国义务教育制度变革既在一定程度上面临着“纳什均衡”、“利益博弈”阻力和“路径依赖”性等困境,同时也面临着外部社会经济环境变化、中央政府及政策变化和博弈格局力量对比变化等带来的契机。因此,要有效治理义务教育差距问题,首先就应打破其制度变革困境。为此,须从以下方面进行:(1)让决策者利益与制度变迁利益的方向一致,并加大中央政府对制度变迁的强制执行力度,以打破利益博弈格局;(2)强化关于“均衡发展及其技术”的学习机制,形成地方政府和社会民众对制度变迁的“多数同意”;(3)选择合适的制度变迁方式,实行政府强制式、主动式、局部式和渐进式变迁。其次,还应针对义务教育资源配置的具体制度问题进行相应变革。第一,针对义务教育预算内投资体制中的委托-代理问题应:(1)恢复中央政府的投资委托人身份,由中央政府统筹义务教育资源的筹集和配置;(2)调整投资代理人,实行“以省为主、省直管县”的义务教育管理制度,将投资代理人层级统一上移到省级政府;(3)通过减少代理人层级、建立科学统一的资源配置标准和均衡发展的评价指标体系、健全均衡状况的信息公开制度、建立良好的代理人决策参与机制等途径来促进信息畅通,改善信息不对称状况;(4)将义务教育投资及其资源配置状况作为相关政府政绩考核的重要指标,并通过信息公开接受监督和进行奖优惩劣,以完善激励约束机制。第二,针对预算外教育投入及师资配置等产权问题应:(1)还给教育行政机构应有的剩余索取权和剩余控制权,把学校经营收入纳入政府统筹配置的权限范围之内;(2)加大并落实津补贴资助力度,健全教师人力资本剩余索取权制度;(3)协调各主体对教师人力资本的控制权,实行由地方教育行政部门统一聘任义务教育教师并定期流动的制度。第三,针对非正式制度问题,应重塑影响我国义务教育资源配置的非正式制度,以促进正式制度与非正式制度的协同变迁:(1)强化正确意识宣传,树立义务教育均衡发展观;(2)加强教育工作人员岗位交流和精神引领,重塑工作人员的职业道德与职业信仰;(3)通过加强正式制度导向和执法来促进非正式制度变迁。总之,打破制度变革困境是缩小义务教育资源配置差距的关键;改善投入体制的委托-代理关系是缩小义务教育资源配置差距的根本途径;调整相关产权制度是缩小义务教育资源配置差距的必要途径;重构资源配置的非正式制度是缩小义务教育资源配置差距的难点所在。

【Abstract】 The disparity of resource allocation in different schools of China’s compulsory education has experienced two different stages--continuous reduction after China’s founding and increased expansion since reform and opening-up. By teasing out the conditions of the disparity of compulsory education in different periods since reform and opening-up, we can find that during the period of "Three-tier Education", from1978to2001, the regional gap, urban-rural disparity and inter-school differences have expanded to a incommensurable degree; Although the government has adopted the adjusting system of "mainly rely on county" since2001, this problem has not been solved efficiently and even become worse. Funds grantee mechanism of rural compulsory education adopted since2006also do not improve the condition obviously. The serious situation of the disparity still keeps worse and causes some bad effects and harms to social development. They threaten social fairness and justice, influence social harmony and stability, promote exam-oriented education and school-choosing hot, decrease the overall efficiency of the educational resources allocation and, to some extent, hinder the rapid development and structural optimization of national economy for the vicious circle with economical disparity. Therefore, it is imperative to narrow and vanish the disparity for the development of compulsory education.The disparity of compulsory education stems from the institutions of compulsory education which origin from economization of transaction costs and is virtually a transaction contract or a Game rule to decrease transaction costs and adjust human’s behaviors. Balanced development, as the inevitable demand to reduce transaction costs of compulsory education, has become significant contact aims of the institutions of modern schools and common orientation of international compulsory education. Therefore, the disparity is a typical institutional paradox and is virtually a problem about institutional performance. Based on it, we put forward a studying assumption about this problem and make sure that the problems about the formal institution, informal institution and relative institutional transition in the investment of compulsory education and resource allocation are the studying contents, and choose relative theories of new institutional economics as the analyzing tools.About formal institution, by using principal-agent theory, investigating reality and analyzing the investment system of compulsory education within budget, we can find that there not only exits some principal-agent problems like asymmetric information, inconsistent objective function and incomplete contract exit in the structure of investment and management system of China’s compulsory education, but also many special problems like the original principals are virtual, absent and vulnerable,agent’s market is insufficient, the agent’s levels are multiple and the chain is long, the paradox of identity is overlapped and the right and responsibility is wrong. All these problems leal to and expand the disparity of China’s compulsory education, which is mainly about that first, the adverse selection of investment agent leads to not only investors’ layer-by-layer drilling and the disparity of regional education, but also the principal-agent relation of urban-rural dual structure in the investment system of compulsory education and the large disparity in urban-rural education. At the same time, the agent’s adverse selection like the "face-saving project" also leads to the incommensurable disparity of inter-school education. Second, the moral hazard is mainly about arbitrary education charges, wage deduction and default on teachers’ welfare and the delays of paying education fund, all these investment shirking behaviors lead to insufficient investment of rural compulsory education and increased expansion of the disparity in urban-rural education. The problems of rights rent-seeking about funds collection and teachers allocation also contribute to the expansion of the disparity of compulsory education. Third, the behaviors of agent collusion like that encroaching and appropriating education funds and the percentage of project funds lead to the un-implementation of educational funds which should have been used to support and improve the conditions of rural and weak schools. Forth, according to some ways of information forgery about data, some schools get more educational resources and extra non-pecuniary compensation. These agent control problems make the conditions of weak schools improved difficultly and intensify the extent of educational disparity.After analyzing the problems of investment system within the budget of compulsory education, it is necessary to have a further analysis of the problems about extra-budgetary education funds and teachers allocation from the perspective of property rights and the influence of these problems about formal institution to educational disparity. Theoretically, educational institution is virtually a kind of special enterprise, therefore, educational property rights not only include ownerships of property, rights of possession, income rights and rights of disposal which are owned by the clients of all walks of life like organizations and individuals, but also include residual-control rights and residual-claim rights. The public-goods attribute of compulsory education determines that only the state-owned property rights purchased by government can be implemented by compulsory education. Resources of compulsory education include cash operating profits, the extra-budgetary funds and teachers, which should be implemented by government’s overall allocation not by market allocation. In order to optimize the arrangement of the property rights of compulsory education, it necessary to enforce no-profit sharing system of surplus and share residual-control rights and residual-claim rights jointly and symmetrically for all the clients.Property rights system determines the conditions of resources allocation. According to theoretical analysis and researches of reality, we can find that property rights system of extra-budgetary funds and human capitals about compulsory education has greatly contribute to the disparity of compulsory education, which is mainly about that first, the absence of residual-claim rights of educational institution and agents results in the momentum loss of balanced allocation of educational resources; Second, the dislocation of residual-control rights of educational institution leads to the extra-budgetary educational funds lacking government’s overall allocation and the expansion of disparity of inter-school education; Third, the fallacy of residual-claim rights and the disorder of residual-control rights of teachers’human capitals both lead to the unbalance of allocation of teachers.Institution, as the principles to control and restrain human’s behaviors, includes formal institution and informal institution. The informal institution is a kind of social norm which hasn’t been ensured or enforced by formal organizations or in written way, which includes ideological theory, value and belief, moral belief, manner and customs, and cultural traditions. Connecting with formal institution, they are mutually dependent, complementary and effected. They jointly determine the allocating conditions of social resources. Formal institution, distinguished from market and project, is the third hand which is different from the "another visible hand of market" and still plays an important role in non-marker allocation area of compulsory education resources. Interviews, questionnaire surveys and statistical analysis show that some unreasonable factors of informal institution also lead to increased expansion of the disparity. The function of these factors to the expansion of the disparity can be ranked as follows:views on disparity development, exam-oriented education, traditions of key schools, cultures of centralized power, ridden rules, inter-personal relationships, money worships, selfish departmentalism, professional beliefs and professional ethnics, etc. There are four dimensions corresponding to them respectively, which are ideology, conventions, moral beliefs and cultural traditions whose influence to financial resource allocation and teacher-resources allocation has reached an obvious level. The trend of these four dimensions to financial resources and human capitals are basically same with their affections to the disparity of educational general resources, it shows that ideology>convention>cultural tradition> moral belief. Typically, ridden rules, selfish departmentalism and views of disparity whose affections to the allocation of teachers are obvious higher than their affections to the disparity of financial resource allocation.According to the theory of institutional transition and by taking analytical method which is commonly used in the history of new economics to have a further analysis of the continuous evolution of the disparity of China’s compulsory education and the institutional transition behind governance, we can find that since reform and opening-up, social economic environment, government decisions, interests Game and culture consciousness have been the major factors to determine and constrain the institutional transition. Currently, the institution, to some extent, faces some transitional dilemmas such as "Nash equilibrium","Interests Game" and "path dependence" and also faces the opportunities of institutional transition brought about by the changes of external social economic situations and the strength contrast of central government, policy changes and Game pattern.Therefore, in order to govern the problems of the disparity,it is necessary to break down the dilemmas of institutional transition, we can do as follows: keep the directions of decision-makers’profits and the profits of institutional transition same, improve the enforcement of central government to institutional transition so as to break down the interests Game pattern. Second, strengthen the learning mechanism about balanced development and technology and reach an agreement between local government and social public. Third, choose a proper way of institutional transition and implement a forcing type, active type, partial type and gradual model transition.About the problems of institution on resources allocation of compulsory education, there are some relative revolutions. Firstly, to the principal-agent problems in the investment system of compulsory education, it is necessary to, first, restore the status of central government as a investment client and make central government overall plan the collection and allocation of compulsory education resources; second, adjust investment agents, execute the institution of "mainly rely on province" and "county administrated by province" as the management institution of compulsory education and promote the level of investment agents up to the level of provincial government; third, decrease the level of the agents, set up a scientific and united standard of resources allocation and index system of balanced development, perfect the information disclosure system of equilibrium and set up a sound agent decision-participating system to promote the smooth condition of information and the conditions of information asymmetry; forth, make the conditions of compulsory education investment and resources allocation as important indicators of the achievements inspection of relative governments, receive supervision and implement the system of "reward good performance and punish poor outcomes" to improve spiriting and restricting system by information disclosure. Secondly, to the problems of property rights, it is necessary to first, give the residual-claim rights and residual-control rights back to the education administrative institution and incorporate the operating revenue of schools into the extent of authority under government’s overall allocation; second, strengthen and implement the financing aid of allowance subsidies and perfect the residual-claim rights system of teacher human capitals; third, adjust each subject’s control right about teachers’human capitals and execute recruitment system and regularly flow system by administrative department of local education. Thirdly, reconstruct the informal institution that effects the resources allocation of China’s compulsory education and promote the collaborative transition between formal institution and informal institution. First, strengthen the propaganda of right consciousness and set up views of balanced development about compulsory education; second, strengthen working communication among staff members of education and the spirit guidance and then rebuild educators’professional ethics and beliefs; third, strengthen the orientation of formal institution and law enforcement to promote the transition of informal institution. All in all, to govern the problems of the disparity, the key is to break down the dilemmas of institutional transition, the basic path is to improve the principal-agent relations in the investment system of compulsory education, an important path is to reform the property rights, the difficulty is to reconstruct the informal institution.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 西南大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2014年 12期
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