【作者】 刘惠华；

【导师】 梅仁毅；

【作者基本信息】 北京外国语大学 ， 英语语言文学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 美国和中国都处在一个重要的变化时刻,都面临着重大的战略机遇与挑战。在主流建构主义对角色身份的认识、建构主义关于国家利益由国家身份界定,而国家身份(以及其利益)在互动的过程中会发生变化的观点,以及身份和身份所界定的国家利益只有在相对物质实力的分配发生变化的情况下才会发生变化的观点基础之上,本研究就中美在过去六十多年中的互动模式提出三个假设：1)如果双方都对世界局势有着错误的或部分错误的估计,而且对对方的角色身份和国家身份有着错误的或部分错误的定位,两国之间不可避免地要发生正面冲突；2)如果双方对世界局势的评估都是正确的,对对方的角色身份和国家身份的定位也是正确的,两国关系很可能将会有所突破或实现更加平稳的发展；3)如果一方对世界局势的评估是正确的,而且对另一方的角色身份和国家身份定位也是正确的,而另一方对世界局势的评估出现短期的错误,并且对另一方的角色身份和国家身份的定位也出现短期的错误,中美关系将恶化,但是如果出现错误的一方能改正错误的评估和定位,双边关系将不会出现严重倒退。三个案例分析证明了这三个假设是正确的。从1949年到1969年,美国政府把美苏之间的争夺看作是资本主义和共产主义、自由和奴役之间的生死之争,并且把整个共产主义阵营看作是铁板一块,而且处于苏联的完全控制之下。在朝鲜战争爆发以及中国参战之后,中国被定位为美国的敌人,期间从杜鲁门到约翰逊的历届美国政府都维持了中国是美国的敌人这一认知。1962年的中印冲突使得中国威胁在美国主要决策者的心目中再次得到确认。由于对中国有着这样的定位,美国所推行的对华政策是政治上孤立、经济上封锁、贸易上禁运、以及军事上围堵,目标是要让北京政权垮台。就中国政府来说,中国的领导人在这一时期也把美国看作是最大的威胁。对美国威胁的认知促使中国领导人决定派志愿军赴朝鲜作战,从而使中美成为兵戎相见的敌人。二十世纪五十年代中国领导人对世界局势的评估标志着中国政治开始逐步左倾,中国政府拒绝接受苏联提出的和西方世界和平共处的主张,导致和美国政府进一步对抗。在二十世纪五十年代末,毛泽东估计东风压倒西风,从而使中国的战略形势进一步恶化,并且导致了中国已经成为世界革命的中心这样的错误估计。美国是中国最大的威胁这一定位在这个时期基本上没有发生变化。从1969年到1972年,世界局势的变化,特别是1968年后苏联的扩张主义政策,引起了美国决策者的注意,苏联对中国进行核打击的威胁使美国决策者认定,苏联己经成为美国在全球(特别是亚洲)之战略地位的最大威胁。因此,中国不再是美国对大的敌人。随着中苏关系在六十年代末不断恶化,特别是在1969年的中苏边境武装冲突之后,毛泽东和其它中国领导人意识到中国最大的威胁是来自北方。在中苏局势最紧张的时刻,甚至中国自身的生死存亡都受到了威胁。变化了的安全形势迫使毛泽东调整中国的外交战略。“两个拳头打人”的战略被改变,中国尝试着寻找盟友以阻止苏联(的扩张)。最好的选择是美国。中国把改善中美关系看作是当务之急。这样一来,美国就不再是中国最大的敌人了。威胁认知的重合以及双方对彼此定位的变化,为可能的关系和解铺平了道路。从1989年到1992年,老布什政府认为世界局势正向后冷战时代过渡,而且美国是唯一的超级大国,在该评估的基础上,美国对中国实施制裁,同时努力保持和北京的沟通渠道畅通,并和国会就保留中国的最惠国地位展开了激烈的斗争,因为老布什政府认为这样做是有必要的,以对中国的发展进程产生影响,并促使中国发生积极的变化。在克林顿政府执政的第一年,美国以总统行政命令的形式,决定把中国人权纪录的改善和延长中国的最惠国地位挂钩,因为克林顿政府中的主要决策者和几位颇有影响力的国会议员认为,美国有一个输出民主和按美国模式重塑世界的绝好机会；更重要的是,他们认为中国共产党在中国很快就会倒台。他们对世界局势的评估是错误的,而且过高地估计了所谓的绝好机会以及错误地认为北京政权将步东欧共产主义政权的后尘。但是,以邓小平为核心的中国领导集体,在1989年“六四风波”之前,具体说来是在1984年和1989年之间,就对世界局势做出了正确的评估,得出了和平与发展已经取代战争和革命成为世界局势的两大根本特征。在“六四风波”之后最困难的几年里,邓小平对世界局势进行了正确的评估,没有改变和平与发展仍然是时代主题的基本判断。尽管当时中国出现了不同的声音,邓小平决定不和美国搞对抗,拒绝当头,并没有像一些发展中国国家所期待的那样,扛起反美大旗。因此,中国领导人做到了冷静观察、稳住阵脚。在对变化了的世界局势做出正确评估的基础上,邓小平提出了中国对美政策的十六字方针,成为江泽民领导下的中国政府外交工作的指南。在看到对中国的施压没有奏效,也不会奏效的情况下,克林顿政府改变了其对世界局势、中国的未来以及中国共产党的未来所做的错误评估。在1994年5月,美国把中国人权纪录的改善和延长中国最惠国待遇脱钩,从而为美国总统克林顿和中国主席江泽民在1994年的亚太经济合作组织领导人峰会上实现首脑会晤铺平了道路。克林顿和江泽民的会晤,标志着中美关系在经历了1989年的“六四风波”以来的波动之后重回正轨。在这三个假设的基础上,本研究认为：一方面,在对全球力量均势没有发生根本变化以及美国仍然是唯一的超级大国这一判断的基础上,中国领导人得出的结论是,中国不应该当头、不应该挑战美国,而是要努力建设一种新型的大国关系；另一方面,奥巴马政府不接受中国已经对美国的安全构成了威胁的观点,认为中美之间不大可能发生对抗或战争。中国尚未被定位为对美国利益的威胁或美国的敌人,因此奥巴马政府仍将坚持“两面下注”战略。美国将继续其亚洲再平衡战略,中国将努力建设新型大国关系。尽管战略互疑己经成为推进中美关系所面临的最大困难,中美两国领导人都很清楚,两国关系变坏的代价将会非常高。本文作者建议中国和美国：1)让对方知道自己的底线：2)强调两国之间的平等和彼此尊重；3)建立危机管理和控制机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 The United States and China are both at a moment of transition and face great strategic opportunities and challenges. Based on the mainstream constructivism’s understanding of role identity, the constructivists’notion that the interests of states are shaped by their identities, while state identities (and therefore interests) themselves are subjected to change in the process of interaction, and the argument that the identity and underlying interests of states are never altered by the interaction unless the distribution of relative material capabilities changes, this study put forward three hypotheses on the pattern of dynamics of interactions between the United States and China during the past60-plus years:1) If the two parties both have a mistaken or partly mistaken assessment of the world situation and a mistaken understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity, it is inevitable that the two countries will have a head-on collision.2) If the two parties both have a correct assessment of the world situation and a correct understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity, it is very likely that the two countries will have a breakthrough in or a more smooth development of bilateral relations.3) If one party has a correct analysis of the world situation and a correct understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity while the other party has a short-term mistaken analysis of world situation and a wrong understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity, Sino-U.S. relations will deteriorate, but if the mistaken’ party corrects the mistakes, the bilateral relations will not witness serious backslide.Three case studies vindicate the validity of these three hypotheses. During the period between1949and1969, the United States government viewed America’s struggle with the Soviet Union as a life-and-death struggle between Capitalism and Communism, between freedom and slavery and viewed the Communist bloc as a monolith which was under the tight control of the Soviet Union. After the outbreak of the Korean War and China’s involvement in the war, China was deemed as the enemy of the United States and this perception of China being an enemy of the United States was maintained by all American administrations from Truman to Johnson during this period. The Sino-Indian border conflicts in1962reaffirmed the threat of China on the part of key American policymakers. As a result of such a China identity, the United States largely pursued a China policy characterized by political isolation, economic and trade embargo and military encirclement which was aimed at the demise of the Beijing regime. On the part of the Chinese government, the Chinese leadership also viewed the United States as the biggest threat in this period. The perception of American threat prompted the Chinese leadership to make the decision to send volunteer troops to North Korea, thus making the United States and China real enemies in battle. Chinese leadership’s assessment of the world situation in the1950s marked the gradual left-turn of Chinese politics and the Chinese leadership refused to accept the Soviet notion of peaceful coexistence with the West, which further antagonized the American government. In the late1950s, Mao Zedong’s assessment that the East wind was prevailing over the West wind further exasperated China’s strategic situation which resulted in the mistaken assessment that China had become the center of world revolution. China’s American identity as the biggest threat to China was kept almost unchanged during this period.During the period between1969and1972, the changed world situation, particularly Soviet expansionism after1968, was taken notice by the American policymakers. The Soviet threat of nuclear attacks against China made the American policymakers conclude that the Soviets had become the greatest threat to America’s strategic position in the world, particular in Asia. As a result, China was not the biggest enemy of the United States anymore. As Sino-Soviet relations went from bad to worse in the late1960s, especially after the armed conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border in1969, Mao and other leaders realized that China’s biggest threat came from the north. At the height of the tension between China and the Soviet Union, China’s very survival was even threatened. The changed security situation made Mao adjust China’s foreign relations strategy. The "fighting with two fists" strategy was changed, and China tried to seek for allies to deter the Soviet Union. The best choice was the United States. China found it a high priority to improve Sino-U.S relations. As a result, the United States was not the biggest enemy of China. Instead, both countries defined the Soviet Union as the biggest enemy. This convergence of threat perception and the changed identity of one another paved the way for a possible rapprochement.During the period between1989and1992, the Bush Sr. administration, based on its assessment of the world situation which was transitioning to a post-Cold War era in which the United States was the only superpower, imposed sanctions on China and at the same time tried to maintain the channels of communication with Beijing open and fought vigorously with Congress to keep China’s MFN status because it thought it necessary to do so to shape the development of China and facilitate positive change in China. During the early Clinton years, the renewal of China’s MFN status was linked to China’s improvement in human rights by an executive order because key policy-makers in the Clinton administration and several influential Congressmen(women) held the view that the United States had a golden opportunity to export democracy and reshape the world in the American model, and more importantly, the Communist Party in China would collapse soon. They had a mistaken assessment of the world situation and overestimated the so-called golden opportunity and mistakenly thought that the Beijing regime would follow the steps of its counterparts in Eastern Europe. However, the Chinese leadership with Deng Xiaoping at the core had a correct assessment of world situation before the June4incident in1989, to be specific, during the period between1984and1989, and concluded that peace and development had replaced war and revolution as the two defining features of the world situation. During the most difficult years in the wake of the June4incident, Deng Xiaoping correctly assessed the world situation and did not change his basic judgment that peace and development was still the prevailing themes of the era and decided to maintain a non-confrontational stance toward the United States even though there were different voices in China and refused to claim the leadership of holding high the banner of anti-Americanism as expected by some developing countries, thus the Chinese leadership observed the situation coolly, held their ground and kept their patience. Deng Xiaoping, based on his correct assessment of the changed world situation, gave the16-character guiding principle in China’s policy toward the United States, which guided the foreign policy work of the Chinese government led by Jiang Zemin. The Clinton administration changed its mistaken assessment of the world situation and the future of China and the Chinese Communist Party when it was clear that the pressure had not worked and would not work. It delinked the improvement of China’s human rights record from the renewal of China’s MFN status in May1994, which paved the way for a summit between U.S. President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the APEC1994Summit. The meeting between Clinton and Jiang Zemin marked that Sino-U.S. relations had come back to the right track after the fluctuations since the June4incident in1989.Based on these three hypotheses, this study argues, on the one hand, that on the basis of the assessment that the global balance of power has not undergone fundamental changes and the United States is still the only superpower, the Chinese leadership concludes that China should not claim leadership and challenge the United States but make great efforts to build a new type of relationship between great powers; on the other hand, the Obama administration does not accept the argument that China has become a threat to America’s security and does not think that confrontation or war between China and the United States is likely. China has not been defined as a threat to American interests or an enemy of the United States, so the Obama administration still adheres to the hedging strategy. The United States will continue its rebalance to Asia and China will make efforts to build a new type of relationship between great powers. Although mutual strategic mistrust is the biggest problem in promoting. Sino-U.S relations, the Chinese leadership and their counterparts in the United States are very clear that the stakes are too high if the bilateral relationship goes sour. This author suggests that Beijing and Washington:1) show the bottom line to each other;2) stress equality between and respect to each other;3) build a crisis management and control mechanism.更多还原