【作者】 周黎明；

【导师】 郭耀煌；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 20世纪80年代以来,我国高速公路的迅速发展使得其在交通运输体系中扮演了越来越重要的角色。与此同时,随着经济的发展和思想的变革,人们对服务的意识越来越强烈,对在高速公路通行过程中所接受到服务的质量提出的要求也越来越高,高速公路服务质量的提高问题亟待解决。本文结合SERVQUAL量表法和结构方程模型,分别针对高速公路的服务质量评价体系和服务质量容忍区影响因素进行了研究,并根据研究结果分别构建了服务相关方(高速公路运营商、顾客以及服务区承包商)之间相互行为的博弈模型,对高速公路的服务质量提升问题提供借鉴意义。首先,文章在总结分析前人研究的基础上,基于SERVQUAL量表法,结合高速公路服务的差异性和特殊性,提出了针对于高速公路服务质量的评价指标体系。该指标体系具体包括了以服务质量五维度为标准的五个一级指标,以及以高速公路服务这一领域中遇到的实际问题为依据的二十七个二级指标。这些指标将高速公路服务的特殊性融合到服务质量评价量表法当中,对服务质量在特定领域的具体体现做出了详细说明。其次,为确保研究的科学合理性,文章通过对高速公路感知服务质量及顾客满意度进行的实证分析调查和研究,结合实际数据进一步检验和修正高速公路服务质量的理论模型,揭示了高速公路感知服务质量与服务质量五个维度的内在关系,即：响应性、保证性、移情性、可靠性和有形性对高速公路感知服务质量均存在显著影响,且其中响应性是当前顾客对最为关注的一个评价指标。再次,为了明晰高速公路服务质量容忍区,文章采用SPSS17.0和AMOS17.0软件,通过问卷调查和数据统计对高速公路感知服务质量容忍区域的宽度及其影响因素进行了深入探讨和分析论证,验证了研究假设的合理性,即：过往经历、环境因素和顾客态度意向分别对顾客的可接受服务水平有显著影响；过往经历、持续的服务强化因素和顾客态度意向分别对顾客的理想服务水平有显著影响；此外,高速公路服务质量容忍区宽度与服务的重要性呈负相关。最后,文章分别从高速公路运营商与顾客、高速公路运营商之间以及高速公路运营商与服务区承包商的关系三个角度出发,针对他们两两之间的相互行为构建了博弈模型进行分析。高速公路运营商与顾客之间的博弈分析显示,在不考虑顾客流动时,存在纳什均衡(不支付,不提高)；在考虑顾客流动时,当运营商提升和不提升高速公路服务质量所引起的顾客转移收益数值之和大于其可能支付的总成本时,存在纳什均衡(不支付,提高)。高速公路运营商之间的博弈分析显示,当对高速公路整体而言提高服务质量后短期利润低于服务质量提高之前的,且提高服务质量获得的转入新客源的收益大于支付的成本,或者提高服务质量后的短期利润高于服务质量提高之前的,两种情况下均存在纳什均衡(提高,提高),即高速公路运营商均倾向于选择提高服务质量。高速公路运营商与服务区承包商的博弈分析显示,高速公路运营商进行监管的概率与服务区承包商提高服务质量需支付的成本、惩罚成本、服务区承包商提高服务质量获得的收益以及合作收益有关；服务区承包商提高服务质量的概率与惩罚成本以及监管成本有关。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the1980s, highway in our country is playing a more and more important role for its rapid development. At the same time, with economic development and ideological changes, people’s sense of service is getting stronger. The requirement of the quality of services received in the process of traffic on highway is becoming higher. So the improvement of highway service quality becomes an issue that need to be solved.Combined with the SERVQUAL model and structural equation model, this paper studied on highway service quality evaluation system and factors of zone of tolerance, and then constructed game models between service related parties (highway operators, customers and service contractors), which is to provide reference for highway service quality improvement.Firstly, considering the particularity in highway service, this paper proposed evaluation index system of highway service quality based on SERVQUAL and summary analysis of previous studies, which include5first index signs on the basis of five dimensions of service quality, as well as27second index signs based on the practical problems in the area of highway service. These indicators integrated the particularity in highway service into service quality evaluation scale and made a detailed description of service quality in specific areas.Secondly, in order to ensure the scientificity and rationality, an empirical analysis was made on the highway perceived service quality and customer satisfaction survey. And then the theoretical model was further tested and corrected by survey data, which confirmed the highway service quality theoretical model and revealed the intrinsic relationship between perceived service quality and the five dimensions, that is to say, responsiveness, assurance, empathy, reliability and tangibility do have a significant effect on perceived service quality. Among them, responsiveness is most concerned by customers.Thirdly, in order to realize the zone of tolerance in highway service quality, this paper made in-depth exploration of the width and influence factors of zone of tolerance through questionnaires and statistics by AMOS17.0and SPSS17.0, which verified the rationality of the hypothesis, namely, past experience, environmental factors and customer attitude significantly affect adequate expectation. Past experience, environmental factors and customer attitude significantly affect desired expectation. In addition, there is a negative correlation between the width of zone of tolerance in highway service quality and the importance of service. Finally, from the perspectives of highway operator and customer, highway operators and highway operator and service contractor, this paper constructed game models to analyze their actions respectively. Game analysis between highway operator and customer shows that there exists nash equilibrium (no pay, no improvement) without consideration of customer flowing, and when considering customers flowing and the sum of the profits from customer flowing for highway operator improve and don’t improve highway service quality is greater than the total cost they are possible to pay, there exists nash equilibrium (no pay, improvement). Game analysis between highway operators shows that there exists nash equilibrium (improvement, improvement) under two circumstances, the first one is when short-term profits after improving highway service quality are lower than previous and the profits from customer flowing is greater than cost, and the second one is when short-term profits after improving highway service quality are higher than previous. At these times, highway operator tends to choose to improve service quality. Game analysis between highway operator and service contractor shows that the probability of the highway operator to regulate is related to the cost service contractor need to pay when improving the quality of service, the punishment cost, the profits service contractor get after improving service quality and cooperation benefits. The probability of service contractor improving service quality is related to the punishment cost and the regulatory cost.更多还原