【作者】 刘军；

【导师】 谭德庆；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 伴随着沃尔玛、家乐福、麦德龙等大型零售卖场的快速发展,零售产业市场集中度不断提高。这种集聚效应赋予了下游零售商更多的市场权力,改变了上下游渠道关系,对产品定价、分销渠道选择以及渠道成员行动时机等产生重要影响。基于这些影响,本文首先通过建立产品定位-定价博弈模型,研究竞争制造商的分销渠道选择问题；然后探讨由强弱零售商组成的分销渠道横向内生时机；最后采用一般需求函数,在将渠道成员的定价类型内生化后,研究常见分销渠道的纵向内生时机。本文主要做了以下研究工作：在第2章中,首先通过引入产品定位-定价策略和Nash讨价还价框架建立基本模型,研究讨价还价能力对产品定位、定价以及利润的影响；然后,分别在制造商利润最大化和渠道利润最大化两种准则下,研究竞争制造商的分销渠道选择问题,并探讨分销渠道结构与产品差异化、消费者剩余以及社会福利之间的联系；最后,从成本差异和消费者偏好不确定性两个角度出发,探讨其对均衡结果、均衡结构以及社会福利的影响。研究表明：制造商讨价还价能力的增加将提高产品批发价格、零售价格以及成员利润,但当制造商的讨价还价能力较低时,它将自建一体化渠道,或者在确保具有较强讨价还价能力的前提下重新选择其它零售商,这一点从国内家电厂商纷纷开设专卖店中可以得到验证。在由强弱零售商组成的分销渠道中,第3章首先研究批发定价权转移、促销转移以及消费者从众行为对均衡结果的影响；然后,采用可观察延迟扩展博弈得到分销渠道的横向内生时机；最后,从销售成本差异和卖场流量两个角度出发,探讨其对均衡结果和横向内生时机的影响。研究发现：制造商和弱势零售商通过促销转移能够分享强势零售商的部分利润,此时,分销渠道的横向内生时机为强势零售商领导,并且它不受产品促销、从众行为、消费者忠诚度、销售成本以及卖场流量的影响,这一结论与强势零售商在零售市场中经常充当定价领导者角色的现象是一致的。在第4章中,采用一般需求函数,假设零售商的边际销售成本非零,通过求解三种纵向行动时机下的成员反应函数,研究常见分销渠道中制造商和零售商的定价类型选择。分析得到：当纵向行动时机为零售商领导或纵向Nash时,为了获得更多利润,零售商偏好于选择基于批发价格的成本加成作为定价。在第5章中,采用可观察延迟扩展博弈,首先按照零售市场是否存在零售商竞争,在基本博弈阶段中,比较分销渠道成员在三种纵向行动时机下的利润；然后,在提前博弈阶段中,研究常见分销渠道的纵向内生时机。研究表明：在常见分销渠道中,先动定价优势或者后动定价优势都不是绝对存在的。根据不同产品代理模式和市场需求特征,制造商和零售商只有选择准确的定价时机才能获得更高利润。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid development of large retail stores such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Metro, the market concentration of retail industry has been improved. This agglomeration effect, which changed the relation between upstream and downstream channel by giving more market power to downstream retailers, has an important influence on product pricing, distribution channel choice and move-timing of channel members. Based on these influence, the problem of distribution channel choice of competing manufactures is studied firstly by establishing a game model of product positioning-pricing. Then, the horizontal endogenous timing of distribution channel, which consists of dominant and weak retailers, is discussed. In the end of the thesis, after pricing types of channel members are endogenized, the vertical endogenous timing of common distribution channels is studied through general demand function. The following studies are done:In Chapter2, the basic model is firstly established by introducing product positioning-pricing strategy and Nash bargaining framework, and the effects of bargaining power on product positioning, pricing and profits are studied. Then, distribution channel choice of competing manufactures is discussed under standards of profit maximization of both manufacturers and channels, and the relations among the structure of distribution channel and product differentiation, consumer surplus and social welfare are explored. At last, its impact on equilibrium results, equilibrium structures and social welfare is discussed in terms of cost difference and uncertainty of consumer preference. The study shows that an increase in manufacturer bargaining power will improve the wholesale and retail price of products as well as members profits. When manufacturer has lower bargaining power, an integrated channel will be built by it, or other retailers will be chosen on the premise that manufacturer has stronger bargaining power-which can be proved by the increasing number of exclusive shops established by appliances manufacturers in our country.Regarding the distribution channel consisting of both dominant and weak retailers, Chapter3firstly analyzes the effects of the transfer of wholesale pricing and promotion as well as the herd behavior of costumers on equilibrium results. Then, the horizontal endogenous timing is generated by adopting the extended game with observable delay. Finally, its impact on equilibrium result and horizontal endogenous timing is analyzed in terms of the difference of cost sales and store traffic. It is showed that manufacturer as well as weak retailer can share part of dominant retailer’s profits through the transfer of promotion. Meanwhile, the horizontal endogenous timing of distribution channel is dominant retailer Stackelberg, which is free from the effects of products promotion, herd behavior, consumer loyalty index, selling cost and store traffic. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that dominant retailers usually play the role of leaders in pricing in the retail market.In Chapter4, through adopting the general demand function in which marginal selling cost is assumed to be nonzero, the choice of pricing types of manufactures and retailers in common distribution channels is studied by solving the reaction functions of members under three vertical move-timings. It shows that when vertical move-timing is retailer Stackelberg or vertical Nash, retailers prefer cost plus based on wholesale price as the pricing in order to obtain more profit.In Chapter5, through the extended game with observable delay, in terms of the fact that whether retailer competition exists in the retail market, the profits of distribution channel members under three vertical move-timings are firstly compared in the stage of basic game. Then, the vertical endogenous timing of common distribution channels is discussed in the stage of preplay game. The study shows that first-or second-mover advantage of pricing may not exist. To get more profits, manufacturers and retailers have to choose the correct pricing timing on the basis of the proxy pattern and market demand characteristics of different products.更多还原